University of Massachusetts Amherst

ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-1990

Path to Tanzanian and Kenyan development in the postwar
international order : the unresolved theoretical development
debate.
Mulugeta, Agonafer
University of Massachusetts Amherst

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1

Recommended Citation
Agonafer, Mulugeta,, "Path to Tanzanian and Kenyan development in the postwar international order : the
unresolved theoretical development debate." (1990). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 1806.
https://doi.org/10.7275/mhy4-0c72 https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/1806

This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.

PATH TO TANZANIAN AND KENYAN
DEVELOPMENT IN THE POSTWAR
INTERNATIONAL ORDER: THE UNRESOLVED
THEORETICAL
DEVELOPMENT DEBATE

A Dissertation Presented
by

MULUGETA AGONAFER

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
May 1990

Department of Political Science

@

Copyright by Mulugeta Agonafer 199 0
All Rights Reserved

PATH TO TANZANIAN AND KENYAN
DEVELOPMENT IN THE POSTWAR
INTERNATIONAL ORDER: THE UNRESOLVED
THEORETICAL

DEVELOPMENT DEBATE

A Dissertation Presented
by

MULUGETA AGONAFER

Approved as to style and content by:

Gerard Br aunthal.^jCJia^r
C
,

Eric Emhorn, Member

Stephen Resnick, Member

Asa Davis, Member

/
George T. Sulzner, Department Head
Department of Political Science

Dedication
To my father, Agonafer Gashe, who died in the struggle
to make it all possible for his children.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This dissertation owes its debt to
the members of my
Committee— Professors Gerard Braunthal (Chair)
Eric
,

Einhorn, Stephen Resnick and Asa Davis.

Each has offered

painstaking comments on earlier drafts of this
project.
Through course work and discussion with Gerard

Braunthal,

Eric Einhorn, and Stephen Resnick
in a different light.

I

am able to see the world

Professor Resnick played a critical

role by acquainting me with his (and Professor Richard
Wolff's)

innovative theoretical work.

Many of their

theoretical formulations were adopted, though transformed
into a form they may or may not agree with.

This dissertation owes its single greatest debt to my

chief advisor, Gerard Braunthal, whose many editorial and

organizational suggestions were adopted.

Without his

painstakingly thorough comments at each stage of the

dissertation this would not have achieved such shape; and

without his general encouragement, understanding, and
patience the dissertation grind would have been much more
laborious than it was.

I

thank him so much.

Undoubtedly,

take full responsibility for any shortcomings or mistakes
that remain in this dissertation.

I

ABSTRACT
PATH TO TANZANIAN AND KENYAN
DEVELOPMENT IN THE POSTWAR
INTERNATIONAL ORDER: THE UNRESOLVED
THEORETICAL
DEVELOPMENT DEBATE
MAY 1990

MULUGETA AGONAFER, B.A., INDIANA UNI VERS
ITY/ BLOOMINGTON
B S
.

.

,

PURDUE UNIVERSITY

M.A., WESTERN WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY/BELLINGHAM
PH.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS/ AMHERST

Directed by: Professor Gerard Braunthal
This dissertation attempts to test the applicability
of
the neoclassical, orthodox Marxist, and dependency
paradigms
in light of the development experiences of Tanzania
and

Kenya.

The larger goal of the dissertation is a preliminary

formulation of an alternative development approach which is

non-essentialist and class focused.

In chapter one, the

dissertation format as well as statements of the problems
are introduced.

In chapter two, the international context

within which the two countries must operate is discussed.
In chapter three, the three theoretical approaches are

critically examined.

In chapter four, the colonial history

of Tanzania and Kenya, designed to acquaint the readers with

the two countries is sketched.

In chapter five, the two

countries' actual development experiences are examined.

Specifically, the role of the state, the industrial and

agricultural development experiences of both countries are

closely examined.

In chapter six, the three theoretical

vi

paradigms in light of the experiences
of Tanzania and Kenya
are assessed.
The assessment shows that none of
the
paradigms fully describes or adequately
explains their
process of development. Finally, in
chapter seven,

an all-

encompassing alternative development approach
based on the
concept of "overdetermination" is proposed.
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PART

I

THE PROBLEM

.

CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION

Africa is in a period of political, economic,
and
ecological crisis. After three decades of
juridical
independence, its states still suffer, both from
a lack of
political stability (political integration) and
from a lack
of a "self-reliant"

economy capable of meeting, at least,

the "basic needs" (food, shelter, clothing, and basic
health
care)

of its people.

1

its external trade ties, born of its

colonial experience, still remain unequal and in many ways

resemble the ones that existed during the colonial era. 2
Overwhelmingly, its postindependence trade ties are still

with the Western industrialized countries (hereafter ICs)
There is very little intra-Af rican trade or trade with

socialist countries. 3

In many cases a single IC, normally

the ex-colonial "master," is still the key trading partner. 4
Its people's perseverance to overcome these and other

obstacles in order to achieve an independent, egalitarian
political and economic development continue to meet stiff
internal and external resistance.
Externally, key international political and economic

institutions (for instance, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF)

and the World Bank)

,

products of "realist" politics,

2

.

seldom attend to the Africans'
twin goals of development and
political integration-two processes
that have preoccupied,
with great zeal and vigor, the
African people ever since
they gained their independence
from European colonialism. 5
The international institutions'
principal role have
been and continue to be to police the
international foreign
exchange system and to ensure good payment
relations between
member states so that the world capitalist
system can function smoothly. 6

The concern for the smooth functioning of

the international political and economic
system, more or
less, guide the IC's relations with the
African and other

"Less Industrialized Countries" (LICs)

7

Thus, the Africans' repeated pleas to such

international institutions for higher and stable prices for

their primary commodities, for alleviating their debt
burden, for a code of conduct, for a transfer of technology

to them via these institutions, and for equal partnership in

the international order, continue to be ignored.

This is

likely to continue so long as the demands by the African

countries remain inconsistent with the institutions' stated
principles. 8

Even the United Nations' modest resolution,

which passed on May

1,

Economic Order (NIEO)

,

1974, calling for a New International

failed to significantly alter the

intransigence of the IMF and World Bank because it contra-

vened their principles. 9
Internally, African countries face numerous social,

political and economic development problems, including that

of national integration. 10

The political institutions, a

legacy of colonialism, are very
weak and seldom meet the
growing and justified demands of the
people for their basic
11
human needs.
those countries, the political
elites or
"modernizing elites" mostly made up of a
group of powerhungry military dictators, incompetent
civilian bureaucrats,
opportunistic intelligentsia, or a combination

m

of all, are

primarily interested in securing their lucrative
power
position, often as intermediaries between the
power brokers
in the international system and their own
people. 12
This

applies to political elites, whether or not they
consider

themselves "communists," "socialists,"
"Africanists.

"capitalists," or

" 13

The rural areas in African countries, though they

account for 72 percent of employment and almost
of the value of exports,

14

40

percent

are as "stagnant" as ever. 15 This

is in the face of a widely acknowledged fact that

agriculture will remain the dominant source of income and
employment for the foreseeable future.

Commission for Africa (ECA)

,

The Economic

for instance, projected that

the rural sector will provide 53 percent of employment by
the year 2008. 16

And yet, the people continue to live on a

subsistence agricultural economy.

Indeed, many now flock to

the cities in the hope of securing

a

better life.

job in order to lead a

But once they arrive in the cities they often

find themselves in similar or worse situations than

before. 17

—
Not surprisingly, many of these
countries that once
were surplus food producers have
now become net food
18
importers.
Additionally, most of them suffer from
ever
increasing foreign debt and political
instability. This
applies even to countries like "socialist"
Tanzania, which
had been praised by many countries concerned
about solving
the problems of development in the LICs.
Tanzania originally had set out to minimize its foreign
dependence and
maximize its self-reliance. 19 of course, we now
know that
Tanzania accomplished neither of these goals. 20
Indeed,

it

has become one of the classic examples of economic
and

political, so called, basket cases in Africa. 21

Since the late 1950' s, various schools of thought have

offered different explanations regarding the sources of
these problems. 22

Many theorists have endeavored to explain

the problem's origin, characteristics, and the means by

which they might be remedied.
theories

— their

of the problems

The disparities in these

conflicting views on the nature and solution

— have

led to heated, and at times bitter,

arguments among the advocates of one or another perspective.
Meanwhile, the political, economic and social development

problems of the countries continue unabated.
In this dissertation three of the main theoretical

paradigms advanced by scholars of the LICs— (a) the

developmentalist (neoclassical and structuralist) model,
the dependency model, and
are discussed.

(c)

the orthodox Marxist model

(b)

—
The developmental ist model suggests
that the LICs, like
Tanzania and Kenya (the subjects of
our study)
will
,

gradually develop through foreign aid
and outside contact. 23
The orthodox Marxist model suggests
that development in LICs
will come about through a revolutionary
change brought on by
imperialist penetration and/or internal conflict. 24
The

dependency model

(b)

basically stands model

(a)

on its head:

it suggests that imperialist penetration
will cause

underdevelopment rather than development in LICs.

This

implies that LICs can only develop when their internal

structures and their foreign relations are fundamentally
changed. 25

There seems to be a disjunction between these neatly

constructed theories of development and the realities of
development facing the LICs. 26

While much research is

conducted in the ICs and the LICs to explain the problems of
development, with no conceptual unity, statesmen (sincere or
otherwise) are painfully experimenting with development

projects influenced by these theories in order to alleviate
the development problems of their country. Clear failures
are recorded, 27 but some countries hang on the balance.

Meanwhile, the theoretical debate and the strategy to

overcome development problems in these countries continue

unabated

— often

merely to defend one theoretical stance

however erroneous.

Clearly, then, a different, an all-

encompassing theoretical approach for planning the political

6

.

and economic development of the
LICs has to be charted. This
situation accounts partly for undertaking
this research.

Central Thpgic,

The argument underlying the following
discussion is
that none of the development models (paradigms)
fully

describes or adequately explains the processes of
development in the LICs. The implementation of development
policies based on and guided by these paradigms will
only
lead, even if there is economic growth and political

stability, to maldevelopment rather than to "sustainable

development." 28

What is needed is a "deconstruction" of

these paradigms.

The concept of development shows the

fictive nature of the postulates of each of the paradigms
and proposes an all-encompassing alternative approach to

social analysis, in particular, to African development

analysis
To anticipate the conclusion, the paradigms reviewed

here will be shown to be essentialist (Essentialist

epistemology involves a claim to the ability of theory to
capture, however complexly, the true [and independent of
theory] reality.

Essentialist social theory asserts

a

particular essence that causally determines other aspects of
social life.

In economistic social theory, the economy [or

an element of it such as class] is asserted as the essential

determinant of society.

In some political theory,

insti-

tutions [or an element of them such as the party] are often

,

asserted as the essential determinant
of political life)
and need to be deconstructed
and be replaced by a non-

essential,

an all-encompassing and flexible
theoretical

paradigm.

The paradigm itself is subject
to change at any
moment and asserts no essential
determinant of social life
(whether individuals, the party, the
economy or theory
itself)
The practical outcome would be that
African
countries no longer have to adhere rigidly
to one paradigm
to guide their development path, as
many of them seem to
have done with disastrous consequences.
Rather, the
alternative paradigm proposed will allow
policymakers in
.

these countries to jump from one paradigm to
another (hold
multiple theoretical positions) in order to search
for the

best theoretical guidance for their country's particular

practical problem (itself complex and dynamic) at that

particular moment, within the current international
political and economic order

— or

disorder.

Additionally, the current debate about sustainable

development and the particular impact of the international
system has motivated the two primary hypotheses of this
study.

The first is that given the existing "realist"

influenced international order, "capitalism"

as thought of

and practiced in Kenya and "socialism," in Tanzania (the two

countries analyzed in detail) cannot fundamentally transform
their economic and political systems either in the long or
short run.

There is no workable solution within each to

overcome the major obstacles LICs face in their struggle for

development within the contemporary,
complex international
system.

The second hypothesis is that
the ongoing debate by
proponents of the various paradigms
about development in the
Lies is deterministic and cannot
fully explain the numerous
development problems faced by the LICs.
The uncritical
application of each of these models will
merely lead the
country in question into domestic political
repression and
economic crisis, as well as pressure each
into entering a
political and economic alliance with one or the
other major
ICs.
As a result it will involve each in the
East-West

"Cold War" politics— assuming a less heated Cold
War will
still be with us for some time to come.

This hypothesis will be analyzed theoretically, in

chapter three, by comparing the neo-classical, orthodox
Marxist, and dependency perspectives on issues of

development.

By using the case studies of Tanzania and

Kenya in chapters four and five, we will compare in chapter
five, and assess in chapter six, the practical impact of

these theories on the development efforts.
In examining Tanzania and Kenya we will specifically

look into three distinctive periods:
1950-1961;

(b)

(a)

colonial period,

early independence period, 1961-1967, for

Tanzania and 1963-1967 for Kenya; and

(c)

the Arusha period,

1967-1977 and beyond, for Tanzania.
The three competing paradigms produce a fundamentally

different understanding of the development processes of

.

Tanzania and Kenya.

We will argue, in chapter six,
that
none of the theoretical paradigms is
adequate by itself for
explaining their problems of development even
though each
theory provides helpful insights about the
cases under
study

The first hypothesis is approached historically
and

then theoretically from the perspective of
"political
realism" since, we believe, this paradigm influences
the

security managers of the industrialized West and indus-

trialized East.

We analyze the historical development of

the contemporary international system according to the

particular writings of this school and how it impacts the
development efforts of the LICs (whether or not these
countries follow the "capitalist" path as in Kenya or

a

"socialist" path as in Tanzania) that occupy the lower

echelons of the international division of labor.
The contention by realists that a state's "power"

explains the contemporary international system, the all-or-

nothing approach adopted by the dependency theorists (i.e.,
in order to build a socialist society domestically, LICs

require de-linking from the international capitalist system)
and the neoclassical approach, which advocates more economic

integration of the LICs into the world capitalist system.
These are all rejected on theoretical grounds in chapter
six.

In chapter seven, we not only criticize the three

paradigms, which produce divergent and deterministic
10

conceptions of the development processes,
but also propose
an alternative development theory,
which is nonessentialist in its rationale and class based

in its focus. This

fourth approach to social analysis and,
in particular, to
the analysis of the processes of development
in LICs is
adapted from the numerous works of Resnick and
Wolff.

m

this approach a different way of looking at
development and,
combined with the nonessentialist Marxian notion
of class

as

the process of surplus labor extraction, a different
way of
constructing development paradigm are produced.

The Rational e for Using Tanzania and
Kenya as Case Studies

The rationale derives from the following observations:
(i)

In the case of Tanzania, it had been praised as a

successful "socialist" country in Africa. 29

It experienced

growth, at least the first four years after independence.

As its early history suggests, trade, which was of an

extractive nature and externally imposed, and which had been
at the center of the dependency approach, played an

important role in its history.

It has a unique culture in

an African geographic context, different from both the Latin

American dependency approach and the European developmentalist approach.
(ii)

In the case of Kenya, many developmentalists cite

it as one of the few countries in sub-Saharan Africa that

achieved high economic growth rates since independence,

.

making it an economic success story. 30

it also had been

subjected to several distinct types
of economic and
political dependency that are the central
concern of the
dependency approach. Moreover, its unique
culture and
history, coupled with its African
geographic context, differ
significantly from the European-American basis
of the

developmentalist approach, the Latin American
focus of
dependency theory, and the erstwhile East European
orthodox
Marxist approach. Thus, analyzing Kenya and Tanzania
might
turn up additional explanatory forces by introducing
new

variables

The Concept of Capitalism and Socialism

We need to point out the conceptual difference between

socialism as advocated by Marx and the one practiced by

African countries, like Tanzania.

In Tanzania it denotes

political and economic power being held by the state as
opposed to power being held by the oppressed classes, as

suggested throughout Marx's work.
Similarly, the concept of capitalism as practiced in

the West and as practiced in LICs like Kenya is also

different.

In Kenya the state plays a prominent role in

investment, surplus extraction, and distribution as opposed
to the individuals or private firms driven by market forces
in the West.

In particular, liberal democracy, a key

ingredient for a successful free enterprise system in the
West, is not accepted in Kenya and elsewhere in the LICs.
12

.

Therefore, when we discuss capitalist
Kenya and socialist
Tanzania we must keep these differences
in mind.

Methodology
This dissertation uses the case study
methodology to
systematically explicate "facts" and
characteristics
of

development in LICs.

We seek to analyze from the available

data the theory and practice of development
as a deliberate
public policy in Tanzania and Kenya, identify
development
problems, and provide initial theoretical
suggestions and

conclusions.

The goal is to contribute an initial alter-

native development approach for LICs which is both
non-

essentialist in its reasoning and class theoretical in
focus
Therefore, we include the class analysis method of

political economy.

Historically, its scope and method has

varied with the individual writer.

As Schumpeter noted,

31

the exclusive concern of political economy was the economy
of the state or, synonymously, public policies of an

economic nature.
J.

S.

Mill's conception of political economy as

explained in his principles exemplified the common problem
of definitional ambiguity.

For Mill, political economy

connoted "the nature of wealth, and the laws of its

production and distribution, including, directly or
remotely, the operation of all the causes by which the

condition of mankind... is made prosperous or the reverse." 32
13

For Marx, the emphasis was not
just the production of
wealth, but also social processes
whereby surplus labor is
appropriated from its direct producers,
the performers
of

that surplus labor in the producing
wealth.
Political economy, as used here, will
refer to the
complex and contradictory relations between
the state and
its citizens as manifest in the management,
i.e., the
distribution and allocation of national wealth,
the same
vein, international political economic
relations are

m

relations of nations at the level of, inter alia,
politics
and economics.
The methodology of class analysis will be applied

mainly in the last chapter.

Historically, it has often been

used in a descriptive, mechanical, and refined manner,

manifesting structural and often economic determinism. 33
Here class analysis is applied in conjunction with nonclass analysis in a dynamic and complex manner, avoiding

deterministic abstractionism.

The point is that theoretical

constructs which attempt to interpret and order social

reality must take cognizance of the fact that, as Dale

Johnson notes, "social classes are not entities but
groupings of concretely situated people engaging in the
rigors of daily activities." 34

This cannot be understood by

simplifying the complexity and reducing it to simple
economic relations, much like Alexander the Great's cutting
of the "Gordian Knot."

14

Marxian theory of class is different
from other social
theories because it makes a
particular notion of class
(fundamental and subsumed classes)
central to its analysis
of social reality and because
the relationships between the
various classes and non-class processes
(for instance,

poli-

tical and cultural processes) of any
particular society are
understood in terms of a complex pattern
of mutual effectivity or "overdetermination." The
application of this
concept into our method of analysis in the
field
of

political science, it is hoped, is one of the
unique

contributions of this dissertation. 35
The concept of "overdetermination"

36

(i.e., the

relational concept of our alternative theoretical
framework

which signifies that each aspect or process of the social
formation is mutually determined, mutually constituted by
the complex interaction of all the other aspects of the

social formation) and "class" will be utilized in order to

distance our conception of causation from those paradigms

which argue that one aspect determines others.

These

concepts allow us to consider the contradictory social

processes that may be entered into by any given agent or
group of agents.

The arguments advanced by orthodox

Marxists that the Marxist concept of class is an economistic
one and everything else is an epiphenomenon cannot refer to

the overdetermined concept we will discuss here.

15

.
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CHAPTER

THE CONTEXT
:

2

THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC ORDER

Introduce nn
i

Diverse and dynamic patterns of development,
changing
income distribution and welfare levels
within and between
the African countries cannot be explained
solely in terms of
internal forces. Critical in development theory
is the need
to relate national changes to the forces at
work within
the

broader international environment.
Since the colonial period the exchange of goods through

international trade has comprised a significant share of the
national income of African states.

Powerful corporations in

the form of foreign, private investors have sought to

exploit the resource potential of the continent and in doing
so have had a significant impact on development through

their control over the means of production and investment
decisions.
The fragile base of this primary exporting economy is

reflected in its dependence on fluctuations in world market
prices and on foreign capital and technology for development.

External vulnerability has indeed been widespread

among African states.

Many have experienced a slow growth

in export earnings from primary commodities and a deteri-

20

.

oration in their terms of trade.

1

.

National income and

government revenue have in turn
been affected, making the
fulfilment of development plans more
difficult.

The feeling of this desperate
situation by many African
leaders is well expressed in the
Arusha Declaration (1967)
of President Nyerere of Tanzania
(discussed in chapter 5)
We have been oppressed a great
deal, we have been
exploited a great deal and we have been
disa
grea
eal
Xt is our weakness that
?
^
h»! ? S
Ur being
S?L
^°a° Now we °PP r *ssed, exploited and
disregarded.
want a revolution—
tion which brings to an end our weakness,a revoluso that
we are never again exploited, oppressed
or
humiliated.

V

C

*

The current international political order,
informed by
Realpolitik has exacerbated this situation.
It is to this

,

we now turn our attention.

The International Order

Since World War II the structure and context of the

international political and economic order has changed
markedly.

It has moved from a tight bipolar system with the

nation-state dominant to a multipolar system with the

nation-state competing in the economic and political
spheres, with an increasing number of nation-state actors. 3

Despite this change, however, as Robert

0.

Keohane

observed, the international order still remains a function
of superpower politics

(

Realpolitik

4
)

Moreover, the

ideological divide (realist-capitalist versus realistcommunist) which informs the superpowers' competition and

21

the nuclear context in which
the competition takes place,
compels the superpowers to
view other actors in the
international system as peripheral
to their national
security concerns. This is
still true even though the
political situation in Eastern
Europe and the USSR has
changed significantly.
The ideological divide and the
nuclear context also
shape the LICs perception of the
two superpowers.
For them,
the security concerns of the
superpowers has a detrimental
effect on their development strategy
since they must be
carried out within the rules created by
these powers and
their allies. The rules often reflect
the security concerns
of the superpowers without regard to
the developmental

concerns of the LICs.

In other words, for the superpowers,

the stability of the prevailing order takes
precedence over
everything else.

What do the superpowers mean by international order?

Hedley Bull defines it as

"those patterns or dispositions

of human activity that sustain the elementary or primary

goals of social life among mankind as

a

whole." 5

Such a

definition supports the primacy of the state in relation to
individuals and the state system in relation to
collectivities.
Bull regards "order" as "the condition of the reali-

zation of other values," including the pursuit of justice. 6
He admits, however, that the demands for justice relate, in
a profound way,

to the search for acceptable forms of order.
22

Yet, only if the party can
agree on just results, or if
a
consensus on an international level
can be achieved, can
order and justice be reconciled,
if not, the state accords
priority to considerations of order
as against the claims of

justice. 7

Bull's system-maintenance image of
world order is
implied by his preference for order
over justice. 8
Morton Kaplan defined the international
system as a
"very loose bipolar system" categorized
by the uncommitted
Lies playing an important and noticeably
independent role in
9
world politics.
The word "order," where used in this
sense, implies purposeful arrangement,
which in international affairs in turn implies understood
relationships,
an observable pattern of repetitive behavior,
and the

satisfaction of needs or the achievement of goals by
the
actors concerned.
The international order conceived as a system of state
relations, as the definitions thus far suggested by

Realists,

10

presupposes that the conscious mind is detached

from the world and that the subject transcends objectivity.

Such a metaphysical assumption leads to policies of social
control that seek to apply "rational" models of homogeneity
and order to the world, often with force.

Such a realist international order arrangement that
still exists today is under stress. 11
complex, interdependent, and dynamic. 12

It is now much more

Therefore, the ICs

involved in world affairs within the old context of interstate relationships miss an important segment of "reality"
23

that governs contemporary
interstate relations. The polioy
implications of such a practice
become adversarial to the
development efforts of LICs and in
the long run to the ICS
as well.
For instance, in American foreign
policy, Henry
Kissinger writes: "The West is deeply
committed to the
notion that the real world is external
to the observer, that
knowledge consists of recording and
classifying data." 13
This metaphysical hypothesis, which
dichotomizes subject and
object, means that the differences between
East and West,
and North and South in their perceptions
of the international order are not the result of complex
and dynamic

processes, including class and cultural processes,
but,

according to Kissinger, of different mind-sets.

He writes,

"The instability of the current world order may thus
have at
its core a philosophical schism which makes the issues

producing most political debates seem tangential." 14
To regard the political issues as tangential is to call

them epiphenomenal, derivative, and accidental vis-a-vis the

question of the mind-set, considered the essence.

If the

mind is the standard of measure, then it follows that

rationality is the norm.

Once this is asserted, in a

blatantly ethnocentric (even racist) way, the norm attaches
to the ICs mind.

"Empirical reality," Kissinger states,

"has a much different significance for many of the new

countries than for the West because in a certain sense they

never went through the process of discovering it." 15
24

Thus,

it is the ics as political
actors who think of empirical
reality as separate from mind,
who "manipulate reality" in

order to attain "equilibirum,

which is the principle of

rational balance in the world.

Kissinger writes, "we must

construct an international order
before a crisis imposes it
16
as a necessity."
This tendency in the discourse
(and practice) of
international relations can also be found
in the speeches
and writings of Zbigniev Brzezinski,
former U.S. National
Security Adviser. For him, the ICs prove
that "people can
cooperate on behalf of central ideas." 17
other words,
the rest of the world is disorderly not
because of material
needs, the needs for principles of
distributive

m

justice, or

decentralized and equal distribution of wealth and
resources, but because of a lack of central ideas.

Such a philosophy also guides the USSR's realist

informed foreign policy as it attempts to create a

contemporary international order in its own image.

In

general, East and West believe that the world is to be
ordered, managed, and shaped from a detached subjective

position and according to their respective national security
needs.

The corollary of this is that the contemporary world

order has created a disjunction, in the perception of
countries, between the ICs and the LICs.

From the

perspective of the LICs, the impact of the basic rules of
the contemporary order is perceived as detrimental to their
25

development efforts, whereas the opposite
view is held by
the ICs.
such dichotomous views suggest that,
unless
there is a fundamental change in the order,
the system

will

remain crisis-ridden, under stress, and
unresponsive to the
Lies' development needs.
Eventually it will affect
the

national security of the ICs and LICs.

Its Evolution

The signposts of such a realist tradition can be traced
from the works of Thucydides to St. Augustine to

Machiavelli, Clausewitz, and Weber, and to a degree to
Hobbes.

19

During this classical period in which the

international system lacked central regulation of the use of
force, statesmen maintained order and stability via a crude

mechanism called the "balance of power." 20

The assumption

was that as long as nation-states, individually or in

alliance with others, did not allow adversaries to gain

military superiority, peace will prevail.
While balance of power considerations created mutual

anxiety among the European powers concerning their military
capability," the primitive nature of weapons technology
meant" according to Pearson and Rochester, that in contrast
to later periods the allies "were not linked together by any

need for coordinated military planning and training, and

enemies did not share the common bond of knowing that a
fatal decision by one side could mean annihilation for

both." 21
26

This classical international system
was characterized
by a relatively low degree of
military and economic interdependence that is so prevalent among the
contemporary
22
nation-states.
Order, therefore, was maintained
among
European states simply by a crude mechanism
known as the
balance of power system.

More important, the objectives of nation-states
in the
classical era were not so much national as personal

ones of

the various rulers, namely, to enhance dynastic
wealth,
power, and prestige.

Indeed, in this era, the power and the

security of the nation-state was often identified with
the
security of the monarch's own well-being and that of his
dynasty.

King Louis XIV of France expressed such concern

well when he allegedly claimed,
the state")

"1'etat, c'est moi" ("I am

23
.

As time passed, the confluence of events led to

European nationalism which in turn led to a new wave of
imperialism that resulted in the subjugation of the peoples
of Africa and other LICs. 24

Africa was conquered and

colonized, while a major portion of its population was

scattered and enslaved in the Americas and elsewhere. 25
A most relevant example is that prior to 1875 not one-

tenth of Africa, the second largest continent, had been

appropriated by European nations, but by 1895 all but
tenth of it had been. 26

a

Thus, by 1914, very few countries

were left to be colonized in order to dampen European

27

rivalry for power and glory.

According to Craig and George:

To ensure that the five major actors [states]
remained
of roughly equal power and to dampen the
competition
among them, several other rules and practices were
institutionalized as necessary means for the operation
and maintainance of the system. One of these, the
principle of compensation. .worked as follows: when one
of the great powers acquired or wished to acquire
additional territory or resources, it was understood
that the other powers also had to receive appropriate
payoffs of territory, population, or resources— usually
at the expense of weaker states inside or outside of
Europe.
.

The total colonization of Africa was thus the thrust of
the 1884-1885 Treaty of Berlin, in which detailed rules were

drawn up to guide the Europeans in their scramble for
Africa.

Such conquests and colonialism kept European powers

so busy overseas that they remained peaceful among

themselves for a while. 28

In short, as long as war did not

involve the great powers and threaten their balance of
power, war and disorder in other places was tolerated. 29

The international order based on the Concert of Europe

collapsed with the formation of rival alliances on the eve
of World War I. 30

But until then an attempt was made for

the first time to establish a formal and conservative

structure of world order. 31

Five great powers (Britain,

France, Prussia, Russia, and Austria) played a special

managerial role in its shaping. 32

They assumed that "world

order" could only be maintained by the formal recognition of

and vigorous assertion of their rights and responsibilities.

At the same time, colonialism became, in the words of

28

.

Taylor, a "move" in the European game of the balance of

power

33

The great powers, reflecting status politics, turned

back to Europe as the colonial frontier disappeared before

World War

I

and as some 84 percent of the world's land was

already controlled by them. 34

Pearson and Rochester noted,

that "imperialist objectives could be accommodated without

major conflict as long as there was enough colonial territory to go around, a condition that had evaporated by
1914.

h35

World War

I

and the successful 1917 Bolshevik revol-

ution in Russia ushered in a new era in international
relations.

Not only did the revolution begin to challenge

the old European order, but it also threatened (and still

does in the eyes of a few Western national security
strategists) to destroy the world capitalist system, on

which western civilization was based, and replace it with

a

different one based on Marx's vision of a communist world
order. 36

Since the 1917 revolution, and especially since the
1930s, the international system has undergone significant
37
paraBy the late 1930s the "idealist"

transformation.

digm, which was once dominant, was in decline.

publication of

E.

H.

The 1939

Carr's classic attack on the idealists

conception of a harmony of interest, or nation-states'

morality unrelated to power in international relations,
38
exemplified this decline.

29

1

Since the Second World War "realism" 39
has replaced
idealism and has been the dominant "paradigm" 40
in the
contemporary international order. Scholars
like John Herz,
George F. Kennan, Walter Lippmann, and Hans J.
Morgenthau,
drawing from the writings of the classicists
mentioned
above, articulated the merits of this paradigm. 41
Carr's
statement, that "in the international order, the
role of

power is greater and that of morality less,"

42

became the

order of the day.
This historical development gave rise to two types of

impediment to world order.

The first concerns the desire

for world hegemony sought equally by the U.S., and the USSR,

guided by Realoolitik in the name of national security.

The

second arises from the structural imbalance of the existing
international order.

These two factors have a great impact

upon how the LICs perceive the West and the East, and how
they address their respective national security and

development concerns.

What are these security concerns?

The Security Dilemma

The concept of security is rooted in the Latin term

"sinecura-securitas,
toil and anxiety." 43

"

meaning "lack of absence of care, of
The contemporary Great Power security

system finds its origin in Europe during the classical era,
and has since gradually evolved to incorporate the entire
globe. 44

30

Since the end of World War II, the concept of
security
has come to be identified with the global policy
formulated
by the major powers to stabilize the international
system as

they saw fit and to avert any new causes of disorder and
war. 45

The basic charters of the UN Security Council, the

US National Security Act of 1947, and the Convocation of
the

European Conference of Security and Cooperation in the
1970s, along with many other regional alliances for security

purposes, exemplify the superpowers quest for national
security.

Security also serves to define and delimit the term of
"peace" itself.

It is not just any kind of peace, but

rather one based on national security considerations.

It is

international peace which prevents violent disturbances and

guarantees the conservation of the dominant systems. 47

In

this sense, from the perspective of the Realists, the term

"security" has always seemed to imply the maintainance of
the status quo favoring the superior power. 48

But it has

often been seen by the LICs as impediments to their develop-

ment aspirations as well as to their special security
concerns. 49

The recent U.S. intervention in Panama

accentuates this point.
Given the absence of a world government to guarantee
international peace and security by monitoring each state's
behavior, proponents of a realist theory advocate that each

state must in the end look out for its own security,
protection, and survival and that nation-states have to
31

)

learn from the past, especially from the
statesmen who were
responsible for maintaining peace via the
"balance of powerin Europe in previous centuries. 50 Thus,
as long as nationstates, individually or in alliance with others,
do not
allow adversaries to gain military superiority,
national

security will be served and peace will be maintained. 51
The corollary of this is that any major threats
to the
security of the dominant powers and their allies takes
the

character of a crisis for the whole system, thus calling
for
immediate action. 52 Put differently, a threat to the

alliance-system is viewed by the major powers as destabilizing the global balance of power between them, a

balance which, in their view, forms the underpinning of the
stability and security of the contemporary international
order. 53

(Although the Eastern alliance system is in

question by the recent developments in the Soviet Union and

Eastern Europe it is still too early to conclude that it is
dead.

From this Realist school perspective regional wars
involving LICs are viewed as less threatening, unless they

become big enough to threaten the existing balance of power,
in which case the superpowers will intervene to contain

them. 54

On the other hand, as noted, the international system

viewed from the perspective of the LICs is disorderly,
chaotic, and insecure. 55

This is because, what the ICs

consider international peace and security, for them means
32

a

.

not only war, but also the presence of structural
violence
resulting from lopsided international political
and economic
56
relationships.
Most contemporary LICs continue to suffer
from direct military conflict and structural
violence. 57
The LICs repeated attempt to improve their economic
and
political condition by making proposals such as the New

International Economic Order (NIEO)

,

and by supporting the

reforms suggested by the Brandt Commission report, 58 continue to be frustrated by the ICs.

The latter view the

proposals as destabilizing and a threat to their primary

pursuit of the maintainance of the status quo.

The ICs fail

to see (or choose to ignore) that the debate among those

visions will help create a new order beneficial for all
sides concerned. 59
For the ICs, the system is in order and, with the

exception of minor reforms, they are quite content to live
with it.

But from the perception of many LICs the order as

it relates to them is often what the superpowers want it to
be, and therefore necessarily unresponsive to their urgent

needs and priorities. 60

This perception is further compli-

cated by the LICs poor political and economic conditions as
well as by their internal class and other struggles

—

process further complicated by historically produced weak
state structures.

This is a condition whose source, in

part, can be traced back to the colonial era and more often

than not leads to a condition that invites super-power

intervention
33

Several reasons account for the historically
produced
weak state structure in the LICs. 62 These include the
following:
(i)

the boundaries of most LICs, particularly African

countries, were arbitrarily drawn by Europeans in 18841885 at the Berlin Conference, resulting in the

forcible incorporation of ethnic groups who do not

identify with the artificially created state
structures, 63
(ii)

as a result of the LICs instability and the

leaders' political insecurity, many leaders spend their

time and the countries

1

meager resources in shoring up

their own security rather than planning the countries'
long term development programs. 64

Consequently, many

people living in the LICs, especially in Africa, fall

victim to severe economic problems as well as political
repression.

This does not imply that there exists a strong

relationship between the internal disorder of LICs and the
order and stability of the international system.

It does,

however, imply that a strong link exists between the

security of the leaders in the LICs, on the one hand, and
the international order and stability, on the other.

For

example, while economic problems and political conflicts in

the LICs create internal disorder, this disorder, however,

provides the elites the opportunity and the excuse to

accumulate weapons in order to forcibly control their own
34

people for the mere purpose of strengthening
their political
65
power position.
In this respect, the interests of the
ruling elites in
the LICs (i.e., to remain in power for life)
and the

interests of the ICs (i.e., to sell arms and
prevent the Lie
from aligning with the enemy) coincide, since
both have
vested interests in the security of the contemporary

international order, though for different reasons. 66
in this light,

Seen

it is no wonder that internal or intra-

regional conflicts within and among the LICs are viewed
by
the ICs as non-threatening (or, peripheral) to the
prevailing order (balance of power), and therefore tolerable. 67

The regional conflicts in the Horn of Africa, the Iran-Iraq
war, the crisis in Latin America, and the struggle for

liberation in South

Africa testify to this view.

Indeed, one can argue that the power elites in the ICs

are accomplices of the power elites in the LICs in that both

share common interests in the continuing internal political

disorder in the LICs. 68

This helps the elites in the LICs,

as mentioned earlier, to secure their political power

position, and allows the ICs to advance their economic and

geopolitical interests. 69
Some of the interests of the ICs include, inter alia,
the following: 70

a)

keeping the arms industry and the

Research and Development (R&D) in the ICs functioning;
b)

enabling the ICs to test their latest weapons; and

35

providing the ICs the opportunity to
demonstrate their
reliability in times of crisis to those allies
they consider
vital to their security and world-wide
geopolitical
c)

strategy.
In the processes of advancing these interests,
the ICs

often impinge upon the already internally weak
state
structures of the LICs in a way seriously exacerbating

the

existing political, economic, and ethnic problems in
those
countries. 71 Already, the people in the LICs suffer

from a

variety of problems such as state legitimation crisis,
identity crisis, disarticulated economic development,

economic exploitation, political repression, outside
intervention, and natural disasters to name a few. 72

What

are the implications of this for Africa as a whole and

Tanzania and Kenya in particular?

The Implications for Africa
For the people of Africa, who are already confronted

by a variety of internal disorders, the international
system, which encourages outside intervention with impunity,

exacerbates the already worsened political and economic
situation for most of them. 73
As Africans continue their struggle for development in
an effort to restore human dignity, it is important that

they understand the intricate international environment

under which they must operate. 74

Once they are clear about

this, then it is possible for them to wage a meaningful

development struggle consistent with their
own concrete
needs and means. 75
Thus far, it seems the strategy for
development has
eluded the Africans. Their development
strategists have
become the uncritical consumers of either
Eastern or Western
ideologies rather than formulators of an original
and sound
strategy to speed up Africa's development by
taking the best
ideas from the two worlds. 76

The existing dominant paths of development (i.e.,

capitalism and socialism) are products of the bifurcated
world view, explained above, which advances the
geopolitical
strategic interests of the superpowers more than they
fulfill the pressing development needs of the African
people. 77

Both paths of development have been formulated

with little effort made to understand the "complexities" as

perceived by the ultimate "beneficiaries" in Africa.

Both

ideologies claim that their respective development path

guarantee a rosy future for the people.
As our case study of "socialist" Tanzania and

"capitalist" Kenya will show, the intellectuals of both
camps manage to justify sacrifices for the great mass of the

population rather than for themselves.

As Berger observed,

"It is the intellectuals who proclaim the myths and work the

theories, and usually the others who pay the price in sweat
and blood." 78

Under "capitalism," as our case study will show, the

characteristic income polarization and unemployment force
37

many people to endure severe
economic: sacrifices, leading,
in Berger's words, to a
poverty-induced

'

"massacre of the

innocent"

79

in which millions of persons,
mostly children,
are condemned to a premature
death.
This

sacrifice is

necessary, they are told, to spur
production, which will
eventually "trickle down" to benefit
them.

Under "socialism," such as the
Tanzanian case will
show, development is seen as
requiring massive political
sacrifice, particularly, politicaly
motivated repressions
(for instance, forcibly settling
peasants on collective
80

farms)

This action is justified through the
myth of
revolution, which argues that once the
domestic and foreign
imperialists are rooted out of the social
fabric
.

and the

true revolutionary community is created,
repression (and
eventually the state itself) will no longer be
needed and
will "wither away."
Today, neither the East nor the West could
point with

pride to a single clear-cut model of success for its
ideological project in Africa.

The ascent of Gorbachev and

the winds of changes that are now blowing in Eastern Europe,
has made the very idea of socialism as an alternative path
of development for Africa in doubt.
Is there, then, a way out of this seemingly development

impasse for the African countries? We will try to give an

answer by proposing an alternative theoretical framework.
But,

first, we will examine the various development

paradigms, whose origin and evolution can be traced to the
38

experiences of Western and Eastern civilization,
with an eye
to examining (in chapters four and five)
how they impact
upon the development efforts of Tanzania and
Kenya, whose
societies have quite a different historical
background.
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CHAPTER

3

THREE PARADIGMS OF
DEVELOPMENT

Introdnr-M ^ n
in the last chapter,
it was stressed that
the ics view

the international system
essentially from the
perspective of
a Hobbesian world view,
where the political dialogue
between
them and the Lies at the
international level presumes
mutually exclusive global
interests.' And yet, when
protracted debates on the
problems of economic development
in the Lies and possible
solutions arose in the late
50'
and early 60 -s, the ics social
scientists made the problem
of Lies along with the
problem of international
development
a major concern of research
and theory.

They believed that without
changing the international
political order, they would be able
to solve,

in co-

operation with Lies, the development
problems of the Lies
and the international economy.
They hoped that the Lies
would economically grow with the
assistance
of the ICS,

which in turn would rapidly enhance
the former's growth and
further lead to their political
democratization in the image
2
of the latter.
But what really constitutes political
and
economic development remains, as yet,
illusive and a highly
debatable issue.
47

Analysis of regional and
international inequality,
agricultural and industrial
development, and how peopll make
a living and organize
their economy and politics within
these different environments
cannot be explained without
reference to the broader set of
forces by which their
environment is shaped, in particular
the ideals surrounding
the formulation of government
policy and the constraints on
government action.
In the light of over twenty years
of political

independence in Tanzania and Kenya and in
African countries
in general it is apparent that
patterns of social, economic
and political development have been
shaped, inter alia,
by

the prevailing ideology and practices of
those with

political influence and economic power.

However, these have

been conditioned not only by historical
circumstances and
the form in which liberation was achieved but
also
by

contemporary internal and international events.
The links between ideology, policy and practice can
be

characterised as follows.

First,

identifying particular

political, economic and social development goals depends

initially on clarifying a particular blueprint for

development (or ideology) defining desirable conditions and
the means by which to achieve them.

Second, commitment to

achieving these goals depends upon an acceptable approach by

which to translate ideology into practice through the
institutional structure and resource allocation between
sectors and regions.

It is the gulf which has emerged
48

.

,

^^

between ideology, policy and
p raotice which Ues at
of many contemporary problems
within African countries and
which had given rise to the
theoretical debate (outlined
below)
In their efforts to define
an official pattern of
development and to establish the
appropriate politico-

economic institutions African
leaders had before them as a
guide, since the Second World War,
three major markedly
different approaches to development,
each one based on a
different set of assumptions and
values concerning the types
of changes to be encouraged and
methods employed to achieve
them.
They include the following: (a)
developmental ist
(neo-classical and modernization),
and

(c)

(b)

the dependentistas

the orthodox Marxists.

This chapter will critically examine
and present these
strategies, or what Thomas Kuhn called
"paradigms." 3
it

should be clear that none of these paradigms
forms a
monolithic entity since there are differing
theoretical

emphases within each tradition.

The Developme ntal ist (Neoclassical and
Modernization) Paradigm

The neoclassical approach is premised, since Adam
Smith, on human preferences, on the given endowments of

productive resources that human beings privately own, and on
the productive capabilities (the available technology) that

enable humans to produce what they desire in an environment
49

of domestic and international
political stability/

Human
nature is, therefore, the
theoretical entry point around
which the argument of this school
revolves.
Development is
theorized as a phenomenon of the
entry concepts, which in
turn function as essences.

According to this paradigm, human
beings exercise their
free choices in the context of a
given scarcity, which
propels all economic activity forward. 5
Human beings choose
what they want to consume and produce
what is
rational to

produce; of course, by rationally
responding to market
forces.
Rational institutions or, in other words,
political
and economic systems, can be created
that correspond to the
rational human nature, whose primary goal
is to accumulate
capital and wealth.
in the process, it is assumed that
such
institutions will also advance and secure the
democratic
rights of capitalists and workers alike.
in such organized

institutions, the market is assumed to take care of
the

economic growth of the country, for reasons spelled out
by
Adam Smith and David Ricardo. 6 The fact that the market
rewards the "productive"— so long as it stretches the margin
of profits and punishes the "unproductive" sectors

of the

society is accepted and considered unproblematic.
Internationally, it is argued that the development

processes of the LICs can get the necessary "push" if
investment capital is allowed to move "freely" and if

nationalist barriers are not allowed to inhibit the flow of
investment capital in the international market. 7
50

In a

context where there exist
ICs and LICs, the former
could
then transfer capital to the
latter and generate wealth
there, via economic growth,
for the benefit of both
parties.* The market will force
individuals, or society, in
ICs and LICs to initiate such
international trade relations
if the utility gain from such
trade is greater than without
it.
According to this school, barring
any interferences,
such as market imperfections
created by external economies,
monopolies, irrational institutions,
or nationalist politics
and culture, the pattern of trade
is fully determined by
conditions of scarcity and choice.
In neoclassical paradigm formulation,
the success of a

country's development was conceived solely
in economic terms
and measured by the rate of growth of
its Gross National
Product (GNP). Gross national product, a
measure of the
total output claimed by the nationals of a
country, is

assumed to show the well-being of a nation-state.

Thus, the

strategy used by LICs to achieve their goal of
development
focused largely on economic growth in the belief that
an

increase in GNP

9

will percolate down to the poorest of the

poor and eventually eliminate poverty, inequality and
unemployment.

In such neoclassical conceptions, production

is encouraged to expand untrammeled; further production is

considered profitable, and, assuming man's natural innovativeness, new ways of stretching the profit margin are

constantly created.

51

Associated with such neoclassical
conception of
development was the concept
of modernization

(structural

development theory,.-

For proponents of
modernization

the

emphasis is mainly on either
some kind of given economic
structure, say, dualism, or an
aggregate lack of investment
capital, or the size of the
market.
Political developmentalists, educators and economists
within this school
thought that particularly
appropriate work ethics, proper
social and family attitudes, as
well as an appropriate

political system, were more conducive
to development than
11
others.
Lies, therefore, differed from the
ICs because their

society did not exhibit these modern
attitudes.
order to
be on the right path of development,
LICs had to make sure
that their people acquired modern attitudes/
i.e., adopted
the culture, values and paths of development
of the already
existing ICs
Such a view is well expressed by Daniel
Lerner: "The process of social change [takes
place when]
less developed societies acquire characteristics
common to

m

.

more developed societies." 12
Similarly, Wilbert Moore observed that "what is

involved in modernization is a total transformation of

traditional or pre-modern society into the types of

technology and associated social organization that

characterize the advanced, economically prosperous, and
relatively politically stable nations of the western
world." 13

Edward Shils' definition of modernization is
52

a

"being western without the
onus of dependence on the
West
The model of modernity is
a picture of the West
detached in
some way from its geographical
origins and loco..-" Hence
development equals modernization
equals a shift from an
agricultural economy to an industrial
economy.

The central theme of the
above discussion is a
unidirectional, linear conception
of the processes of
development through which human
society evolves from
traditional (pre-industrial) to
modern (industrial) society.
Since development is thought to
proceed in a linear fashion,
it follows that every country
that wants to develop must
necessarily pass through a series of
stages, i.e., capital
accumulation, ever-increasing
industrialization, a drive to
maturity, and a constant move toward
a modern wealthy
economy with mass (high) consumption—
that once were
experienced by the ICs. This view was
propounded in works
like Rostow's Stages of Economic. Growth,
and it has had a
powerful influence on the political elites and
development

planners in the LICs. 15
The idea of "take off" captured the LICs'
imagination
and presented them with an operational tool to
map out their

development strategies.

In this school all countries were

presumed to follow the same pattern of economic development,
and the different countries of the world were grouped in a

hierarchical classification.

The poorer LICs were presumed

to have a long way to go to reach the "take-off," as defined
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by Rcstow, the point
at which they would
have
dynamism to sustain economic
growth. 16
Still another neoclassical
position, which has a
strong
hold on the thinking of
the political elites and
the
development planners, is to
view the processes of
development as monocausal. Such
a view is evident in
the idea of
the "vicious circle of
poverty," whe re the scarcity
of
capital is seen as an obstacle
to development that condemns
Lies to remain permanently
at levels of economic sub-

^

17

sistence.

The corollary to this is that
the solution lies in the
virtuous cycle of capitalism, which
makes productive
behavior rational, and hence leads
to economic growth and
political stability. 18 The task is,
therefore, to find the
necessary capital and to invest it
in those countries.

m

order to break the vicious cycle,
these countries are also
encouraged to install "strong" (a
euphemism for
"repressive") and stable governments that
can provide the
long-range planning necessary for rational
growth

patterns.

19

Political stability is presumed to encourage an
influx
of foreign investment as well as foreign
technical
and

economic assistance.

To this end, the Harold-Domar model

became the development plans of a large number of LICs. 20

Governments and development planners in the LICs have found
the Harold-Domar model (The model underlays the development

plans of

a

large number of developing countries.
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The model

was based on a capital:
output ration and presupposed
that
capital investment of a
certain quantity would bring
about a
given increase in output,
if tne capital;
output
were 4:1 (an average assumption
in most developing
country
Plans)
four units of capital-say
$4~„ould result in an
increase in output of $1. If
20% of a country s QNp
saved and invested this would
lead to an increase

^

,

,

^

of 5% of
GNP.) and the Rostowian model
of stages of growth
convenient
for development planning.
Although they recognize the

interconnection between economics
and non-economic factors,
they remained committed to the
former because it is easily'
measurable and prone to manipulation.
These models assumed
capital by and large as the prime
prerequisite to economic

growth
The basic contradiction in the
international economy,
therefore, is between two self -reinforcing
cycles: the
"virtuous" cycle of capitalism which
makes productive
behavior rational and hence leads to economic
growth and
political stability versus the "vicious"
cycle of noncapitalist economic nationalism, which
interferes with the
rational logic of market-responsive individual
behavior and
hence leads to economic stagnation (or
"backwardness"). 21
The social task of rational economics is to
tirelessly

reveal the nature of the two cycles.

Its task is to expose

the irrational reasoning that promises economic
benefit from

restrictions on economic freedom, or that misunderstands
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capitalism as the source
,_,
urce r.f
of the _
problem
of economic
stagnation rather than as the
source of the solution."
Most of the recent literature
on political development
also reflects the above
dichotomous schemes of
modernization
theories. Political
developmental ists, with some
variations,

U*e

their modernization counterparts,
classify
societies into three broad
categories: traditional,

transitional and modern. 23
Lucian Pye was among the first
group of political
science scholars to present an
in-depth analysis of
political development. He has
compiled a list of the
connotations of the term "political
development" as
currently used by comparative politics
scholars: 24
Political development as (l) the
political prerequisite of
economic development; (2) the politics
typical of industrial
societies; (3) the operation of a
nation state; (4) political modernization; (5) administrative
and legal

development;

(6)

mass mobilisation and participation;

the building of democracy;

change;

(9)

(8)

(7)

stability and orderly

mobilisation and power; and

(10)

one aspect of a

muti-dimensional process of social change.
He also argued that these definitions manifest
three

common denominators in political development: as
an attitude
towards political equality, as the capacity of a
political
system and as the differentiation and specialization of

structures resulting in increased functional specificity of
the various political roles within the system. 25
56

Samuel Huntington, inter

alia, has criticized Pye's

ten definitions.

He argued that -if there
are ten
definitions of political
development, there are ten too
many, and the concept is,
in all likelihood,
superfluous and
dysfunctional.- 26 Huntington further
argued that the
identification of political development
with modernization
would restrict the use of the
concept of political

development "in both time and space.'' 27

Therefore,

political development should not be
defined in terms of
modern i z at ion 28
Rather, he defined political development
normatively,
i.e., as the absence of open
conflict.
He described
political development as the growth of
political

institutions capable of dealing with strains
of social
mobilization and political participation.
For Huntington,

political development is a process independent
of, although
affected by, the process of modernization; and
modernity and
tradition are essentially assymetrical concepts. 29
The

importance of Huntington, therefore, is his challenge
to the
prevailing idea of the unilinearity of modernization
theory
and his stress on those issues, especialy the dislocations

that arise in the modernization processes, that had been

played down by earlier writers.

For him, as O'Brien

observed, the goal of political development is not

necessarily democracy but order. 30
Perhaps a landmark in the development of the concept of

political development is Huntington's observation:
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structures
traditinnii £
traditional
transitional, or modern, on the
other. 31

Similar concerns for the primacy
of political stability
or order were also expressed in
the works of
Apter, Halpern,

and Weiner.

32

The literature's shift from
emphasizing

democracy to order reflected not only
the values of those
who were theorizing but also the
security concerns of the
two superpowers.
Their belief is that the more the LICs
are
politically developed, the more they are
politically stable
and the less likely will a confrontation
occur between the
superpowers arising from their respective
geopolitical
strategic concerns.
Some political developmentalists, such as Deutsch,
Diamant, and Eisenstadt, 33 have conceptualized
political

development

in terms of system capabilities to try to

remove ethnocentrism from the definition of political
development, but the difficulty of operationalizing the

concept has reduced its utility.

They assume, much like

neoclassical economists, that the force of history moves in
an unidirectional manner (from traditional to modern) and

that in order to modernize, traditional societies must take
up the patterns of development that were once followed by

the now-modernized (industrialized) nations.

Where

political institutionalization is weak, military regimes are
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recorded

to replace civilian ones.

They are viewed as

powerful and good facilitators
of development," even
though
the writers are conscious
that the stability the
military
achieves (if at all, cannot be
guaranteed without loss of
lives and/or without a denial
of basic civil liberties
of
the citizens concerned.
Political modernization theorists
often focus upon
endogenous variables, ignoring or
simply glossing over the
role of exogenous factors in
social change. When they do
focus on such factors it is
limited to cultural diffusion.
For instance, Lerner, inter alia,
emphasized the western
impact in modernization only in terms
of its consequences
for diffusion of particular cultural
attributes. 35
These theorists, for the most part,
ignore the
political and economic interactions
between societies and
the resulting impact upon them.
This is related to one
aspect of their methodological problems.
That is, these
theories take up the nation-state as the unit
of analysis
and limit their attention to that apparently
autonomous
system.

For the most part, these theorists ignore the

historical development of the society.
Tipps has argued that evolutionary theory and twentieth

century structural-functionalism have been influential
in
the making of a modernization paradigm.

The frequent use of

the dichotomous types, the emphasis on stability and adaptation, and the use of such concepts as social system and

social differentiation illustrate their linkage to the
59

structural-functional and
evolutionary theories. „
oreover
according to Tipps, oany
of the leading contr
Modernization theory have come
f ron men such as
Levy
and Eisenstadt who have
been schooled in functional
theory
and the intellectual milieu
from which it emerged.-*
..

.

^^

'

Chirot traces the origin of
the modernization paradigm
to the response of American
political elites and intellectuals to the international
setting of the post-Second
world war era." This was the
time of the emergence of
many
new nations and also the
beginning of the Cold War. These
two phenomena are, however,
not unrelated. As we
suggested
in the last chapter, the rise
of Lies became the arena
for

the hegemonic control of the
two post-war superpowers.
During the two decades after the
war, American social
scientists, with the help of generous
governmental and other
private organizational support, started
taking a closer look
at development problems in the Lies.

Political institutions do not operate
in a vacuum.
As Lipset observed, they are intertwined
with economic
processes and social organizations. 38 The
early phase of
the modernization paradigm can be seen
as the outgrowth of
the economic theory of developmentalism.
According to the

explanation of the early generation of the modernization
theorists, such as Hoselitz, McCelland, Hagen, etc.,
the

underdevelopment of a country was the result of its
deficient value system and/or pre-modern economic structure.
They argued that the people of advanced European societies
60

and of the United states
had developed because
of their
-dern, rational business
system and ethic which had
enabled
then, to accurate
capital, invest it, and
achieve rapid
economic growth. Following
this tradition, Rostow
argued
that the west had gone
through a series of stages:
capital
accumulation, ever-increasing
industrialization, a drive
toward industrial maturity,
and a constant move toward
a

modern and wealthy economy
with mass consumption. 3 '
Some contemporary scholars
of the modernization
paradigm view modernization as
a set of policies
pursued by
the leaders or elites of LICs
for changing their societies.
Modernization has been considered
as a conscious set of
plans and policies changing a
particular society in the
direction of contemporary societies
which the leaders think
are more advanced in certain
aspects. According to
Eisenstadt, an influential contributor
to the modernization
paradigm, different types of elites
tend to develop

different strategies with regard to some
major problems of
social and economic development policies.

He writes, "these

include the pace of industrialization,
sources of funds,
priorities in development, pressures on
enterprises and
managers, the educational system, policies
of agriculture,
methods of allocation of labor, and many others." 40

At an intra-national level the concept of economic
dualism proved a persuasive prescription for economic
development.

Initially formulated by W. Arthur Lewis

it

considered the changes involved in the transition from
a
61

non-capitalist mode of production
to mature capitalist
-de.- Ranis and Fei formalised
it as a normative model
of
rural-urban movement- while Ann
Seidman used it to describe
the internal structure of the
East African economies. «

m

practical terms, during the era
of economic growth in the
1960s, it encouraged state and
private capital investment in
the modern sector of African
economies.
The modernization approach has
come a long way from
this neoclassical expectation of
economic and political
development in LICs. This is reflected
in the 1980 (Willy)
Brandt Commission Report on North-South
relations which
emphasized that the problems of economic
development are
significantly dependent on the terms of
trade in the world
economy.
it also dealt with the impact that
monetary
issues, such as borrowing, have had on
the development

programs of the LICs.

Summarizing the economic relationship

between the LICs (south) and the ICs (North)

,

the Commission

stated:

The South needs and wants to be more self-reliant
to
complete the process of political independence. But
that does not imply separation from the world economy.
It means rather the ability to bargain on more equal
terms with the rich countries, to obtain a fair return
for what it produces, and to participate fairly in the
control and running of international institutions.
Many leaders in the South have complained that while
the North may be prepared to spend money on alleviating
Southern poverty or distress, it is reluctant to
surrender control over economic decisions. But this
issue of power cannot be evaded. 44

With respect to financial and monetary issues, the

Commission concluded that:

62

causing heavy problems In lJi7* COmnercial b«*s
9 ° Ver their loans
which by the end of tL ?o™
° aUSing anxiet to
borrowers and Anders alikl
many
deve l°Ping ^
^*
countries will need
f nance over the
next twenty
years to produce
!
Y
t
rOVement
in
health
and
nutrition? in mineral and tSS
development, or in
sustaining sat?sfac?orTg^

1L^

^

With respect to technology,
the Commission noted
number of difficulties:

a

i,e

hn^i ^ LI ? S] may bene fit bfrom direct investment
fully s ^- d : h
ich
"as- c^sir^i^iLrLnsior
?r
,
technol °^
through licenses' but only on
terml se?
f
corporations
They do nol "sh^lose
controller
eC ° nom es; the

^

:

i

SSSrXlo£?&

y want to be able to trade on fair
eXPertiSe With the transnaSonar

The Commission also observed that
the mechanisms for
creating and distributing international
means of payment
were influenced by the national
policies of a few industrialized countries and that the South
(LICs) sought a
greater degree of influence in international
monetary

decision-making
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Nevertheless, the developmental performance of
most
LICs ever since decolonization (from early
1950s on) did not
fulfill the optimistic expectations of
modernizationists
In fact, the LICs debt burden was estimated
to range from

$800 billion to $950 billion by 1985. 48

Among LICs,

Africa's debt burden was only $129 billion in 1985. 49

While

this debt burden is relatively small compared to Asia's
and

Latin America's, its debt service, however, is very high in

relation to its gross domestic products. 50
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To sum up, the historical
significance of the
developmentalist (structuralist
or modernization, paradigm
should not be underestimated.
It brought to the attention
of the social sciences some
issues hitherto ignored or
unexplained save snap-shot
explanation of the Lies by the
anthropologists. The important
assumption of the modern-

ization paradig* was that it would
not only explain the
situation of poverty in LICs but
would also suggest policies
to overcome it.
However, after decades of research
and policy formulations change did not take place as
expected.
In fact, the
economic and political situation in
these countries went
from bad to worse, precipitating a
veritable crisis for the
developmental ist paradigm. Many scholars of
development
concluded that the developmental ist paradigm
is unable to
fully explicate the problems of the existing
LICs

development; thus they sought for a new explanation. 51

The

result was the emergence of a dependency/world
system
paradigm.

The Dependen cy Paradigm

The dependency paradigm arose in reaction to the

failures of the optimistic growth models proposed by

neoclassicists and structuralists (modernizers) discussed
above.

It is an eclectic body of thought incorporating

several hues of opinion; even the individual authors within
this tradition are not often consistent in their argument.
64

There are differences in
their approaches, degrees
of
emphasis, and policy recommendations.
in this paradigm the
inequality in wealth and power
between the ICs and the LICs is
seen as a key reason for

transferring a huge amount of Lie
(surplus) wealth to the
ICs, regardless of LICs
consent.
The result is not only
the development of the ICs (this
paridigm's

center) but also

the underdevelopment, or dependent
and distorted development, of the LICs (the periphery). 52
short, the
theorists contend that the developmentalist
strategy of
development leads inexorably to neocolonialism.

m

The dependency theory got its
inspiration from the
works of, inter alia, Hobson, Magdoff,
Sweezy, Lenin, and
Nkrumah, who are scholars of imperialism
and neo-imperial53
ism;
and from structural theories on the effects
of

dependency relations in the international
political and
54
economic system.
Dependency theory argues that
the

international relationship today between the LICs and
the
ICs creates economic underdevelopment in the former
and

development in the latter.
Moreover, the dependency theorists claim that the

Modernizers' assumption that development takes place only by

following the western model is both an ahistorical under-

standing
L I Cs

— because

— and

it ignores the colonial experiences of the

a false understanding of the ICs development

processes. 55

Indeed, they claim that the ICs, the

capitalist ones in particular, prevent the LICs from
65

choosing their own development
path. 56
countries like Japan have escaped

if non-western

the present condition of

LICs, they argue,

it is because such countries
have managed

to escape colonialism.

Andre Gunder Frank, in his essay
"Sociology of
Development and Underdevelopment of
Sociology," challenged
not only the sociologically
oriented modernization theories
of Parsons, Levy, and Wilbert
Moore, but also attacked

neoclassicists and modernizers such as
Hoselitz, Hagen,
McClelland, Rostov, Nash, et al. 57 Frank
contends that,
despite differences in their explanations
of modernization
theory, these writers were united in
their acceptance of an
ideal-type methdology, a trickle-down notion
of social

change, and a specific type of orientation
to end under-

development.

Frank's essay not only runs counter to modem

ization theories but also attacks some Marxist
inter-

pretations (to be discussed in the next section)

,

which

shared with some developmental ists the dual vision of
LICs.

Frank is not the only dependentista, nor is he the sol

originator of the dependency theory.

Bath and James claim

dependency theory as the creation of U.S. scholars. 58
Bodenheimer and later O'Brien thought that it is rooted in
the works of the Economic Commission for Latin America
(ECLA)

and neo-Marxist and Marxist writers. 59

Foster-

Carter trace its origin exclusively to the neo-Marxist

writings

—a

modified version of the earlier theories of

imperialism. 60

Trimberger attempted to differentiate
66

between Lenin's and TrotsinM=
irotsky s theory of^
imperialism from
that of the dependency
theory of Frank and
Wallerstein «
Cardoso and later Fernandes
traoe the origin of dependency
theory from the works of
Lenin and Trotsky to recent
.

theorists."

This conflicting claim of
the origin of
dependency theory is further
complicated by other claims and
counterclaims of parentage of the
theory. Albert o.
Hirschman presented F. H. Cardoso
and o. Sunkel as the
63
founders.

We think Peter Evans correctly
stated the origin and
the continuity of the development
of the theory.
According
to him, the dependency tradition
began in Europe with Lenin
and Hobson, and later was developed
in the United States
by

Marxists such as Baran and Frank.

This theory was further

developed by Latin Americans, such as
Celso Furtado,
Cardoso, F. Fernandes, and 0. Sunkel. 64

F.

H.

The contribution to the origin of one
very important
strand of this school came from the works
of Latin Americans
working in ECLA, established in 1948 in Santiago,
Chile,

with the Argentinian economist Raul Prebisch
as its chief
65
executive.
The origin of ECLA in turn can be
traced,

ironically, back to the neoclassical s key propositions.
'

The initial argument of this school is Latin American's

"peripheral" position vis-a-vis the ICs, as reflected in the

region's historical evolution as an exporter of raw materials.

In this way, ECLA's thesis linked Latin American

underdevelopment to the world economic system.
67

Frank's views are also shared by
many other dependency
theorists. Amin, an African scholar,
for instance, argued
that the impact of ics on the economy
of LICs creates
"peripheral capitalism," a social system
in which the total
articulation of the capitalist mode of
production
is

hindered, thus resulting in distorted
economic develop66
ment.
From the same school, Rodney, a Guyanese
scholar,
provides the most incisive analysis of how
Europe underdeveloped Africa by siphoning off its surplus. 67
Sunkel and
Paz affirms Frank's original thesis by arguing
that development is a global, structural process of change,
and under-

developed countries are those countries which lack an
autonomous capacity for change and growth, and which depend
for these on the center. 68

Emmanuel argued that underdevelopment is caused by the

absence of high wages in LICs.

Low wages neither stimulate

sufficient market outputs, nor cause the development of
capitalist goods sector in LICs.

a

Thus, according to

Emmanuel, if private capitalists agree to pay high wages,

then these countries can achieve economic development. 69
His theoretical approach involves identifying an independent

variable and relating other phenomena to that variable as
its effect.

In, Unequal Exchange.

Emanuel states how any

system of analysis must be based on a predetermined data:

Any system of analysis must ultimately be based on one
or more data taken from outside the system.
These data
are independent variables. Without them analysis comes
to a dead end and the argument becomes circular. 70

68

Emanuel specifies differential
wage rates as the key
factor from which all other model
determinations are
explicitly derived. Thus, he writes,
"wages are the
independent variable, and prices (and
so the terms of trade)
are the dependent variables of the
system." 71 This simple
causal chain is, according to Emmanuel,
"Marx's position,

which forms the basis of my thesis." 72

Classes, in

Emmanuel's theory, are determined by their
relationship to
this wage rate. Those who receive the
wage rate comprise
the working class. Those who receive
the remainder-after
the wage is paid— comprise the capitalist
class. 73
Thus,

class is defined in reference to type of
income and the
possession of "essential" conditions of existence.
Exploitation is considered by him as the outcome of
monetary flow
(in the form of higher wage payments)

from the periphery to

the center.

Then there is Wallerstein

'

s

world-system and world

economy approach in which he divides the world capitalist
system into three vertically structured states
the semi-periphery, and the periphery. 74

— the

core,

According to

Wallerstein 's thesis, closely related to that of Frank, the
essential difference between the three world segments lies
in the power of their respective state machineries.

The

periphery has the weakest power; the core the strongest; and
the semi-periphery, the medium power.

Wallerstein assumes

these inequalities eventually lead to the transfer of

surplus from the periphery to the center, thereby further
69

enhancing the power of the core
state. 75 The semiperiphery, between these two
antagonistic points, serves as
a buffer zone to prevent
a possible collision between
them.
Any attempt by the periphery to
be the center of a socialist
economy is blocked by the
"world-capitalist-system." 76
It should also be pointed out that,
for Wallerstein, a
class analysis of peripheral societies
is of secondary
interest, since the class-structures of
those societies have

already been specified once their peripheral
status has been
77
established.
A peripheral location in the world
economy
necessarily entails reliance on coerced labor,
which

implies

class structures and relations adapted to
coercive labor
control

Because substantial growth occured in numerous
LICs
including Tanzania and Kenya, during the early and
late

1960 's, this in turn gave rise to a theory of
dependent

development

as well as to a countervailing neoclassical

line of argument. 78

For dependent development to take

place, three basic prerequisites must be fulfilled.

First,

the LICs must possess sufficient material and human

resources to support domestic industrialization.

Second,

the state must play a major role in transforming the

formerly stagnant nonindustrial economy, both by becoming

actively involved in developmental activities that could not

otherwise be accomplished and by forcing concessions from
foreign multinational corporations.

Third, some degree of

international economic competition must be present.
70

The

'

resulting growth implies a continued
external dependence and
internal dependence (to be discussed
below).
As a result,

dependent industrialization remains
qualitatively inferior
to economic structures in the ICs. 79
Dependent development, like dependency
theory, thus
implies a significant dependency by the
LICs on the

political economy of the ICs.

But, the creation of the

category of "dependent industrialization"
(dependent
development) is an attempt to reflect the
development
reality in some LICs. Such a position was
maintained at the
expense of eliminating the original purpose of
the

dependency theory, which was to explain "the
morphology of
backwardness" (non-industrialization and the persistence

of

the pattern of primary commodity production
throughout
LICs).

In other words,

first the structure of dependency

was considered bad because it blocked industrialization.

When the latter was achieved, it also became bad because it

remained within the structure of dependency. 80
The arguments of Frank and others that industrial-

ization could not take place at all in

LICs because

of

imperialism then changed to a somewhat different claim by
other dependency theorists.

They stated that imperialism

would allow industrialization, but only if the LICs were

willing to occupy a subordinate position within the
international division of labor.

This did not mean that the

LICs had to remain content as primary producers, but would

have to be satisfied with low technology, low profit, and
71

high polluting industries
rendered obsolete by the ics.
short, the ics would allow
the Lies to develop "this
far and
no further." This view
is olosely related to
Wallerstein's
approach discussed above. 81

m

Despite the existence of various
competing views on
dependency theory, there are
certain specific points on
which all the writers are agreed.
First, they cite power as
their point of entry and essence,
around which they
focus

their organizing idea and their
reductionist logic. All
argue that the existing structure
of international trade
constrains the success of many LICsdevelopment efforts
while accelerating the ICs, because
the power

of the ICs

determines who trades what at which price. 82

Put dif-

ferently, the development and underdevelopment
are partial,
interdependent structures of one global system.
The
condition of the LICs are closely related
with the

capitalist expansion of the ICs.
Second, dependency theorists, in general, agree
that

development and underdevelopment are two sides of
a unified
system.

Underdevelopment, therefore, is the outcome of the

historical relationship (through trade and colonialism)

between the periphery and the core countries.

It is the

result of the development of capitalism on a world scale at
the expense of the periphery.

Historically, underdevelop-

ment and development have been simultaneous processes that
have been linked in a functional way, that is, have interacted and conditioned themselves mutually. 83
72

Third, the dependency
theorists insist that underdevelopment is not a natural
and temporary precapitalist
stage that must be experienced
by all nations. Europe
was
once undeveloped, but not
underdeveloped as are many LICs
in
Africa, Asia and Latin America.
Given the power of the ICs
and the weak conditions of
the LICs, underdevelopment
is not
seen as a transitional stage,
but rather as a persistent
condition that will last so long
as unequal exchange between
the ICs and the LICs continues.
The periphery gears
its

production to export, not because
it lacks internal markets,
but because the highly developed
productivity of the center
compels it to be a complementary
supplier, usually of
agricultural and mineral products for
industrial
needs.

Supranational lending agencies (especially
the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund)
are seen as partners of
the ICs in this exploitative relationship. 84
Fourth, the dependency theorists also
agree that

the subordinate relationship of LICs is not
confined to
external ties. They claim that dependence
extends to the
internal social structure, ideology and cultural
beliefs,
and internal decision-making apparatus.

That is,

metropolitan-satellite relations are found not only in an
international context but also in the internal situation.
For instance, the internal dependent class structures of

LICs are dominated by a small political and economic elite

closely tied to foreign interests who may or may not be

physically present in the country.
73

Only cash crop

production becomes well developed.
artifact of the colonial

And while this

i,
ls

an

past, it is continued by
present

political elites because of
the advantages it continues
to
provide them. The surplus
generated from such economic
activities is diverted either
overseas, through exported
profits, or internally into
conspicuous consumption

by local

elites and a small labor aristocracy,
with limited amounts
being invested in capital-intensive
technologies or import
85
substitution.
Thus the view that the world
capitalist system causes
underdevelopment by generating and
reinforcing within LICs
an infrastructure of dependency
is more or less accepted by
all dependency theorists.
This view has been articulated by
Wallerstein and Frank with a wealth of
historical
evidence.

They have not restricted their attention
to Latin America
and to some extent to Africa; rather
they have shown the

working of this process everywhere else too.
Since the early 1980s, with the decline of
foreign
investment and aid, and the increase in the external
debt
assumed by the LICs, the dependency theorists still
hold the
same explanations: that foreign exploitation of the
periphery by the core is the culprit.

In this situation,

interest

payments to creditors in the ICS take the place of siphoning
off surplus from the periphery to the core, thus creating a
form of "debt-peonage". 86

in the case of LICs which have

failed in repayment of their debt, it is argued that the

conditions set by the IMF (or by the private bank creditors)
74

are such that the -poor" are
forced to shoulder the debt
burden.

Where the developmental ists view debt
as a way of
transferring wealth from the ICs to the
LICs, the dependency
theorists view it as a means for extracting
wealth from the
periphery to the core. The corollary of
this is that the
free flow of capital and commodities in
international
markets, instead of leading to economic
growth,
as in the

neoclassical approach, serves to widen the gap
between the
core and periphery, developed and underdeveloped,
modern

and

traditional, North and South countries.

From this per-

spective, the current external debt of LICs reflects
merely

the contemporary form of that groups' exploitation
by

foreign powers. 87

The Orthodox Marxist Paradigm

This school uses the mode of production as its entry

point in the discourse.

Its adherents contend that a

social, economic and political transformation will take

place in LICs through a transfer of capital, technology, and

managerial and organizational skills from the ICs to LICs.
This school questions the underdevelopment thesis, and

argues that the penetration of foreign capital in the

economies of the LICs ultimately will result in the

development of industrial capitalism by destroying their
precapitalist formations.

This vulgar interpretation of the

75

works of Marx was developed
as recently as 1973 (and
1980
by Bill Warren, and in 1975
by Geoffrey Kay. 88
These theorists often quote
Marx's famous statement in
DaS Kap ita1 (also found
the
,

^

Communis

M.n^,-^

„

the

country that is more developed
industrially only shows to
the less developed the image
of its own future." 89 Also
quoted are his writings on India
(as a justification

for use

in other LICs such as Africa)

,

in which he predicted that
a

process of industrialization would
take place as a result of
investment by British capitalists. 90
That was not all.
Orthodox Marxists also often quote
Lenin's Imperial ism
Highest Stage, of Cap italism, "the export
of capital greatly
affects and accelerates the development
of capitalism

^

in

those countries to which it is exported." 91

Writers like Bill Warren, armed with selective
quotes
as above, and basing their works on
empirical data, have
described in detail the industrialization which
they claimed
had occurred in LICs. Warren set out to demonstrate

LICs

development by using the standards of measurement,
such as
GNP,

level of industrialization, and rate of capitalist

growth, similar to the ones used by the neo-classicists

Like them, he too equated advances in productive capacity

with the full development of LICs.

By producing figures on

industrialization he concluded that,
empirical observations suggest that prospects for
successful capitalist economic development of a
significant number of major underdeveloped countries
are quite good
substantial progress in capitalist
industrialization has already been achieved. 2
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Thus, he placed great emphasis
upon the primacy of internal
factors in the emergence and
growth of capitalism in LICs,

with the state playing a strategic
role.
Whatever problems and limitations
may be found in
Warren's books, including his ImperialP

Capitalism

^^

r „f

he deserves credit for at least
boldly pointing
out Lies' industrialization.
Like him, many neoclassical
writers had also reached similar
conclusions. 93 Thus, he
effected no "Copernican" revolution
with his theory of
,

economic development.

Nor did he really discover any new

facts.

He saw capitalist progress as completely
unproblematic.
True, he acknowledged that the transfer
of capitalism
to the LICs entailed a great deal of
human suffering.
But
he did not acknowledge any functional or
other difficulties
in the transfer of industrial capitalism
from ICs to the
LICs.
Nor did he give full recognition to important

systematic variations within the general pattern of
LICs
development.

He also failed to recognise that specific

national policy regimes and institutional arrangements are
not properly considered in the analysis of the variations
in

economic performance between countries. His account of the
spread of industrial capital to LICs is as straightforward
as the "trickle down" paradigm.

You pour in enough capital

on one end and, if you wait long enough, sufficient number
of people will benefit because the capital will eventually

spread to the rest of the population.
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More seriously, however,
Warren made it appear as if
imperialist intervention was
exclusively aimed at rousing
the slumbering forces of
production in the LICs. He failed
to mention many instances in
which the ICs used force
against LICs seeking to industrialize
or gain control of
their own key national resources.
Such use of

force is not

a new phenomenon.

it dates as far back as the
1860's and

the fall of Mohammed Ali in Egypt. 94

Since then, economic, political, and
military intervention in the LICs by the ICs have
continued throughout the
post-World War II period. Two examples
suffice: the 1956
British and French invasion of Egypt in
retaliation
for the

nationalization of the Suez Canal; 95 and the
CIA's successful overthrow of Premier Mossadegh in
Iran following
his

take-over of foreign oil companies. 96

True, available

evidence shows that some ICs, including the U.S.,
have

promoted industrialization in some instances, and
acceded to
nationalization in others. This is particularly true in

the

case of Brazil, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Iran under the Shah,
and
so on.

But this does not remove the need for explaining why

in other circumstances industrialization and autonomy of

LICs have been retarded.
In our view, Warren's reductionist explanation of LIC

industrialization and economic growth is based on the
following assumptions:

First, he assumed that the problem

of LIC development is not underdevelopment, but non-

development.

Second, he reduces the complex, contradictory
78

class and non-class exploitative
relations between ICs and
LIC's into simple functional,
monotonic relations with a
positive slogan: the more imperialist
domination, the more
growth of the Lie forces of production.
In his concept of transformation,
he ignored the

numerous instances in which force,
violence, and numerous
other methods are used to prevent (or
encourage) Lie

industrialization and autonomy.

Similarly he ignored the

long lag time between the establishment
of complex class and
non-class relations, and capitalist relations
of production,
especially in primary commodities and the
creation of an

industrially competitive industrial base.

in this way he

was able to assert that where there is development
in the
LICs it is a consequence of imperialism which
produces
capitalism.

In so far as there is non-development it is a

consequence of the blunders of LICs' administrative
elites. 97

Why either one or the other happens is not very

clear.
True, it can be argued that Marx did fail (if one

chooses to ignore his writings on Ireland and others) in the

article on India to foresee the seriousness of the problem
of "late industrialization."

As many scholars, both friend

and foe of Marx, have pointed out, his belief that the

introduction of the railroads in India would revolutionize
its villages did not fully materialize.

There remain

numerous villages in India that are unchanged from the days
of the British Raj

.

There is no reason to suppose that
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massive injection of "foreign
capital" into LICs win bring
all Lies up to the standard
that Marx envisioned.
Perhaps
the next century will see
the fulfillment of Marx's
prediction as interpreted by
orthodox Marxists; perhaps not;
perhaps it will be in the 22nd
centUTy
In any
_

^^

problems of political economy are
not solved in -geological,
time.

An even more extreme argument
along the line of Warren
is that of Geoffrey Kay.
He argues that "capital created
underdevelopment, not because it exploited
the underdeveloped world, but because it did not
exploit
it

enough".
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Thus, he found the causes of the
persistent

economic "underdevelopment" in LICs not
in imperialism but
in the persistence of merchant
capitalism.
For him merchant
capital still remains dominant in LICs; thus
the surplus

product appropriated (expropriated) is, largely,
reinvested
in trade rather than production.
In short, he maintains
that had imperialism more thoroughly penetrated
the LICs
they would not have remained underdeveloped.

There are of course almost as many interpretations of

orthodox Marxism as there are orthodox Marxists."

This

school's views are also much more complex than what had been

argued by Warren and others.

Admittedly, all agree that

underdevelopment in the periphery can best be understood in
terms of the internal structures of the states, i.e., in
terms of their mode of production.
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This, and the

emergence and evolution of capitalism in the center
80

(European countries), reflect
^uect a r-*i
relatively common ground
among orthodox Marxists. ™
Their emphasis on the mode
of
production is also common to all.
Their commonality,
however, ends in their debates
about the appropriate way to
analyze economic, political and
social structures
i

,

in LICs.

Three broad positions have been
surveyed by a number of
102
Marxist scholars.
I shall present those
aspects of the
debate relevant to our discussion.
The debate centers around the issue
of the base of
society (its economics) and its
superstructure (its

politics, culture and ideology).

The first is a so-called

classical position, often referred to
pejoratively by
critics as "vulgar Marxism," in which the
econonmy

determines everything else. 103
school.

Warren belongs to this

The second position stands the first on
its head:

instead of the economy as determinant, the
non-economic

aspects of society determine the economy. 104

A third holds a

middle position by allowing economic and non-economic
aspects to affect each other, but by affirming in the last
instance that the economy determines everything else. 105

All

claim to be true to the spirit and writings of Marx, and all
cite ample evidence to support their side of the story. 106
The first position claims that the two economic
aspects, the forces of production (read technology) and the

relations of production (read class), combine together to
form the base.

The dialectical relations of the two in turn

determine the forms and development of the superstructure
81

(the political elites, the
laws that govern society,
the
kind of curriculum produced
to disseminate education,
the

kind of music produced, the
cultural processes, and so
107
on).
Thus, the mode of production
contains within itself
the power to determine those
superstructural laws, cultural
processes, etc., within society
which are necessary for

the

reproduction of that mode. "
1

m

short, in this theorizing

the non-economic aspects of society
are regarded as an
epiphenomenon. They exist because they
serve to reproduce
the economic base or mode of
production.

There are theoretical disquiets within
this school of
economic determinists between those who
privilege the forces
of production, such as Warren, and
those who privilege the
relations of productions, such as Dobb. 109
Those who espouse
the second position (non-economic determinants)
view some
aspect (s) of the superstructure as crucial taking
it (them)
to be the determinants of the economy.
Like neoclassicists,
this group treats power over the individuals and/or
property, or human consciousness as the ultimate

determinants of class behavior, technology and culture. 110
Those who focus their attention on power and property claim
that the latter ultimately determines the economic, political and social behavior of society.

111

in contrast, those

who focus on human consciousness posit the essential

position of humans and their human consciousness (of class)
and the realization of that position as the basis on which

82

society changes. 112
?

rpipnaf^ the economy
Both relegate
uotn
to the

secondary level.
Others, such as Hirst and
Hindes, who espouse the third
position, in an attempt to
circumvent the criticism leveled
at economic determinants allow
the superstructure and the
base to interact and affect one
another and, at various

points in history, even dominate one
another. 113 Nevertheless, this group remains committed
to the argument that
in the last instance the economy
determines everything else.
The mode of production, therefore,
determines whether (and
when) the economy and the non-economy
dominate one another
at a particular historical epoch. 114
For instance,
in LICs,

politics and religion may dominate the economy
(where
domination is a function of the particular mode
of production present at that moment in history) and
facilitate

the

exploitation of the society.
These particular tendencies in the orthodox school
have
all adhered to the same essentialist epistemological
terrain

and terms of debate.

All claim to have captured in theory

the true, essential determinants of social reality,

in

other words, all appeal to either empiricism or rationalism,
or both, to support their respective positions.

All seem to

know what determines the nature of society or what constitutes the true knowledge.
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Conclusi on
If the dependency paradigm
had elaborated a large, but
completely untenable, body of theory
to demonstrate the
impossibility of overcoming dependency
without

de-linking
from the system (the Tanzanian
experiment in socialism was
perhaps the most widely discussed example
within the African
continent)
orthodox Marxists did not try to adequately
explain why what had once seemed utterly
impossible (i.e.,
the industrialization of LICs) had now
finally taken place.
Instead these authors merely sidestepped the
complex
,

theoretical issues, by effectively denying that
there had
ever been a problem of lagging industrial
development.

Dependent istas ask, why did it take (as orthodox
Marxists
such as Bill Warren seem to imply) 150 years for
any

appreciable industrialization to take place in the LICs?
By avoiding the question,

it was impossible for Warren and

his followers to transcend the "dependency problematic."
All they could do was invert the dependency theory

portraying the LICs to be "fat," where dependentistas had
shown them to be "skinny."

Where dependentistas had affirmed the impossibility of
industrialization, the orthodox Marxist school insisted on
its inevitability.

Where dependentistas saw stagnation,

they saw growth; where dependentistas pointed to increased

misery and starvation, orthodox Marxists saw improvement in
material conditions; claims about income inequality were

countered by evidence of improvements in income dis84

tribution.

Where dependent istas assumed
imperialism to be
monolithic, orthodox Marxists recognized
the possibilities
for LICs exploiting intra-imperialist
rivalries.
The problems of LICs posed by
dependentistas, such as
the difficulty of creating a market large
enough
for

indigenous economies of scale in impoverished
societies, the
competition with already existing capitalist
countries
in

the West, the disparities in political and
military power
that precluded the option exercised by Western
Europe and
the U.S. in the 19th century (i.e., of closing the
economy
and carrying out industrialization behind tariff
walls)
and
so on, are simply dismissed as pseudo-problems or
non-events
,

by the orthodox Marxist school.

African states, who sub-

scribe to this school, such as Congo Brazzaville (1969),

Somalia (1970), Benin (1974), Madagascar (1975), Ethiopia
(1976)

,

and the former Portuguese colonial empire

(Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau)

thought that they could

easily overcome their development problems by applying the

scientific socialist method.
Dependentistas such as Frank have given us a bleak
future when they pose the choice for underdeveloped

countries as continued underdevelopment or revolution.

The

benefits promised by Rostowian modernizationists could not
reach and penetrate, as hoped, the larger sections of the
community.

Instead, the modernizers' paradigm enabled the

rich to become richer and the poor poorer.
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Such contra-

dictions of capitalism are evident
in many of the African
countries, including Kenya, and
probably will intensify.
And yet, the optimism of some orthodox
Marxists, like
Warren, in light of mass poverty,
unemployment
and

starvation in Africa, is disturbing.

The persistence of

political repression of workers in many African
countries
which orthodox Marxists believed will transform
to

socialism, indicates that they ignore the
dynamic and
complex nature of the world in order to preserve
and perfect

their theory.

For them, capitalist domination was supposed

to bring with it the democratic conditions in which
the

proletariat can organize itself politically as a precondition for overcoming capitalism.

Because, according to

orthodox Marxists, the proletariat cannot exist at the lower
stage of development, the "masses" were to be organized by

a

party led by "conscious" political elites who incarnate the
politics ordained by historical orthodoxy.

The party's role

is then determined by theory without taking the particular

country's complex and dynamic social relations into consideration.

Such narrowly conceived development plans are

moribund, as the experiences of Kenya and Tanzania show.
The plans will ultimately fall of their own weight.
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PART II

TANZANIA AND KENYA

Chapter

4

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Introdunt i on
In the preceding chapter we
outlined the three main

theoretical models of development (or
underdevelopment) in
order to introduce the dominant
development paradigms that
influence development policies in LICs
such as

Tanzania* and

Kenya.

The assessment of the impact of
these paradigms and
of the contemporary international
order (or disorder) cannot
be complete without, at least, a general
comprehension
of

LIC's, in our case, Tanzania's and Kenya's
political and

economic colonial history.

We believe that the colonial

experiences by both countries had three major
consequences.
First, it hastened the destruction of traditional
land

tenure patterns among the various tribes without
replacing

them or alleviating any of the consequent distress.

Second,

it fueled nationalist anger at the allegedly unjust

acquisition of African land by European settlers under

*

The mainland was called Tanganyika before it formed a
union in 1964 with the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba, off
the coast of Tanganyika. Throughout this chapter (unless
otherwise indicated) the country shall be referred to as
Tanzania although the discussion concerns only events on the
mainland.
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colonial auspices.

post-independence

Third , it laid the foundation

develops

^^

patterns of both countries
and
assured their economies
incorporation into the world
economy. The first consequence
magnified the second and the
third.
colonial land policy, in the
cases of Tanzania

and
Kenya, resulted in the
dissolution of traditional tribal
land tenure patterns only after
the outbreak of the Mau Mau
and the Maji Maji uprisings
respectively, and with the
problems of political rights only
after both countries'

sudden propulsion towards independence
in the 1960 -s.
This
chapter will present a capsule summary
of these experiences.

Environm ental Faptnrg
Geography**

The Republic of Tanzania possesses the
most varied
ecology, even in comparison to any other
African country.

1

Tanganyika, the name prior to independence,
means literally
the "bush behind Tanga." Tanga, a port on
the northeastern
coast of the country (see map 3), is the one
specific place
in the territory's name.
The rest of the title
is vague,

refering to the bush behind the town.

This may well be a

reflection of the coastal people's ignorance of the
hinterland.

Unless otherwise noted all information concerning the
geography of both Kenya and Tanzanya are taken from, E. A.
Boateng, A Politi cal Geography of Africa (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 199-217.
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in any case, until the
middle of the nineteenth
century, the interior of
Tanganyika remained less well

known
to outsiders than its Indian
Ocean coast. There is a
belt
of tropical forest along
the coast and on the islands
of
Zanzibar and Pemba. It contains
the highest mountain, Mount
Kilimanjaro, which rises to
19,340 ft., and the lowest spot
in Africa, the floor of Lake
Tanganyka, which is believed
to

be 1,175 ft. below sea level. 2

The united Republic of Tanzania
encompasses a land area
of 364,900 square miles, including
the three off-shore
islands of Zanzibar, Pemba and Mafia,
measuring about 1200
sguare miles. 3 The country borders
with Uganda and Kenya on
the north; with Zaire, Rwanda,
Burundi on the west; and with
Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique on the
south (see map
1)

.

its

coast line stretches 500 miles on the
east along the Indian
Ocean.

Tanzania did not offer an environment conducive
to the
development of sustained economic activity. Over
half its
area is unable to support agricultural
production
due to

shortage of water in the hinterland. 4

During the interwar

period only 10 percent of the territory was then well
watered, and this area contained about 2/3rd of the
total

population.
a

Most fertile and densely populated areas lie in

huge broken circle in the northern and south-western

highlands on the periphery of the country's borders. 5
But there are also highland areas, including several of

volcanic origin, where rainfall is high, the soil fertile,
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and the climate cool, so
that temperate crops can
be grown.
This comprises only one
fifth of Tanzania 4 and when
one
considers that almost 90 percent
of the population i
dependent on agriculture for
its livelihood, the particul"
ar
nature of the climate negates
the advantage of Tanzania's
considerable size. 7
The West comprises a plateau,
about 1000 meters above
sea level, where the rainfall
averages more than 750 millimeters a year. It has also great
lakes such as Lake
Tanganyka; Lake Victoria which is
shared by both Uganda and
Kenya; and Lake Nyasa, along the
border with Malawi
in the

South-west.

There are also several rivers, some
of them
with the potential to produce hydro-electric
power

and the

possibility of developing irrigation. 8
In 1985, Tanzania had an estimated
population of 22.2

millions, of whom 48 percent were under the
age of fifteen. 9
There are some 120 tribes, with none having a
majority. The
largest, the Sukuma tribe, comprises only 13
percent of the
total population. 10 The absence of a dominant
tribe is

highly advantageous, given the fact that most countries
in
Africa which have dominant tribes suffer from tribal
dissent
and the development of rival subnationalisms
a one

.

The fact that

party state could evolve without violence, as has been

the case in many parts of Africa, attests to this fact.
The Republic of Kenya, on the other hand, encompases

225,000 square miles, equal to the size of France.

population of approximately 20.1 million people.
100

It has a

The

proportion of the population
under the age of 15 numbers
approximately 51 percent."
The equator crosses
Republic 90 miles north of
Nairobi, the capital city.
The
country has nearly 14,000
sg.km. of water

^

surface, and of

the remaining land surface,
about 2/3rd is semi-arid
or
desert.
Only about 18 percent of
Kenya is fit for
agricultural production.
The country has several
lakes,
including Lake Victoria, the
largest lake in Africa and the
second largest in the world.
Kenya borders Somalia and the
Indian ocean in the East, Tanzania
in the South, Ethiopia
and Sudan in the North, and Lake
Victoria and Uganda in the
West (see map l)
.

It has seven administrative
provinces,

Nairobi.

in addition to

They are, in order of size, the
Rift Valley,

Eastern, North-Eastern, Coast, Nyanza,
Central, and Western.
About 98 percent of the people living
in these provinces are
persons of African origin, with the
remainder from Europe
and Southwest Asia.
In 1957, three years before

independence, Europeans, comprising several
nationalities,
numbered almost 60, 000. 13

There is heavy rainfall on the coast and in the
Highlands.

semi-desert.

Elsewhere it is sparse; a large part of Kenya is
For land to be suitable for agriculture

30

40 inches is necessary, yet only l/3rd of the country

receives a rainfall of more than 20 inches.

The average

rainfall for Northern Kenya is under 10 inches, the East

receives less than an average of
101

20

inches.

14

to

in sharp contrast, large
areas of the Highlands
have a
rainfall of 40 to 50 inches,
and in some places the
average
rxses to over 60 inches.
But overall, the rainfall
is
unreliable and as one might
expect this unpredictability
has
influenced the history and
political economy of Kenya. *
Tanzania and Kenya share many
features.
As has been
pointed out, both countries have
their richest farmland in
the highland areas between
4,000 and 7,000 feet above sea
level, which are most suitable
for the cultivation of coffee
and tea. While Kenya has no
mineral deposits, Tanzania
1

possesses large deposits of iron ore
and coal that could
contribute significantly to its
national income. 16
As one might expect in both countries,
the bulk of the
population is heavily concentrated in
the arable land areas.
Both countries share a common language,
Kiswahili, and both
were British colonies, Tanzania after
WW I when the British
took possession of the German colonies.
When they were part
of the British empire both countries,
including Uganda, were
closely linked in a customs union, having a
postal union and

shared airways, currency, common railways, and
other
systems.

17

Many hoped that this common bond would even-

tually lead to a political union once they gained
their
independence.

But such a hope was soon dashed because the

political, economic and colonial history of each differs,
to
some extent, making it difficult for such union to take
place.

18
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Indeed, the two countries
"slowly but surely fell
apart, culminating in the
demise of the celebrated East
African Community in June 1977."
why this is so has been
the subject of numerous
studies. 20 Here we will confine
ourselves to presenting a capsule
summary of the political
and economic history of the
two countries.

History

When European settlers first
arrived in Tanzania and
Kenya they had very little or
often a distorted knowledge
about Africa. To them, Africa was
a place where they were
needed to civilize inferior creatures
who lived there.

Not
surprisingly, such preconceptions and
justification for
settlement led them to the conclusion
that the African way
of doing things was savage, and while
theirs was civilized.
Elspeth Huxley, one of the most vocal
apologists of
colonization, summed it up when she explained
the reasons
behind colonization:

inherent conviction that civilization in itself
was good
Civilization was good, savagery was bad.
The logical corollary of this belief was that
who spread civilization was doing right, was anyone
conferring
a benefit on the people he helped to civilize
There
could be no question, therefore, but that the white
was paramount, and must remain so until the native man
became— if he ever did— the intellectual equal of the
European.
[An]

Another apologist of colonialism, Lord Lugard, was more
frank:

The growing population of Europe, together with its
industrial expansion, ... led to the replacement of
agriculture by manufacturing industry, with the
consequent necessity for new markets for the product of
the factory, and the importation of raw materials for
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Based on these views, the
Europeans began their
scramble for Africa in the late
19th and early 20th
centuries.
The European occupation of
Tanzania and Kenya
took place between 1885 and 1895
at the very moment when
European powers were locked in
fierce rivalry over
political, economic and territorial
claims and

counterclaims. *

Their decision to partition Africa
at the
Berlin Conference was partly designed
to divert their

serious internal political problems
from escalating into
world war. 25 in any case, the scramble
left Germany with
possession of Tanganyika, and Britain with

a

Kenya.

Tanzania

Germany's interest in East Africa began in the
middle
of the century, when German business houses
were established
in Zanzibar, and German missionaries and
explorers under the

auspices of the English set foot on the mainland. 26

m

the Gesellschaft fur Deutsche Kolonisation (Society
for

104

1884

German Colonization) was set
up as a company by an
adventurer Karl Peters, one of
its founding members."
Under hi s
leadership, the island of
Zanzibar fell under the jurisdiction of Germany. From this
coastal foothold the German s
moved inland and encroached
into Tanganyka.

m

!885, as

result of the Berlin Conference
that took place between
1884-85, Germany officially took
possession of Tanganyka,
including Ruanda and Burundi, as
its colony, naming it
28
German East Africa.
The Berlin Conference of the
European powers thus
sanctioned the scramble for Africa and
laid the foundation
for them to establish their respective
spheres of interest
in Africa.
The subsequent Anglo-German agreement
of 1890

placed Tanganyika and Kenya under the
sole control of the
German and the British empire, respectively. 29
The establishment of German authority
over German East
Africa (hereafter referred to as Tanganyika)
was not easy.
It ignited an open warfare with the
indigenous people.

The

most famous organized resistance against the
German
authority has been recorded in history as the "Maj
i-Maj i" 30
rebellion of 1905-1907.

(Maji means water.

The water was

given by a medicine man, Kinjikitile, who taught that

Africans were one and that his medicine, the water, was
stronger than European weapons. 31

)

Lumley reports that the German authorities, because of

their frustration to control the resistance, took revenge by

killing over 100,000 people. 32
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In the process, not only did

they put the indigenous
people forcefuly under their
firm
control, but they also destroyed
all of the peoples' traditional political, economic
and juridical practices,

m

its

Place, they substituted a new
rule called the "Akida
System," known as "Direct Rule.""
Tnis system involved the
appointment of a minor African
administrator to enforce the
general orders of the German rulers. 34
Also, the new colonial legal
system institutionalized
private property, individual tenure,
labor contracts, and

master-servant relations, using the colonial
military and
35
police to enforce the laws.
the economic

m

realm, two

types of export production were attempted:
European plantations that employed wage labor and
communal farms on which
Africans were forced to work. The communal
farms,
in

particular, were a source of discontent that
grew into the
full-scale revolution of 1905-1906. 36

Rweyemamu observed that Germany decided to use its
colony as a secure source of cheap raw cotton for
its

growing textile industries in the metropole. 37

Con-

sequently, it developed a basic infrastructure (railroads,
harbors, a tropical plantation economy, civic buildings,

education and a certain residue of discipline) 38 and built
the estate sector in order to make its economic activities
in its colony as profitable as possible.

The task of

building the necessary infrastructure was left for the Ost-

Afrikanische Eisenbahn Gesellschaft. 39

As an incentive the

Reich gave the company all sorts of concessions, even free
106

grants of land and
capital.

percent interest guarantee on
its

3

40

The Company soon constructed a
central railway across
the territory, largely following
the old caravan routes.
Construction began at Dar es Salaam
(once the capital city)
in 1905.
The track reached Morogoro in
1907, Tabora in 1912
and Kigoma in 1914 (see map 3) .« A
railway line was also
opened in the sisal growing area of Korogwe
in 1902, and the
coffee and rubber growing areas around
42
Moshi in
1912.

The result was not disappointing to the
German Imperial
state, for the investment paid off. According
to Siedman,

"Tanganyika produced 20 percent of all the goods
imported by
Germany from its colonies and bought about 16
percent of the
goods exported by Germany to them in 1912.

" 43

Iliffe esti-

mated company and private capital invested in Tanganyika
in
1913 at f4, 800, 000, of which fl, 050, 000 went to the rail-

ways,

f 2, 400,

000 to agriculture, fl, 100, 000 to trade,

try and mining, and

f 2 50, 000

outbreak of World War

I,

industrial undertakings,

to banking. 44

indus-

Before the

there were about 270 commercial and
8

cotton plantations, 60 coffee

plantations, and about 440 plantations and farms for mixed

agricultural products. 44
This large capital investment belonged mainly to

immigrant nationalities of Asians, Germans, British, Greeks
and other Europeans.

Of these, the German nationals pre-

dominated numerically and as owners of big capital.
1913,

In

4000 out of a total of 5000 Europeans were Germans. 45
107

The Asian community, on the
other hand, was mainly concentrated in commercial activities. 46
The profit made by these
nationals in their local and
foreign capital investments was
enormous.
For instance, in
1911 alone their profit from sisal
production rose as high
as 25 per cent/ 7
(After WW II, during the Korean
boom of
the 1950s, the sisal companies
reaped enormous profits,
estimated as much as 72 and 45 percent
in 1951 and 1952

respectively/ 8

Even though this profit was part
of the
product of the Tanganyikan s labor it
was not reinvested
)

•

the country to benefit them.

in

Instead, as Rweyemamu's study

shows, in 1912 alone as much as 30
percent of the settlersprofit was repatriated. 49

Interestingly, the Germans, as opposed to the
British
in Kenya, never encouraged a permanent
settlement of German
nationals because they found Tanganyika's climate
not suitable for European settlement. 50 Moreover, there
were
no

mineral resources of value to encourage significant
European
settlement.

Neverthless, there were about 1000 settler

families, hardly enough to control and force the people to

work for them as in the case of the "White Highlands" of
Kenya. 51

The Germans gave about 1.3 million acres and the

British after World War

I

about 1.4 million to European

settlers as "alienated" land in Tanganyka. 52

Compared with

alienation of land in other British colonial possessions,

particularly in Kenya, this was relatively minor, though its
impact was substantial.
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After Germany's defeat in World
War I, the principal
Allied and Associated powers agreed,
pursuant to condit:lions
of the Treaty of Versailles (in
1920) and the League of
Nations, that the United Kingdom should
administer mainland
53
Tanzanya as a mandate.
it was the British who gave to the
mandate territory the new name of Tanganyika
and
set up

administrative structures, headed by a governor
assisted by
an executive council of nominated members.
On the surface, the mandate status seemed
advantageous
for Tanganyika, because it seemed to prevent
the British
from having direct and full control over it,
as it had over
its favorite colony— neighboring Kenya.
Also, the mandate

required the British to enforce economic development,
trade
relations with all members of the League of Nations and,
even after the demise of the League with its successor
the

United Nations, no further alienation of lands beyond what
had been carried out under German rule, and the guarantee
that the inhabitants of the territory would eventually

govern themselves. 54

In short, the mandate made it clear to

the British that the colony was to be administered in the

interests of "the material and moral well-being and the
social progress of its inhabitants." 55
But that did not deter the British from exploiting the

Tanganykan people.

In fact,

following World War

I,

a

closer

union between all British administered countries in East and
Central Africa was contemplated to facilitate

exploitation of the colonies.

a

further

It was only the absence of
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adequate transportation that
prevented the union fro, coming
to full fruition.
Even then, as early as
1927, the British
were able to succesfully
join Tanganyika, Uganda and
Kenya
in a common customs union.
its purpose, as admitted
by both
the British Foreign Office
and the British commercial
interests in East Africa, was
mainly to facilitate economic
development in the region for the
56
benefit of the

British.
If any indigenous people among
the colonized benefitted
in the region from this union,
it was not the Tanganikans,
but the Kenyans. This was because
foreign business owners
(mainly Asians, Greeks, and British
nationals), were unsure
of the mandate status of Tanganyka.
Therefore, they were

reluctant to invest there.

But in Kenya and other British

East African colonies where a significant
number of European
settlers lived and where the countries'
political status was
much clearer, foreign nationals were
investing heavily. 57
In the early 1930s, the European settlers
in Kenya

envisioned once again a European dominion in a
region
stretching from Kenya to Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe)
Tanganyika. 58

,

including

But because of the repercussions that their

superior racial attitude would have had throughout the
federation, the union was adamantly opposed by the colonial

Governor of Tanganyika as well as by the Indians and
Africans who lived in Uganda and Tanganyika. 59

Tanganyika

and Uganda were especially afraid because they thought

closer ties with Kenya would further undermine their limited
political freedom and economic progress. 60
110

in response to these
concerns, the Hilton Young

Commission (1929) recommended
that a formal East African
union should be postponed.
As a result, official efforts
to
federate temporarily subsided. 61
Meanwhile, the British
continued to settle their subjects
in Tanganyka; albeit in
small numbers compared with the
numbers of the Europeans
they helped settle in neighboring
Kenya. 62
any case, the
settlers in Tanzania never reached
sizable numbers to
threaten the future political
independence of the people as
the settlers in Kenya did to the
Kenyan peoples. 63
The British rule of Tanganyka under
the mandate lasted
from 1919 to 1945.
In 1946 the mandate status changed
to a
United Nations Trust Territory still
under British con-

m

trol. 64

Yet, the political and administrative
developments

in Tanganyika proceeded very slowly.

The first significant

change under the new system was the introduction
of a system
of administration now generally called
"Indirect Rule." 65
This system was a reversal of the German system
of

administration.

The new system was a form of administration

in which traditional chiefs serve as a conduit
between the

colonial administration and indigenous people.

Such an

administrative arrangement was effective since it made the
people feel that they actually participate in the management
of their own affairs when in fact they were not. 66
True, with the indirect rule the local authorities were

given token executive, judicial and financial powers over
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their ethnic groups.

This helped the British to
extend
their control over wide areas
of the trust territory,
especially where the traditional
chiefs had control over the
people.- But the system was
not entirely successful
in

areas where chiefs were
non-existent.

For instance,

indirect rule was successful in
places like Bukoba." But
such was not the case in other
places like Ugogo (Dodoma,
the present capital city of
Tanzania, is located in it.
See
map 3) because the people there
lived in small groups and
had no traditional chiefs. 69
On the economic front, plantation
agriculture,
especially sisal, which had proved
to be suitable to the
climate and profitable in the world
market, developed.
But
as suggested earlier, because of
better opportunities in
Kenya, the settler population and
other investors chose to
invest heavily in Kenya rather than in
Tanganyika.

The one exception, in the case of
Tanganyika, was the
Meru land case. There, the British forcibly
evicted 3000
African farmers from some of the fertile
lands to make way
for European settlement. 70 with hindsight,
this action by
the British was a blessing in disguise, for
it helped the

Tanganyikan peasants to organize and fight against
British
colonialism. 71
British colonial policy stressed the total sub-

ordination of native interests to European settlers'
interests. 72

Consistent with this ideology, the British

failed to make any progress in Tanganyika during the
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depression and the decade o,
the 1930-s, and instead
left it
to drift into the shadow
of its rival neighbors.
This
situation was further
complicated and worsened fay

^^

II in Europe and North
Africa. 73

These changes in the
international and domestic scene
influenced the politicization
of the Tanzanian people.
At
first, voluntary associations
concerned with mutual aid of
their members began to appear.*
1924,

m

for instance, the

Tanganyka African Civil Servants
Association (TACSA) was
formed to promote the welfare
of government employees in
75
Tanga.
Following the formation of TACSA,
the Tanganyka
African Association (TAA)
from which the Tanzanian African
National Union (TANU) emerged, was
formed in Dar Es Salaam
to function chiefly as a mutual
benefit organization
,

for

urban African dwellers. 76

Meanwhile, the rural areas were

also organizing themselves to protest
against unacceptable
British administrative policies. Because
these organizations took the form of tribal unions there
were as many as
there were different tribes. 77
Gradually, the TAA became more politically
oriented and
extended its influence further into the rural
78
areas.

m

the process it formed allies with the tribal
unions which

later became affiliated to it.

Prior to its incorporation

of tribal unions, TAA membership was composed of only

central government employees and teachers.

Later, its

membership expanded to include African traders, African
farmers, and local government employees. 79
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Once it reached this
stage it began playing
a .ore
active role in national
politics.
For example, in 1947 TAA
protested the proposal which
sought to create an East
African Central Legislative
Assembly because in that case
Tanganyika would be drawn into
an East African Federation

which would be dominated by
Kenyan white settlers. 80
By the 1950 -s TAA had
consolidated its political
activities to such an extent as
to include cooperatives and
other non-political organizations
in its membership. 81
This
was a period where cooperative
societies, affiliated to the
Victoria Federation of Cooperative
Unions, founded by Paul
Bomani, had become significant in
the cotton belt area
around Lake Victoria. 82
Several reasons account for the
proliferation of such
cooperatives across tribes. First, the
slave trade had
altered tribal systems by destroying the
fabric of traditional tribal society. Thus, there was
a need to replace
the old order by something resembling it.
Second,

colonial-

ism helped spread, albeit inadvertently, the
Swahilli

language from the coast to the interior of the
mainland,
thus making it possible for various ethnic groups
to have a

common language. 83
The emergence of a common language benefitted the

British and the Tanganykans, the latter because it helped

them organize, with ease, a national movement against
British colonialism.

The British, on the other hand,

benefitted because they used Swahili as
114

a

lingua franca for

their colonial administration.

The net benefactor from
this
became clearer after Julius
Nyerere, the admired leader
of
the indigenous people,
returned home from extended
college
studies abroad. 84

immediately after Nyerere- s
return in 1953, he was
invited to become president
of TAA.
The TAA, at that time,
lacked strong coordination
between the center and the
branches because it had extended
itself thinly over a wide
85
area.
Nyerere, taking advantage of
the widely spoken
Swahili language, immediately
set out to transform the TAA
into a political party. Thus,
on July 7, 19 54, the TAA
members who were meeting in Dodoma
announced the formation
of the Tanganyka African National
Union (TANU) in place of
TAA. 86
Yet, TANU, at the beginning,

functioned as a national

movement rather than a national party.

its sole aim, prior

to the country's independence, was
to gain freedom from
colonial rule.
It achieved its goal of independence on

December

9,

1961, under the leadership of Nyerere. 87

On

Independence day, Tanganyika, renamed Tanzania,
became
republic, an act which added life to the country's

a

motto—

Uhur na Umoja (Freedom and Unity) —and Julius Nyerere
moved
to the executive office as president. 88 Soon after,
Tanzania's major preoccupation became nation building, the
creation of an ideology in order to give a coherent policy
guidance to government, the Africanization of the leadership
and the civil service, the modernization of the agricultural
115

and industrial sectors,
and the striving to achieve
social
reform based on egalitarianism.*9
H e sought to achieve
these objectives primarily
through party control of
those
institutions which might otherwise
have bred opposition.
Nyerere understood that Tanzania
lacked well developed
political institutions to implement
some of his ambitiously
stated objectives. Consequently,
after only fourty-four
days in office, he resigned as
a leader of the government
and decided to concentrate more
on institution building, as
president of TANU. 90

Although many speculated that Nyerere
had been forced
out of office by some of the more
militant members of
parliament who advocated complete and
immediate

Africanization of all government posts,
it was obvious to
Nyerere, and possibly to some of the
more enlightened elite,
that Tanzania was still a long way from
becoming
a self-

sufficient nation. 91

Hurriedly achieved independence, a

flag, a national anthem, and a national
emblem, did not make
it a nation.

Nyerere explained his reasons for stepping

down:

...Our new objective [is]... the creation of a country
in which the people take a full and active part
in the
fight against poverty, ignorance, and disease. To
achieve this purpose it is necessary to have an able
elected Government which has the full support and
cooperation of the people. This we have had and will
have.
It is also necessary to have a strong political
organization active in every village, which acts like a
two-way, all-weather road along which the purposes,
plans, and problems of Government can travel to the
people at the same time as the ideas, desires, and
misunderstandings of the people can travel direct to
Government. This is the job of the new TANU. 92
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To this end, one of
the

f irst

changes introduced by the

government too* place in the
civil service system where
a
TANU representative was
installed as the head
official in
each of the regions and
areas.
The civil servant holding
this office, who in most
instances was still a European
became the secretary to the
TANU official, but continued
to
handle the administrative
workload, with such a system
Nyerere felt he had constructed
the "two-way, all-weather
road" which would provide
the necessary linkage between
the
central government and the
people.
He regarded TANU as an
indispensable instrument for nation
building. 93
During the first year of its
independence, Nyerere
finally settled down to concentrate
on the much needed
political and economic development
of the country.
He

pushed for the implementation of
the 1961-63 first
development plan.

Kenva

The initial stage of exploration,
conquest, and
establishment of British dominant rule in
Kenya (and Uganda)
took place from 1888 to 1903. In 1888,
the Imperial British
East African Company (IBEAC)
began operating from a base in
Mombasa (see map 2). In 1889, the IBEAC moved
inland to
,

control Uganda and by 1890 the Anglo-German
agreement

officially established that Uganda lay within the
British
sphere.

Once Uganda fell the British East African Empire

required effective communication with the coast and the
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Indian Ocean.

Consequently
uy
4

'

Rrii-^r, *
Britain
decided to build a

railroad between the coast
(in Kenya) and Uganda
to facilitate development and thereby
assure her a return in her
investment on railroad
construction. 94
To do this, the British
government first began seizing
land from the local Kenyans
and Ugandans by a series
of land
ordinances for railroad
construction and for European
settlement.* The Africans who
lost their land to the
Europeans were confined to "native
reserves." Thus in Kenya
there was a Kikuyu reserve, a
Luo reserve, a Kamba reserve,
and so forth. 96 within the
reserves, the Africans lived
a
peasant life, meaning that they
engaged in small-scale
traditional agriculture, producing
partly for their own
consumption and partly for the market. 97
in Kenya, spatial differentiation
and development began
with the completion of railway
construction in 1902 linking

Lake Victoria with the sea.

As Soja notes:

The construction between 1895 and
1902 of the KenyaUganda railway, more than anything that
preceded it,
signified the start of the second growth
stage, a stage
in which "the development of penetration
motion a series of spatial processes and lines sets in
readjustments as the comparative locational advantages
centers shift." Although it nearly paralleled of all
the
caravan route for most of its course, the railway
produced its own nodes rkey route] which superseded
the
old ones in importance.
The British with their commitment to East African

colonization in 1895, started the railroad construction
work
in 1896 at Mombasa on the coast.

The railroad reached

Nairobi in June 1899; in July the railway headquarters was
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moved there from Mombasa
and in August the line was
open to
the public." After the
Mombasa-Nairobi line opened,
government administrators
settled in Nairobi, and by
19 00 a
small Indian bazaar appeared
and military barracks were
established. With the arrival
of white settlers to

farm the

Highlands in 1902, the destiny
of Nairobi was set as the
future administrative capital
of a future state.
The
incorporation of the interior of
Kenya into the world
100
economy was assured.
once the railroad was complete
in
1902, the Crown Lands Ordinance enabled
more European
settlers to obtain grants of land in
the fertile areas and
101
settle there.
Foreigners' occupation of land continued
without regard
to the Kenyans who owned it, and
with little consideration
to the traditional agriculture, land
tenure system, and
nomadic grazing of the various local
political groups. Once
in Kenya, the white settlers sought to
consolidate and

increase their control over the life of the
colony. 102

One

key element in this campaign was to settle what
came to be
known as the -White Highlands', the racially exclusive

European farming area encircling the Rift Valley, which
tended to create buffers between rural African communities
and,

in particular, to block the westward expansion of
the

Kikuyu into lightly populated pastoral Masai country.

103

With the establishment in 1902 of an official policy of

colonization in Kenya, "the issues and course of development
were, in a large part, a response to interracial tensions;
119

....it was unquestionably in
the economic sectors of land
and labor that Af rican-English
hostilities were to polar10
ize." * Early colonial
government policy was strongly
biased toward the protection
of settler interests. 105
From the onset, the economy
was shaped by the plantation pattern, an enclave to be
developed and expanded
separately from its surroundings.
To this end, for
instance, in 1904, the Land Office
required that a line be
drawn "to separate the uninhabited
from the inhabited areas"
and that this line be used to govern
the parceling of land
to European settlers. 106 As soon
as they learned that this
was not going to be enough they introduced
a policy of

indiscriminately taking lands from the Africans.
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Kenyan immigrants were not colonists in the
same sense
as those men who settled in the Western
Hemisphere
and

employed labor from their own family; instead, they
came
with the expectation that labor requirements would
be met by
the African population. As early as 1905, a political

issue

emerged, which reflected this sentiment.

Assertions were

made by the British that it was "grossly unfair" to invite

Europeans to immigrate and fail to supply them with
labor.

1

08

Such ideas served the European settlers well to

justify the primacy of their rights over Africans.

Elspeth

Huxley's candid remark reflects such feelings of the time

when she said, "the idea that the interests of .. .untutored
tribesmen.

.

.should be exalted over those of the educated

Europeans would have seemed.

..

fantastic.
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Not surprisingly, the
justification mentioned above
coupled with the continued
white settlement, had a
certain
symmetrical convenience, for it
deprived the Africans of
land and created a landless
labor force that was required
to
work for the Europeans in order
to survive.
There were also
other measures used to prevent
the native Kenyan from

leading a self-sufficient life
on his/her own land.
One was
the poll tax instituted in 1908
to force Africans to seek
cash incomes by working for
European settlers
as

laborers.
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Second, because of the growth
of the African
population and economic necessity, many
Africans were
compelled to accept jobs, even with
poor pay, that the
Europeans were offering them. 111 Third,
Africans were denied
from growing cash crops within the
reserves for fear that

they might become prosperous and consequently
deprive the
European settlers with a cheap labor supply. 112
This fear did not translate into reality, at
least up

until World War

I

broke out, because African and European

agricultural production increased simultaneously.

Even

production in the African reserve increased at the same
time
as African participation in wage earning.

World War

I,

At the height of

however, wartime labor compulsion and popu-

lation decline contributed to the decline of food production
in the reserves.

But,

soon after the war, production

increased as before, save for a slight setback starting in
the depression of 1921-22, and lasting until about 1925.
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in the 1920- s, the labor
issue shifted from a demand

for a stable labor supply to
a defense of substandard
conditions of employment.
Inadeqate wages, justified on the
ground that they prevented the
quick return of Africans to
the reserves, were reinforced
by abuses in housing and diet.
Such treatment of Kenyans was
harsh even compared to the
treatment of Africans in other parts
of Africa,
as in

Tanzania.
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From the British point of view,
although labor
in terms of numbers was abundant,
it was its alleged

relatively high price which was not
acceptable.
In addition, because the Kikuyu were
intensive agri-

culturalists and were experiencing population
pressures that
they suffered the consequences of racial
discrimination
more

than other ethnic groups.

Settler pressures to extend the

area of the Highlands, the imposition of an
identification

document for Kenyans,

a

co-ordinated deduction of wages by

settlers and government, increased taxation of Kenyans
and
the harsh treatment of employees during the currency
change
from the rupee to the shilling provoked further resentment
and bitterness among the population. 114

The repressive colonial practices and mentality of the

British was the principal cause of the early development of

Kenyan nationalism.

African labor resisted working for

returns which in terms of satisfaction were less than those

obtained from self -employment on the traditional subsistence
farm.
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As early as 1921, Jesse Kariuki and Henry Thuku

(both Kenyans from the Kikuyu tribe)
122

founded the East

African Association (no
relation with the East African
Community) in order to secure
tenure of the land that was
still in their possession
and to try to regain the
land that
had been taken by the British."'
At first, the Kikuyu and
later other African groups
spearheaded political
activism,

in 1922 the British closed
down the East African Association
as a result of Thuku's militant
program. 117 But that was not
all.
Such attempts to protest the
situation were met with

stiff resistance and hostility from
the colonial
adminstration. According to Hopkins:
atteinptS
consoli date African discontent
wi;hfL
B?
within an organizational
structure were
considerable suspicion. .. .The efforts of regarded with
for example, to institute certain labor Harry Thuku
and taxation'
Wer Ve Y P^Ptiy defined by government
as
^fn^- US ? and^ led to
deportation
as
a
danger
\
to
^b?t^°security in 1922. 118
public
'

.

»

A major consequence of such a British policy
was that
the Kenyan's sensitivity to the relevance of
race
as a

source of political identification greatly increased.

The

demonstrated marginality of African participation in
decision making led to a new level of identification
that
superseded the traditional tribal loyalties.

Race, not

tribe, was to be the primary determinant of status.
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Kenyans believed land given over to European settlement had
been taken from them wrongly, and the redress of this

grievance became a fundamental article of the nationalist
political faith until the early 1960s.
The formation of the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA)
in 1924 was primarily to address this issue.
123
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The KCA,

according to Brown, had three
main concerns: 121 (a) a
constitutional reform which will
enable Africans to participate in Kenyan politics; (b)
the return of their land
taken by the white settlers;
and (c) a return
to the

traditional customs, in this case
the Kikuyu ethnic custom
With these guidelines the KCA
continued its agitation
against colonialists' discrimination
throughout the 1930s.
But like its predecessor, the East
African Association, it
too was banned and its leaders
122
detained in the
1940s.

Unlike its predecessors, however, the
KCA did not disintegrate.
Instead, it went underground and
continued its
agitation throughout World War II. 123
A colonial land policy in the 1920

-s

concentrated les

on increasing African control over the
country than on

entrenching each rural racial and ethnic community,
includ
ing the Europeans, in land areas reserved for
their exclusive control.

The White settlers wanted even more; to

further consolidate their economic gains by attempting
to

muster political and cultural suzerainty. 124
This time, however, the British Government and its

colonial administration, sensing danger coming from the
people, departed from the objectives of the white settlers
In the 1923 Devonshire White paper (titled "Indians in

Kenya: A memorandum") the British government asserted its

responsibility for the protection and development of the
people:
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and His
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nece
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and when, those In?erests^ 5 a f am ° "5 and that
n
eKsts of the
immigrant races h
f c
prevail. Obviously thlinti^L* h * 0rmer should
° f ° ther
communities, European Tnrt?»
St be
severally safeguarded'
Bu?
6 adml-^
nistration
Kenya, His Majestv-s eAvoSJ™
of
S
* hemselves «exercising a trust on Seha™
of ItTlr 1C
and they are unable to
P ° pUlation
deleqa?!
or%hf
the object of which may
trUSt
fae defined
.
and advancement of the
Paction
native races

»

? "
•

'

'

inV^S'

™

^
^

'

The Africans took comfort
in the Devonshire White
paper, which established the
paramountcy of their interests
over all but the essential
requirements of the minority
European and Asian communities.
On the other hand, sir
Robert Coryndon, governor in
1923, interpreted the
Devonshire White paper differently.
For him, the principle
of "paramountcy did not mean
European interests would be
sacrificed, but rather that the
interests of the European
and the Africans would be respected.
He developed the idea
of "dual policy" 126 in which the
separate development of
Africans and non-African communities
was to take place.' 27
The governor hoped that the dual policy
would advance
European interests to pursue their goal
of self-government
by simultaneoulsy allowing the Africans
to pursue their own
interests separately.

Whatever the interpretation, the aim of the
Devonshire
White paper was a desperate attempt to stabilize
the
political and economic relationships among the various
races.

Nevertheless, it failed to address the fundamental
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problem, that is, the social,
cultural, social an d
economic
disruptions the colonial
rule and European settlement
had
caused the people, especially
the Kikuyus.

Unfortunately, for all parties
involved, the solution
had to wait until the Kenyan
peaceful resistance and
protest
against colonialism culminated
into a violent Mau Mau
uprising in !953
The antecedents of the
uprising go back
to the 1920s and the 1930s
when the various ethnic groups,

-

especially the Kikuyus, began
organizing themselves in the
form of the Kikuyu Central
Association, the Kikuyu
Provincial Association, the Kavirondo
Taxpayers' Welfare
Association, the Teita Hills
Association and the Ukamba
Members' Association, in order
to address some of their
local needs. 129
In the 1930s there also emerged
a division of the

Kikuyu society into three categories: 130
Kikuyus with large or above average
land holdings and
who no longer needed to work on the
European
(1)

farm land;

Kikuyus with medium and below average land
holdings who
continued to alternate between working on
their farms and
working on the European farms as migrant labor;
and
(2)

(3)

Kikuyus whose land was insufficent to support the

traditional large family and who had to work on a
permanent
basis as migrant labor.
The effect of these shifts created in most parts of

Kikuyu land the destruction of the lineage or mbari
structure of the traditional joint land holdings.
126

The

buying and selling of land
began to be accepted,
resulting
in severe disparity in
its distribution.
For the most part
chiefs, tribal elders,
teachers in mission schools,
and
government employees benefited
at the expense of the
poor
and tenants. 131
This is hardly a surprise
given the severe economic
and
political inequalities that
existed.
Consider the following.
First, prime land was under
the exclusive control of
the European settlers, while
great disparities existed
between the number of Kenyans
with land and the amount of
land available. The Native Trust
Ordinance of 1938 legally
prohibited the Kenyans from owning
land.' 32 second, educational outlays were markedly biased
toward the settler's
needs.

Third, employment was discriminatory
in both wage
scales and hiring.

The Kenyan settlers made substantial
economic and
political advances during the last years
of World War II
when Britain's African colonies were
called upon to maximize
production following the Japanese conquest
of South East
Asia.
The British were concerned in 1942 at
the specter of
South African hegemony in East Africa,
especially in
Kenya.
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As a result, towards the end of the war the

Colonial Office decided to reconsider its pre-war
policies
and determined to reassert metropolitan authority

in Kenya.

Consequently, it decided to instill new life into the
Duke
of Devonshire's defunct 1923 declaration of African
para-

mountcy.
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According to the revised
plan the settlers were to
be
bought out and the Kikuyus,
who were becoming increasingly
restless, were to be allowed
to settle on collective
farms
on the White Highlands.
This decision went

too far for the

Colonial Office, which did
not want to abandon the
white
settlers.
on the other hand, the
Africans felt that it
was too little and too late,
it did not go far enough
for

«

them.

What they wanted most was the
opportunity to become
involved in the political decision
making process itself.
But the political reform by
the colonial administration
was
far from a fair representation
or a shift in the balance of
political power which the Kenyans
wanted all along. 136
Meanwhile, especially since post
World War II, the
British policy attempted to legitimize
their right to rule
through rapid industrialization, while
the Kenyans
(especially the Kikuyus) increased their
political activity
with increasing degrees of sophistication
and

organization. 137
In 1944, the Kenyan African Union (KAU)

,

membership crossed ethnic lines, was founded.

whose
It was formed

out of the Kenyan African Study Union, which
had been

created to advise and assist Elliud Mathu, the
first
nominated Kenyan member of the Legislative Council.
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The

KAU gained the support of many members of the now
defunct

KCA when their fellow Kikuyu, Jomo Kenyatta, who later

became the president of independent Kenya, assumed the

leadership in 1947.

Its efforts to become a nationally128

based party were continually
and effectively stifled by
the
administrative restrictions on
meetings and on the movements
of its leaders.
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it continued to espouse
the demands

previously made by the KCA, until
it too was banned in June
1953, after the declaration of the
140
Mau Mau
emergency.

The underlying causes for the
Mau Mau movement must be
assessed. African leaders through
the KAU continued to
press for political and economic
reform aimed at ending
discrimination in land and labor. At
the outset they
attempted to use constitutional channels
but with their
efforts continually frustrated, their
various organizations
adopted more militant tactics and overtly
nationalistic
aims, such as an African franchise and
equal rights. 141
As the pressure on the land grew due to
an increase in
the size of the population.
The traditional rules of land
tenure and practices of shifting cultivation were
more

difficult to maintain. 142

More members of the Kikuyu became

tenants (ahoi) and their tenancy became more unstable
as

private ownership of land took deeper root.
Every Kikuyu' s already shaken security on the land

appeared to be threatened by the perception that Europeans

might still take more land from them.

The overcultivation

of the land coupled with the growing population further

reduced the ability of the land to be productive enough to
feed the growing Kenyan population. 143

This was particularly

true of the Kikuyuland since the Kikuyu were the most

129

affected by this and land
was very scarce in their
reserves. 144
The colonial administration
was reluctant to interfere
with the Kenyans' land tenure
patterns for fear that anticolonial feeling might be
increased and tenure insecurity
magnified rather than eased.
The outburst of Mau Mau in
1952 was largely the result of
this delay. Although,
as

suggested by Rosberg and Nottingham,
it was also the result
of the bitter divisions among
the Kikuyu themselves. 145
some
of these divisions included
the gap between the rich and
the
poor; the Christian missions
versus the adherents of the
independent churches; the old against
the young; the chiefs
versus the established traders;
and the aspiring commercial
farmers (and traders) who supported
Kenyatta and the Kenya
African Union versus the mass of Kikuyu,
who were being
squeezed in the fight for land and
commercial control by the
various rival ethnic elites. 146 Possession
of land was one
of the principal bases for drawing
distinctions among the
147
Kikuyus.
The desire for land, which had once been
theirs,

was one of the principal causes of the
Mau Mau uprising.'

Mau Mau was an armed struggle waged by the
Kikuyu
peasantry against the British colonial forces

from 1952-

1956.

It can be described,

firstly, as those (mainly Kikuyu

peasants) who took to the forests to wage an armed
struggle

against both the colonial forces and their Kikuyu
supporters
and,

secondly, those known to the government as the ^passive

wing' who,

from the reserves and Nairobi, supplied food,
130

arms, shelter, and
recruits to the forest
fight ers. All
would have sworn the „au
„ au oath of unity (the
oathing

ceremony began to take
piace in 1948).
Played an extremely important

such ceremony had

role for the Kikuyu
leaders

when they needed a guarantee
of Kikkukyu loyalty to
their
political or military objectives.
The Mau Mau Association
was so secretive that no
one
for sure knew the identity
of the leadership,
it is
important to note that Kenyatta
did not manage Mau Mau.
While he had assisted in the
gradual spread of the KCA
oaths
immediately after his return from
England, he would appear
to have been ideologically
opposed to the use of violence,
and by 1952 he had very little
to do with Mau Mau." 8
After the Mau Mau emergency in
1952, in a belated
attempt to defuse political tension
over the land issue, the
colonial administration finally
introduced a sequence of

economic reforms that ultimately led
to independence.

In

1954, R. J. M. Swynnerton, the Assistant
Director of

Agriculture in colonial Kenya, introduced

a

plan for the

development of African cash-cropping; which
included the
introduction of competition among African
producers and land
reform."" The land reform was started by
the colonial
authorities in Kikuyu province, and continued
after
independence in other parts of the country.

Under it,

traditional claims to land were replaced with
individual
freehold title, so that it was made possible for
Africans to
obtain credit for farm development.
131

As noted earlier, however,
political frustration among
the Kenyans was paramount
beoause the Mau „au peasant
uprising brought about a
declaration of a state of
emergency
and a ban on all African
political party activities.
The concessions by the
colonial administration did
not
include political independence,
which the Kenyans

deeded

more than anything else,

instead, the concessions
sought a

means to reward those Africans
who had supported them in
putting down the Mau Mau uprising.'"
The British also
wanted to encourage the growth of
a productive rural middle
class which would be immune to the
cries of militant

nationalists and perhaps even challenge
their leadership in
the rural areas. 151
The Swynnerton plan was clear on
the political question
of Kenya.
One section read, "the greatest gain
from the
participation of the African community in
running its own
agricultural industries will be a politically
content and
stable community." 152 Coming at a time when
national

political activities were suspended because of Mau
Mau, and
the African prominent leaders were in jail
(Jomo Kenyatta,

for example)

,

the Swynnerton plan offered rural Africans an

economic outlet for their political energies, and it

envisaged a conservative— rather than nationalist— African
political response.

Indeed, the plan failed to generate the

expected economic transformation and it made the situation
even worse.
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But it soon became apparent
to the British that the
Africans were not going to
settle for less than a fundamental change in the colonial
structure.
Realizing this, in
March 1954, the British decided
to send Oliver Lyttelton,
the secretary of state for
the colonies, to Kenya in
order
to press forward with
multi-racial constitutional

reforms. 154

The new Constitution, known as
the Lyttleton
constitution of 1954, adopted by the
British dominated
government of Kenya, left much to be
desired, though it
marked the first major break with
traditional Kenyan
politics.
For the first time, it granted
Africans limited
rights of political expression and a
direct voice
in

government via a multiracially organized
structure.

governmental
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Prior to this period, Asians and Africans had
representatives (Asian elected and African nominated)

on the non-

governmental side of the legislature. 156

But the government

front benches occupied by members responsible for
various

portfolios contained only European civil servants and
Europeans nominated from the local white community.
was the nature of the so-called

x

Member-system,

1
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Such

by which

persons responsible for portfolios were known as Members for
specific departments— Agriculture and Natural Resources,
Education, and so forth.

Under the Lyttleton Constitution,

though it represented a shift in outlook from the earlier
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African representation, it
ipff the ^
^
ltL left
more fundamental
issue
of land rights as a monopoly
of the Europeans. 158
The Lyttleton Constitution
introduced the Ministerial
System.
it provided for a
fourteen-member Council of
Ministers, of whom eight were
to be ex officio
'

and six

appointed by the Governor (unofficial
ministers)
of the
fourteen members, only one was to
be a Moslem Indian, one
non-Moslem Indian and one an African. 159
At this stage no
increase in African representation
in the Legislative
Council was made. The election had
to wait until early
.

a

1957.

The first African elections were held
in 1957, when
eight Africans were elected to the
Legislative Council in
eight constituencies. 160 The British now
thought that they
had achieved parity in political representation
for the
Africans and satisfied what the Kenyans had wanted
all

along.

But, the successful African candidates
immediately

declared the Lyttelton Constitution null and void, over
British objections to their statement.

Thereupon, the

Councilors campaigned so vigorously against the Constitution
that, within a period of seven months, they precipitated a

situation which ended in the imposition of the Lyttelton
'reforms'

161
,

After the demise of the Lyttelton reform,

a

new

secretary of state, A. Lennox-Boyd, introduced a new
Constitution.

The new Constitution gave Africans additional

representatives, though still short of the majority.
134

The

Legislative Council consisted
of a Speaker, six ex
officio

meters,

37

novated

members, 36 elected members
(14
Africans, 14 Europeans,
6 Asi ans, 2 Arabs),
and 12 specially
elected ambers (4 Africans,
4 Europeans, 4 Asians,
chosen
by the Legislative Council
acting as an electoral college.
The council of Ministers
had 16 members, including
2
Africans. Thus the old -parity,,
safeguarding European
settlers- dominance in the
Legislative Council but not in
the council of Ministers,
had been broken.' 62

Once again Kenyan elected members
in the Legislative
Council had made it clear that they
intended to break the
Lennox-Boyd Constitution, and would
not ease their efforts
until they dominated the legislature.
They requested twelve
more African seats in the legislature,
without corresponding

increases for the other racial groups,

m

addition, they

wanted no less than fifty percent of
the ministries in the
Council of Ministers to go to Africans.' 65
Finally, in 1960 Britain agreed to a round
table

conference (known as the Lancaster House
Conference) with
African leaders to decide on the political future

of Kenya.

Following that conference, Britain conceded to
Africans full
representation and granted universal suffrage. The

Legislative Council was increased to 65 members with an
effective African majority (the council consisted of 33
openly elected seats, 10 seats reserved for Europeans and 10
reserved for Asians; the 12 especially elected members were
maintained).

The 12-man Council of Ministers comprised
135

4

officials,

4

Africans,

addition, there were

9

3

m

Europeans and one Asian.

parliamentary secretaries.

The
Kenyan African Union (KAU) was
also renamed the Kenyan
African National Union (KANU)
and the new party became
victorious in the May 1961
elections. Jomo

Kenyatta, the

man who led the Mau Mau uprising,
was finally released from
jail in 1961 and became head of
the new party. 165 The
opposition became the Kenyan African
Democratic Union
(KADU), the party of the minority
ethnic groups,
led by

Mr. Ronald Ngala,

A second constitutional conference at
Lancaster House
in 1962 agreed on the creation
of a strong
central govern-

ment with federal provisions for regional
governments.
After an election in 1963 a responsible
government under a
majority-party prime minister was formed. The
constitution

provided for a two-chamber legislature,
consisting of a
senate and a house of representatives with a

total of 129

members, of whom 117 were elected and 12
appointed (of these
only 3 were reserved for Europeans). 166

Early in 1963 KADU proposed a new federal constitution,
but it was rejected in favor of a parliamentary
system.

By

December 1963 the country received its independence with

a

Westminister-style constitution and under the leadership of
Jomo Kenyatta as Prime Minister and then President.

In

1964, KANU absorbed KADU, and Kenya became a one-party

parliamentary state. 167

In 1966, the Kenyan National

Legislature of the upper house (having 41 elected members)
136

merged with the House of
Representatives (117 memb ers),
thus
creating a unicameral body
of 158 elected members,
bringing
the total membership to
170 (158 plus 12 appointed)
where it
remains today J"
the same year Kenya People's
Union
(K.P.U.), the only opposition
party, was also banned.

m

With this assurance of Kenyan
political dominance, the
Africans were guaranteed full
integration in national
affairs. As Hopkins observed,
"at the time of independence
in December 1963, only the
Europeans' economic position had
yet to be challenged." 169 with
its juridical independence at
hand, Kenya, like Tanzania, began
charting its course for an
"autonomous" and yet uncertain, future
development.

Conclusion

Political independence did not generate much
change in
both countries. The formal colonial system
was replaced by
an informal neo-colonial system, but the
outcome was the
same, a neoclassical development path and
Western aid to

finance it.
Both countries' development in the early post-

independnce years was biased towards infrastructure and
capital intensive projects for which Western funds were
vital.

The inherited pattern of development was not con-

ducive to attaining a sustained development responsive to
the needs of the people.
The autonomy and cohesion of traditional ethnic groups

was challenged as administrators, health workers, teachers,
137

settlers and private capitalists
gradually penetrated even
the rural village level.
In addition an extensive
periphery including native
reserves provided a source
of
inexpensive labor.
,

^

But while the penetration
of an alien polity, society
and economic system in both
countries created on one level
a
degree of uniformity, traditional
society was not destroyed
and indeed played an active
role in the changes which took
Place.
Undoubtedly, traditional structures
were greatly
altered through interaction with
external forces, but the
form, direction and speed with
which changes took place were
all products of the interplay
between colonial and
indigenous value systems.
Thus, in the administrative sphere
the European origin
of the new institutions coupled with
the character of the

indigenous structures influenced the form
and functioning of
the local government units and the degree
of respect for
traditional political boundaries and authority,
in the
economic sphere this same interaction influenced
an opportunity of access for foreign and indigenous
communities to

material and non-material resources.
By implication,

it also influenced the degree of

external control exercised over land and labor in rural
areas, and the character of the urban system which
expanded

to serve the needs of economies oriented to export.

Thus it

was the interaction between the African and European political and economic structures which moulded the emerging
138

social and economic
inequalities within and
between rural
and urban areas in both
countries. The cause and
nature of
these colonial experiences
raU st be borne
in m ind as we turn
now to consider the develops
policies of Tanzania and
Kenya in three Major sectors
of their respective
societies:
the state, industry, and
agriculture.
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CHAPTER

5

THE STRUGGLE FOR DEVELOPMENT:
GROPING IN THE DARK
Introduct nn
i

Thus far, we have made no specific
reference to
Tanzanian and Kenyan development
struggles and how the
various development paradigms discussed
in chapter three
influence the development path and explain
the struggles
adequately.
This chapter attempts to fill some of
this
void, in these years (1961-67), the
social, economic and
political conditions of Tanzania* and Kenya
remained the
same as during colonial times.
Influenced by one dominant
paradigm (the neoclassical and structuralists,
or modernizers)

,

the structures of the economy in terms of ownership

and relations of production remained heavily
Western
oriented.

Significant reliance upon Western development

assistance, personnel and technology persisted.
However, for Tanzania, the seeds were sown for a

dramatic policy reorientation; while Kenya continued its

development along the same neoclassical path.

The main

policy themes of the Arusha Declaration (detailed below)

,

in

When the name Tanzania is used it refers to the country
after independence; when "Tanganyika" is used it refers to the
country prior to independence.
151

the case of Tanzania, can
be trace, b aOc to the
leadership.*
experiences during these years.

This chapter opens with
a brief synopsis of
Tanzania's
and Kenya's colonial legacy
and postindependence
development
struggles. We approach these
problems by summarizing
Tanzanian and Kenyan development
policies from the postindependence period onwards and
citing their successes and
failures.
Specifically, we will examine:
(i) the role of
the state, (ii) its policies
in industry, and (iii) its
policies in agriculture. our intent
is to provide the
descriptive background on the patterns
of development on
which the later analytical assessment
is
based.

Tanzania and Kpny a
As soon as Tanzania, Kenya (and Uganda)
gained their
independence in December 1961, October
1962, and December
1963 respectively, their leaders pledged to one
another to
form a political federation of East Africa
to engage in

nation building.

"We believe," they declared,

"that the day

of decision has come and to all our people we
say there is

no room for slogans and words.

This is our day of Action."

1

Indeed at the time many observers thought a federation of
the East African state would be the easiest of all "African

federations to organize." 2

Given the common colonial

experience, common language and common market

British colonialism)

,

(a

product of

the optimism of many observers was not

an unrealistic one at the time.
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But beneath the veneer
of similar
fv
-hk
sj-miiarity,
there existed
deep rooted differences
in tne
j-n
*.
the colonial
colonic khistory,
political
organization, the size of the
country, ethnic composition,
personality of leaders, and
ideology of elites, a confluence of events made these
differences surface in January
28, 1964 when Nyerere of Tanzania
announced his determination to form a one-party
rather than a pluralistic
state.
As a consequence, the East
African Union had to be
permanently shelved. 3 From then on
each state began
i

following its own patterns of
development and brand of
nation-building

Tanzania and Kenya became especially
concerned with the
problem of remedying the legacy of
colonialism. As we know
from their respective histories, they
inherited institutions
and conditions tending towards the
intensification and
per-

petuation of existing economic inequalities,
while at the
same time their achievement of independence
raised popular
expectations for increased welfare. Both countries
had to

face a difficult problem of fashioning development
policies
for raising the "standard of living" while at the
same time

meeting the growing popular demands for equality. 4
Given the low level of development of both countries,
the desired level would have been difficult to achieve, at

least in the short-run, even if the leadership were willing.

Nevertheless, both states, ever since their independence,
had been struggling to remedy the inherited institutional

inequality by various strategic means (mainly by emulating
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the western development path)
in the hope of achieving
rapid
development.

Kenya's strategy, despite
Kenyatta's early socialist
rhetoric, from the start had been
to follow the "neoclassical" mode of development - a
development path laid out
by the British colonial state. 5
Britain's decision to spur
agricultural products by settling Europeans
dislocated many
of the African people, necessitated
infrastructure
con-

struction, stimulated a large scale
agricultural production,
and led to the beginning of manufacturing
and processing as
well as to the development of commercial
enterprises, and
technical, financial and governmental services.
Any

resistance, such as the Mau Mau uprising, an
uprising by
native Kenyans (especially by the Kikuyus) to
regain their

expropriated land, was smashed.

As a result, the landless

still had no land, forcing them to become laborers—
one of

the necessary conditions for capitalist development.

Even after Kenya's independence the outgoing British

loaned the new African ruling class millions of dollars in

order to buy out the British settlers and smooth the way for
the development of indigenous capital. 6

The aim was to

transfer land from European ownership to the Africans and to

privatize the African occupied lands by means of legal
registration of the land for individual ownership.

The

assumption was that private ownership would increase the

productivity of the African farmers.
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As expected, in the

first decade of independence,
Kenya achieved a remarkably
high rate of economic growth. 7
The corollary of this is
that the settlers promoted
an
economy, in the early 19 60s,
where "80 percent of the
value
of marketed produce of
agriculture came from the Europeanowned farms and estates, 55
percent of the total wages
paid
went to non-Africans (who
constituted only 10 percent of
the
labour force)
and virtually all profits from
manufacturing
and trade were received by
non-African companies and
individuals. 1,8
,

For example, from 1964 to 1972
Kenyan gross domestic
product grew at an average of 6.5
percent per year.
Marketed agricultural output grew at a
recorded rate of 6.7
percent, and agricultural subsistence
output at an estimated
3.7 percent, giving a 5 percent per year
growth rate.

Growth of marketed production was particularly
rapid in the
smallholding sector as peasant farmers responded
to the

removal of colonial bottlenecks on cash-cropping. 9
This action gave the ruling class the proper excuse
to
create a land market and sell most of the land rather
than

redistribute it to the original owners of the land—the
native Kenyans (particularly, the Kikuyu ethnic groups who
were victims of massive land expropriation)

.

Once the

government received the money it paid the settlers in cash
at an inflated price, as the British expected and proceeded
to resell the land to the same settlers rather than re-

distribute it to the rightful owners.
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As can be expected,

the hope of the Kenyan
masses, who were supposed
to benefit
from this deal, were soon
dashed.- The result was
that of
the total land transfers
following independence,
Europeans
acquired 54 percent of the land
areas, Africans 39 percent, and Asians 7 percent."
Among the Africans, the main
beneficiaries of this transaction
were mainly the new

political elites and some traditional
chiefs.
These groups
not only bought and ran large
one-time settler farms, but
also collaborated with foreign
capital and became the
backbone of the nascent capitalist
enterprises. 12
Thus, Kenya began its long road
to its brand of

capitalism and, like other NICs, became
heavily reliant on
limited range of commodity exports.
Even as recently as
1979 such exports represented 26.6 percent
of Kenya's GDP
(Gross Domestic Product)
The percentage share

a

of the three

.

major exports (coffee, tea and sisal)
increased from 34.2 to
52.2 between 1961 and 1976-8. 13 The government
also
actively sought foreign investments by making
significant
concessions to investors.

The Development Corporation, a

parastatal agency of the Kenyan government, has served to
facilitate joint ventures and ensure an ever expanding role
in Kenya's economy for local entrepreneurs.

14

Undoubtedly, such a favorable environment for foreign

investment helped accelerate the growth of the economy.

For

instance, the annual average growth rate of per capita

income between 1960-79 was 2.7 percent, and of GDP was 6.0

percent in the 1960s and 6.5 percent in the 1970s, well
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above the average for
middle- income oil importers
(3.4 and
4.6 percent in each period).If there was

^

in the sectoral distribution
of the domestic product
from
I960 to 1979 (agriculture
down from 38 to 34 percent
industry up fro, is to 21
percent), the quantity index
of

manufacturing production increased
from 100 in 1963 to 345
in 1977.
1980, 141,280 were employed
in manufacturing
and about 13 percent of
merchandise exports were in manufacturing.
This total might have been
much larger had it
not been for the breakup of
the East African Common
16
Market.

m

increasingly, Kenya embarked on an
import substitution
industrialization. Thus, the ratio of
imports to GDP (at
constant prices) declined from 42.6
percent in 1964 to 28.1

percent in 1976 and, as a proportion
of the total supply of
manufactures, imported goods declined from
42.6 percent in
1964 to 30.8 percent in 1975.

17

Imports of consumer goods

as a percentage of total imports dropped
from 33 to 24.4

percent from 1964 to 1975.

18

By neoclassical development

standards, these were comparatively impressive
achievements.
In Tanzania, German and British colonialism
resulted in

the dislocation of peasant farmers and the
transformation of

subsistence farming into large plantations where African
labor was often forcibly used.

19

Colonial policy, there-

fore, was geared to the extraction of resources for the use

of the Metropoles. 20

In Tanzania, however, Germany did not

encourage Europeans to settle, even though some did— the
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small capitalists or petty
bourgeois ie-who had little
political influence compared
to the Kenyan settlers."
Because of the few German
settlers, they had to
depend
on cheap African labor
to produce cash crops
such as coffee
cotton and sisal." To assure
themselves of an uninterrupted labor supply or cash
crops they needed, they
instituted a hut tax, which had
to be paid off in cash.
To
this end, many Africans were
forced to either take jobs on
German plantations or to produce
cash crops themselves
in

order to earn cash so as to pay
their hut tax. 23
This colonial agricultural policy
destroyed, as Hyden
observed, the principle of »Ujamaa»-a
traditional system
where one member must assist another
member

of the same clan

or tribe in time of need such as
harvesting, ploughing or
when tragedy struck one or the other
clan or tribe

member-

arid

replaced it by private production. 24

Private production

was even more encouraged after the
British took over the
responsibility of the country.
Thus, like Kenya, Tanzania's early independence

economic policy was virtually
policies.

a

continuation of colonial

The first Three Years Development Plan (1961-

64), which was largely drawn up by the outgoing colonial

government at the recommendation of the World Bank, was

designed to promote such development. 25

The plan emphasized

the development of the agricultural sector, especially cash

crops production through what was known as the improvement
and transformation approaches. 26
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Under this plan large

^
^^^

areas were = le are d by
the government and
encouraged to grow an
expQrtabie
nuts.
The plan also oreated
au sQrts
conditions such as tax
holidays, tariff
protection>
exports of profits in
order
er to attract f
foreign investment
and capital in the
agriculture sector.- Tne
World Ban,
therefore, laid the
foundations for the country's

^ ^^^^

^

initial'

program for economic
development.- its recommendation
in
the first three-year
plan (1961-1964) reinforced
the

economic priorities the
country inherited from
the colonial
state, encouraged the
development of a cash crop
economy,
and the continuation of
private ownership and
production."
During the first five years
of independence
(1961-

1966)

Nyerere became concerned by
the overall slow growth
of the rural sector.
For this reason, he veered
away from
the earlier World Bank
sponsored plan; instead he hired
a
group of economists from France
to draw up a new one.
Following French indicative planning,
the government
accepted the first five-year
(1964-1969) development plan. 30
The country's industries were to
emphasize import substitution, by processing of raw
materials as well as export
promotion with the cooperation of the
private and public
sectors in order to hasten the process
of industrial,

ization. 31

Even though Tanzania attempted to accelerate
its
industrial growth by making itself attractive
to foreign
investors, its efforts failed to materialize. 32

The primary

reason for this is Britain's interest in making
Kenya the
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industrial center of the
East African Common
MarXet ever
since 1927 .33 The Brit sh

^

.

^^

advantageous position vis-a-vis
Tanzania.
As a result,
Tanzania continued to
experience increased capital
outflow
and a declining trend in
private investment as evidenced
by
the following.
1961 Tanzania's private
investment
capital was +15.4 million
shillings, in 1962 +14 million
shillings, in 1963 -56.6 million

m

shillings, in 1964 -336.4

million shillings, and in 1965 -89
million shillings.*
addition, from 1963 on the price
of Tanzania's main export
commodities (sisal), which accounted
for its 35.7 percent of
total value of exports dropped
drastically. 35

m

Increasingly Tanzania became dependent
on foreign
finance even for its development
budget.
For example, 52
per cent of the development budget
of the First Development
Plan (1964-69), 44 percent of the
Second Plan (1969-1974),
and 49 percent of the Third Five Year
Plan (1976-1981) were
all externally financed. 36 Yet, even
this was threatened
when Tanzania's non-aligned foreign policy
rhetoric
on the

questions of East Germany, Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe)
and
Vietnam threatened to offend West Germany, Britain

and the

United States, its main donors.
For example, in 1964 when Tanzania joined with
Zanzibar
it had a West German embassy while its newly
acquired terri-

tory hosted the East German Embassy.

West Germany put

pressure on the Tanzanian government to either close the
East German embassy, confine its representation in Zanzibar
160

to the level of a
consulate, reduce it to
a trade mission
or risk the loss of aid.
When Tanzania failed to
comply
West Germany threatened to
withdraw its military
assistance
which included 70 million
shillings worth Qf
50 Military advisors and technical
personnel, 6 coast guard
boats and 36 Military aircraft.
it cut off its economic
assistance worth about 178
million shillings altogether. 37
in the same year, Nyerere
ordered the United States to
remove a satellite tracking
station from his country, a
year later he expelled American
diplomats in protest over
U.S. actions in Vietnam.
1976 Nyerere s UN position on
Zionism and racism prompted the
U.S. to suspend $29 million
in aid to Tanzania. 38

^

m

'

In another development, when
Rhodesia declared its

"unilateral independence" for its minority
whites, the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) demanded
that Britain,
being the colonial power, put down the
rebellion

led by Ian

Smith.

Otherwise, the OAU member countries threatened
to

sever diplomatic relations with Britain.

When Britain

failed to meet the OAU's demand, Tanzania, in
compliance
with the OAU's resolutions, severed its diplomatic
relations
with Britain.
Britain then retaliated by freezing
its aid

and $21 million loan.

Britain had been the biggest aid

donor to Tanzania accounting for more than 44.5 percent
of
total aid in 1965. 39

After Britain's decision, this

essential aid had dropped to

4

and

2

percent of total

foreign aid in 1966 and 19 67 respectively, drying up much
161

needed Tanzania's foreign
exchange
failure to attract the
necessary capital
foreign
without compromising ms
noii+-^ a1 principles
9 his political
troubled him
greatly.

^

^

Even .ore troubling
for hi, was the ever-widening
gap
between urban and rural
incomes and the tendency
of party
and governs officials
to benefit economically
from their
leadership positions. He,
therefore, saw the need to
formulate a different development
strategy (later known as
African Socialism) which he
incorporated in his Arusha
Declaration of February, l967
and in two companion vol
s
which he authored, entitled
Social
QSvSlsEsm&
and Education for- S elf-pm a np.
,

m

^

^

This declaration required,
inter alia, hard work from
all capable citizens, the
nationalization of the means of
production, collectivization of
farms, villagization of the
rural community, and the mobilization
of all Tanzanian
resources, primarily, for rapid
agricultural development,
in his writings, he clearly outlined
his objective which was
"to build a society in which all
members have equal rights
with equal opportunities; in which all
can live in peace
with their neighbours without suffering
or imposing
injustice; and in which all have a gradually
increasing
level of material welfare before any
individual lives in

luxury." 40

Thus, Nyerere's development strategy was charac-

terized by "Ujamaa," a Swahili word usually translated
as

"familyhood"— a concept embodying values such as solidarity
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and cooperation.-

The three neans Qf
achieving
societal goals, which have
becone

^

^

^

strategy, are socialism,
rural development, and
selfreliance.

Nyerere -s conception of
socialism came from the
particular historical experience
of Africa and not from
the
abstractions of Europe. The
orthodox Marxist belief that
there must be class conflict
in society and that
capitalism
must precede socialism is
rejected by Nyerere. His
Utopian
Ujamaa (village socialists
^^iisij social
*nc*i*i philosophy,
y
in which he
directly counterposes orthodox
Marxism,
states:

The foundation, and the obi ert

*.e

-i

•

l0 k ° n ° ne Class of men as
his brethren and
f™?>,
another
as ?
his natural enemies. He rather
reaards an
men as his brothers~as members
of hifevL-expandina
°r
famil ynood
deLriEefoSr
:
, to
ls opposed
capitalism, which seeks to
bS?i2 t
PPY societ on th * basis of the exploitation
n?
of i
man by man. And yit is equally
trinaire socialism, which seeks to opposed to docbuild its haoov
society on the philosophy of inevitable
conflict**
42
between man and man.

sTc^is^Ti

^

f

.

.

\

With this philosophy, Nyerere embarked
on
policies that attempted a development strategy
reliance on external resources, and

a

without undue

desire to create

institutions based on an African model of

village society.

a set of

a

communitarian

By the late 1970s even rural society had

been "villagized" by an unprecedented movement of
peasants
to state controlled and Ujamaa (socialist)
villages. 43

The

new policy, socialism and self-reliance, therefore,
in part,
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originated fro* frustrations
caused by a lack of foreign
investment capital.
Additionally, Nyerere
established a leadership code
that a cut-off income
point beyond which party
and government officials were not
allowed to have other sources
of
income.
it gave them one year
to divest themselves of
their
urban-related economic activities
or resign their leadership
posts, on the premise that
an economically elite
leadership
is a contradiction in a
society which advocates egalitarianism.
Though alleged violations of
the code existed,
it made the country's leaders
and citizenry more aware of
the problem of income differentials. 44
But Tanzania, which had been
relatively self-sufficient
in food at independence, made
little investment in agriculture.
Investment in research, modern machinery
and
irrigation was not seen as vital, and it
was not until

October 1982 that the party realized its
neglect of the
agricultural sector and allocated to it 24
percent of the
national budget. 45 Tanzania's attempt at
self-reliance in

agriculture has not been entirely successful,
however.
Indeed, during the early and late 1970
1980' s)

(see Table

1)

(even

it depended more on foreign assistance than a
decade

earlier.
a LIC,

's

Some of this dependence, as one might expect from

has been due to economic forces beyond the country's

control: i.e., inflation, higher energy costs, drought,

conflict in Southern Africa, and military intervention in
Uganda.
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TABLE

1

FINANCIAL GRANT FLOWS TO
KENYA AND TANZANIA
(In Millions U.S.
Dollars)
Country
Tanzania
Kenya
Source:

Development

1971

1972

1973

20.6

44.5

64.9

37.9

85.7

1

1975

1976

188.1

195.7

89.4

109.8

Organization for Economic Cooperation
and

1978.

An exception to this has been
Tanzania's success in
social fields.
For instance, by the late
1970s some 70
percent of children were enrolled
in primary schools, while
19 percent attended secondary schools. 46
The people's
health also improved. As a consequence,
life expectancy at
birth rose from 42 in I960 to 52 in
1979.
In addition,
water supplies were substantially
improved/ 7
But most other indicators suggested
very limited
success before 1973 and a considerable
decline thereafter,

with 1967 (the year of the Arusha Declaration)
as
watershed.

According to the government there was

a

visible

a

growth

rate in the gross material product of 4.3
percent from 1965
to 1971 and 4.4 percent from 1971 to 1977.
But the credi-

bility of the second figure depended heavily on an
alleged
growth rate of 6.5 percent in subsistence agriculture,
which
was almost certainly guesswork and highly improbable,

because the government imported vast amounts of food in the
mid-1970s. 48

Andrew Coulson calculated that the index of
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the standard of living of
m in imum wage-earners in
Dar es
salaa* (1966=100) rose from
99 in 1965 to a peak
of ii 8 in
1974, then dropped to 53 in
1978.
In rural areas the index
dropped fro m 100 in 1966/7 to
65.6 in 1974/5, rising to
72.8
49
in 1978/9.
in the agricultural sector,
production of most major
export crops, especially cotton
and sisal, declined after
1966/7 (though slight increases in
coffee, tobacco and tea
were registered)
resulting in heavy deficits in the
balance
of payments by the mid-1970s. 50
To offset these deficits,
,

despite Tanzanian's commitment to
"self-reliance," it had to
rely heavily on foreign aid and
51
investment
in the 1970s.

Its net food exports between 1968
and 1971 also changed to
imports of over 500,000 tons of maize
between 1973 and 1975,

primarily to avert possible starvation. 52
The same was true in the industrial sector.

Industrial

growth which had been quite considerable from
the mid-1950s
until the early 1970s, 53 soon began to decline
in spite of

(perhaps because of) Tanzania's strong commitment to
indus-

trialize via import substitution.

Given the state's lack of

oil revenues to subsidize industry and its heavy
reliance on

imported raw materials and spare parts its failure to indus-

trialize is hardly a surprise.
Surprisingly, however, the country's manufacturing

capacity was underutilized.

There was much spare manu-

facturing capacity: for instance, a survey of thirty-nine
firms in 1974 showed that 38 percent of them were using less
166
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than half their capacity
while using 80 percent or
their material inputs.
Labor productivity in
Manufacturing
declined by about 3 percent
a year from 1 969 to
1974.
From
to
1968
1973 the ratio between new
investment and output
changed from 3:6 to 6:6.
» There is no evidence that the
industrialization process via import
substitution had

in any

sense helped the industrial
sector to take off.
indeed, import substitution
industrialization was an
expensive nationalistic method of
replacing imported
consumer goods which would otherwise
have come from Kenya
for less cost.
The Role of the State

The state has played a central role
in Kenya's and
Tanzania's development. in Kenya a
nascent upper bourgeoisie controlled profits as well as
politics as early as
the 1930s, while in Tanzania, teachers,
traders, and clerks
were the core of the independence movement,
with the participation of ''kulak- (rich) farmers. 55 The
kulaks, however,
never played a dominant role as a class in
national

politics. 56

in sharp contrast to Kenya, Tanzania was

neither a favorite colony of Britain nor

a

settler colony

and, therefore, did not benefit as much from Britain.

This

was reflected by its undeveloped infrastructure, and industrial and manufacturing sectors at independence in 1961. 57

Europeans in Tanzania expropriated less than
the land.

1

percent of

The natives were relatively free to grow what

they wanted, though the official policy was to promote cash
167

crop production by
expanding the number of n
iddle-peasant
household producers. 58
Consequently, wage workers
in Tanzania were few
by
comparison with Kenya, where
the imposition of settler
estate agriculture often
necessitated separating the
producers from their means of
production, resulting in
landlessness.
Tanzania's kulaks did not face
similar
treatment.
Because of British bias against
Tanzania in
favor of Kenya, Tanzania became
from the earliest colonial
times a dumping ground for
Kenya's developing industrial

and

manufacturing products.

As a result, opportunities
to accu-

mulate capital were more limited
in Tanzania.
Therefore,
the nonproductive "petty bourgeoisie"
predominated. To be
sure, a small number of kulak
farmers emerged

in the fertile

areas of Kilimanjaro and other parts
of the country (e.g.
ismani [see map 4], and Lushoto [see
map 5]
alongside the
European estates)
But these farmers were not favored
by
the colonial state vis-a-vis the -peasant
cultivator- until
the mid-1950s when the state attempted to
encourage "the
,

.

transition from native customary tenure into
freehold in
59
appropriate areas."
By then, the independence movement was in full
swing.

The policy which acted to stabilize the kulak class
was

roundly attacked by Nyerere, who claimed:
If we allowed land to be sold like a robe, within a
short period there would only be a few Africans
possessing land in Tanzania. We would be faced with
problem which has created antagonism among people and
led to bloodshed in many countries of the world. 60
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a

in Kenya, the upper
bourgeoisie came to power
to strip
capital of its raciai
fetters and proceeded
to remove

petitbourgeois opponents who
stood in their way.
Tanzania's
ruling "bureaucratic
bourgeoisie," as Shivji
oalled it «
lacked the material base
to act like its Kenya
counterpart
and was not prepared to
continue to support land
policies
that would develop capital
and proletarian!^ a
middle
peasantry. Hence, while
Kenya devised policies to
support
the further development
of an upper bourgeoisie,
its poorer
sister chose "Narodism.'(''Narodism- came from Russia's
narodniks who believed that
socialism could be based
on the

mir [village commune] and its
communist peasantry to
institutionalize a petit bourgeoisie
and small

capitalism.)

62

The dominant role of the state
in Tanzania was made
unequivocally clear time and again by
President Nyerere.
one of his statements on the
'principle of Socialism,' he
noted,
"[t]hat it is the responsibility of the
state to
intervene actively in the economic life
of the nation so as
to ensure the well-being of all citizens
" 63

m

From 1967 on, the state's intervention
appeared to show
some positive results. 64
the urban sector, after the
Arusha Declaration in 1967, the state took
over all

m

commercial banks, insurance companies, grain mills,
and the
main import-export firms and acquired a controlling
interest
in the major MNC subsidiaries and the sisal
industry.

Subsequently the state undertook all importing and exporting
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through the state Trading
corporation, ana expropriated
all
buildings worth »ore than
100,000 sh. (excluding
private
residences,.
It also too* over
«a„ y snall businesses
and
replaced all co-operative
unions by government
65
corporations.
,

Foreign enterprise continued
to operate in manufacturing, but only in
partnership with the state, as
a minority
holder of the equity. All
cooperative unions were suppressed and in 1976 were replaced
by a single national
corporation, which was a branch
of TANU itself the ruling
and, by then, the only legal
political party. 66 Most
,

aspects of the modern economy
came to be controlled by
parastatals (64 in 1967, 139 in
1974, and more thereafter),
which acted both as holding companies
and as business
67
organizations.
The state fixed minimum wages,
provided all credit and
set prices for traded agricultural
produce.
From 1964 on,
five-year plans were used to allocate
resources and control
patterns of development.
In the rural sector successive
policies (outlined below) were adopted whose
aim was to
extend state control over the peasantry.
Virtually all

political power and economic control were vested
in the
hands of the president, TANU and the bureaucracy.

in short,

Tanzania ceased, at least in principle, to be an open
economy or a liberal democracy.

Instead, it started its

long march towards African Socialism in a society, as
Hyden
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put it, where "the material
base
„
case of ch=
the peasant
mode was far
too narrow for a rapid
socialist transformation. -«
Kenya, too adopted a
state centered approach
to
development, though it:
it aid
did not
nnf follow it as
y
dogmatically as
Tanzania. As a proportion
of GDP, the state's
share
increased from 11 to 20 percent
from i960 to 1979, while
private consumption decreased
from 72 to 65 percent. 69

Between 1964 and 1977 public
employment rose from 32 to 42
percent of total wage employment.
it is not known what
proportion of manufacturing output
was in the public sector
after 1967, but at that date the
few but large government
establishments (only 2 percent of the
total number) employed
20 per cent of manufacturing workers and
were responsible
for 15 percent of the gross
product (value added). 70

The
state invested heavily in both
indigenous and foreign-owned
enterprises through the Industrial and
Commercial Development Corporation, the successor to the
Industrial Development Corporation of 1950 and its various
subsidiaries.

m

1977 its assets were nearly Kf31 millions, of
which 45 percent was in loans and advance, 27 percent
in equity and 24

percent in subsidies. 71
The state also took a controlling position in

agriculture.

The Maize and Produce Board had a theoretical

monopoly of buying and selling maize, though in fact,
because of private consumption and illegal sales at higher
prices, it handled only a small proportion of the total
output.

The Kenya Tea Development Authority, the Kenya Meat
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Commission (with a monopoly
of the urban, but not
the rural
meat trade) and organizations
for coffee and other
cash
crops, performed the same
functions as marketing boards
in
other African states.- From
the

^^^

national plans and adopted
conventional protection by me
ans
of tariffs and licensing
of imports in order to
expand its
productive capacity. In form
at least Kenya
the same state-centered
approach to development as most
other African countries. What
distinguishes

^

,

,

it from its

neighbor Tanzania is the manner
in which it used state
power
and the effects its policy had
on the industrial and
agricultural sector.
Industry

The state's policy towards industry
and manufacturing
in Kenya is one of encouragement
of foreign direct investment.
Large inflows of foreign investment
and stable earnings from primary exports— including
the boom in coffee
prices in the mid-to late-70 s-have helped
finance import
substitution.
In 1967, for example, 57 percent of the
gross
product (value added) was foreign owned; in 1972
it was 59
•

percent. 73

Kenya did not go to the extreme to attract

multinationals; there were no tax holidays and generous

permitted rates of depreciation.

Moreover, there was

considerable pressure on multinationals to employ Kenyans in

management and on their boards, and to sell shares in the
equity to the state and private Kenyans.

From 1971 on

multinationals had to obtain permission to raise capital
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locally, to issue shares
"ares and to *develop
new lines of
74
production.

On the other hand, the
government tried to help
multinationals by providing
effective tariff protection
on
demand.
Langdon's sample showed
that more than 75 percent
of all domestic manufacturing
firms had protection and
79
percent of their requests had
been successful; the larger
the firm, the more probable
its success would be. 75
The
motives of multinationals were
mixed, but their primary
aim
was to protect existing
product markets created by
exports
against other multinationals and
indigenous competition. 76
Langdon argues that, from the
multinationals' point of view,
the outcomes of government
protection were to their satisfaction.
Average after-tax profits and fees
were about 2 3
percent of capital employed, dividends
taking some 65
percent of profit, most of them
repatriated. 77 However,
this has created for the Kenyan
government a heavy reliance
on foreign investment for finance
and has increased its

balance of payments problems due to heavy
outflows of
78
surpluses.
Yet, unlike Tanzanya where its rural-focused

development has neglected the urban industrial sector, 79
Kenya's seems to have

a

linkage between its industrial-

ization strategy and its other sectors of the economy.

in

1971 domestic inputs to industry from non-manufacturing

sectors amounted to 28 percent of the value of output,

compared with 29.6 percent of imported inputs, of which 15.6
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percent was from domestic
agriculture.
Conversely, 22 9
percent of manufactured
output went to other
domestic
sectors: for example, 16
percent of the beverages
and
tobacco industries went to
the Kenyan hotel and
restaurant
trade, and 27 percent of
sawmill production into
building
and construction. 80
In Tanzania, the pattern
of post-independence

industrialization falls into two
periods.
there was almost no manufacturing,

Before the 1950s

save some processing

Plants.

After the 1950s, prior to
independence, importsubstitution industrialization began
to develop because the
government was now prepared to protect
firms which requested
it, provided they could put
up a good case. 81 This policy
was also begun because some foreign
companies in Kenya
opened subsidiaries in Tanzania as a
hedge against a
possible break-up of the East African
Common Market.
However, firms like Unilver decided
against building

a

subsidiary firm at Dar es Salaam in 1964 on
the ground that,
without the Common Market, there would be an
inadequate
market for a small enterprise. 82
Until the later 1960s this resulted in a typical

pattern of import-substituting industrialization.

Most

manufacturing was carried out by foreign firms whose
products were previously imported consumer goods.

There was

a rapid growth of enterprises and production. 83

According to Rweyemamu, this expansion was primarily
the result of high levels of protection on manufactured
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consumer imports, coupled
with zero duties and few
restrictions on imported capital
and other inputs. 84 These
industries had many of the common
features
of import-

substitution industrialization
in Lies.
There were few
backward linkages into other
sectors of the economy, except
from those firms which processed
coffee and sisal. Most of
the firms used capital intensive
methods for manufacturing
products.
Between 1958 and 1966 employment
in manufacturing
rose from 20,000 to 30, 000. 85

After the Arusha Declaration, the
state owned all or
the majority of the equity in all
significant
industrial

enterprises through its parastatals. 86

Some factories were

run entirely by these state corporations,
others by multinational corporations as managers and owners
of a minority
of the equity. 87 in addition, in
1971, workers' councils
were set up in factories under the Mwongozo
(or TANU Guidelines)
These councils, for at least a couple
of years,

.

seriously disrupted production in

a

number of factories

until they were brought under control by the socialist

oriented TANU.

Industrialization continued to grow, albeit

for a short period of time.

Up to the early 1970s, the manufacturing sector

continued to expand satisfactorily.

By 1971 about half the

value of total parastatal assets in manufacturing was in new
companies formed since 1964, 88 which suggests continued
expansion.

Output in the major industries, like cotton

textiles, cement and petroleum refining, continued to expand
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until 1973/4 , after which
it faecame static
aeciine ^
Beer, iron sheets, sisal
ropes and wheat . flour
declined to at least the
later 1970s. A number
of new
products, including electric
batteries, shoes and rolled
steel, were introduced
ea in the later
l
1960s.
Between 1967 and
there
1977
was a significant decline
from 36 to 19 percent
in the share of consumer
goods in total imports and

^

^

of 14 to

percent in imports of building
and other construction
goods, while imports of
intermediate goods and spare
parts
rose from 27 to 4 0 percent. 89
5

Bienefeld estimates that productivity
rose in
manufacturing from 1965 to 1972,
after which

it fell back to

the 1968 level.

By 1976, however, the chief
sustained gains
were confined to the more dynamic
industries. 90 until 1970,
there was a continual growth in
manufacturing with increased
employment and some improvement in
productivity.

After 1970,

however, the conditions were less
favorable. From 1973/4
there was a marked increase in incremental
capital output
ratios, but a slight decrease for parastatals
from their

previous high ratios from 1972. 91

The operating surplus of

industry was fairly constant at about 24-25 percent
from
1965 to 1975, though this was determined by levels of

effective protection and monopolistic price-fixing. 92
There was, however, some serious limitation in this
performance, particularly in exclusively state-run
enterprises.

From 1967 on, new state enterprises became

more capital intensive than private or jointly owned firms
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^^

and .ore dependent on
imports:
74 peroent Qf
were imported, compared
with 30 percent for
older f
Each unit of labor
contributed only half as
»uch to
production in these new
enterprises as in older
finus »
Moreover, in 1973 the newer
firms

valued at only

percent of their capital
stock, compared
with 32 percent in finns
established before 1967,
retaining
only 50 percent of value
added as against nearly 80
percent
94
repatriated.
4

Since foreign capital was
largely excluded on dogmatic
grounds and Tanzania could not
afford the foreign exchange
necessary to finance its capital
imports, its growing
dependence on foreign aid in the
1970s (see Table 2) to
provide new industrial investment
meant that new factories
tended to come as packages, which
reflected industrial

conditions in the European or American
country of origin.
Tanzania took what was offered. But
the most significant
aid came from its ideological
ally-china. Among China's
aid the most efficient one was the
new textile mills which
cost only about 60 percent of a similar
but capitalintensive mill designed by a French company.

The Chinese

mill produced more fabric in 1975, employed
twice as many
Tanzanians and made a larger profit than the French
mill. 95
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TABLE

2

uoiiars and as Percent of
GNP)

Year
Grants

1971

1972

1973

1974

30 6

44 5

64 '9

^71

1975
188.1

1976"
195.7

Loans

31.8

16.5

35.4

63.1

107.3

71.4

124.8

61.0

100.3

162.5

295.4

267.1

339.9

*

Total:
Capital
Inflow
GNP:

*

62.4
1457

Capital
Inflow
% GNP
a

1633

4.3

1817

2296

2505

2724

2735

3.7

GNP is estimated for the year
1977

The performance of the manufacturing
sector in Tanzania
is similar to that of most other
African states, despite the
country's "socialist" rhetoric. Just as
in Latin American
countries, import-substituting industrialization
policy,
financed by foreign aid, failed to generate
significant

production of intermediate or capital goods and
became
increasingly dependent on imports, whose supply
became more
uncertain as the country experienced serious balance
of

payments problems. 96

Linkages to the domestic economy

remained weak except in processing.
only from

4

to

6

Factory employment rose

per cent of the labor force and industrial

production from 11 to 13 per cent of GDP between 1960 and
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"79." And

yet

,

^

Nyerere rgmained

of A frican socialism
and refused to try
course for his country.

ws

^

chart g

fcQ

_

increasingly, Tanzania
began to use the bulk
of
investments provided by
foreign aid, after the
A rusha
Declaration, to provide a
social and physical
infrastructure
in the rural areas.
This is
ite . departure

^^^

^

Arusha practice of absorbing
most foreign capital,
especxally in the form of aid,
in the government
budgetary
expenditure. Table 3 demonstrates
how the bulk of investments has been provided
through foreign
capital.

TABLE

3

MINISTRIES AND PARAS TATALS

PERCENTAGE OF FOREIGN CAPITAL IN
GOVERNMENT
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME IN TANZANI^
Year
1965
?
Ministries
listries'
External
share (of
total investments)
42

Parastatals
External
Shares
UrCe:
-,oo°

56

'66

'67

'68

"^9

WO

nl

^72

*7'

-

-

•74

42

50

36

38

36

40

48

47

50

49

86

70

53

57

51

48

55

48

clark

'

I nvestment

in Tanzania

,

Table 81, 1978

Major expenditures have been in the areas of an
improved transport system, especially the major
trunk roads,
and a rural water supply, including irrigation
and r:iver
179

program,

consul

clark reported that
in 1975 the water
project
192 niU io„ Tanzan
an shUUngs Qf
.

money.

At present, the economy
of Tanzania, is controlled
by
parastatal organizations.„ e „ce parastatal
investment has
been growing rapidly in
absolute terms and as a
proportion
of total investment.
These investments,

however, are said
to be concentrated in the
more capital intensive
areas of
the economy, which makes
them, therefore, of less
value in
terms of providing employment
to the people.
At the same
time, when seen from the
viewpoint of investment orientation, parastatals are developing
the economy in a way which
makes it very dependent externally
(i.e., export oriented).
Based on the information of the
first and second five year
Plans, Clark computed the degree
of external orientation by
showing the share of exports in
the total output of these
parastatals (see Table 4)
.

TABLE

4

SHARE OF EXPORTS IN THE TOTAL OUTPUT
OF
PARASTATALS IN TANZANIA

Year
Share to
exports

1965

Source:

'66

'67

'68

'69

40

53

55

45

~ '70

'71

^72

~2

~A

28

39

44

51

34

~

'

48

Clark, Investment in Tanzania see table
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3.

Agriculture
It is

wen

xnown that the most
ambitious experiment in
agricultural development
has taxen place in
Tanzania.
Like
-o-t other colonized
African states, it
inherited an
agriculture economy organized
to produce mainly
cash crops
for export.- In the
predominantly peasant and
subsistence
economy there existed an
important plantation industry
producing sisal for export,
a number of white
fanners
producing coffee and other
export crops on a large
scale
and a growing class of
African farmers, having
small-to
medium-sized farms increasingly
active in cash-crop

production.'-

As soon as Tanzania gained
its independence
»any of its white farmers
left the country leaving
African
farmers to rapidly expand
production of cotton, coffee and
cashew-nuts between 1960-2 and
1966-8, with annual growth
rates ranging from 8 to 13 per
cent."' However, the few

remaining foreigners controlled
most of the exportable crops
(see Table 5)

Nyerere did not endorse capitalist
development whether
controlled by white or black; but he
wanted the country to
be self-reliant and self-sufficient,
and in
the 1960s

experimented with various methods to improve
production and
productivity. To this end, existing
cooperatives were given
a monopoly of buying and selling
and were put under state
control.
Extension services, already well developed under
the improvement scheme, were further
expanded.
The so*

•

called

»

transformation approach' was used to establish new
181

settlements on unused land
with
irrigation and equipment.'"'

m

a

considerable investment

In short

government poUoy
remained unchanged between
i af „
^tween the later
y
colonial period and the
mid-1960s.
TABLE

,

5

DISTRIBUTION OF OWNERSHIP OF
SISAL PRODUCTION
IN TANZANIA, 1964

Tons

Greek
British
Asian
Swiss
Dutch
Italian
Germany
African

Percenta ge
30.5

70, 000

57,000
62,000

25
27

15, 000

6
6

13,000
150
1,250

0.5

9, 100

Total

229, 800

100.

0

^

Source:
I. Shiviji, Class Struggle in T *n 7
lanzamaa
(London: Heinemann, 1976)
p. 36
.

,

But all this changed, as mentioned
earlier, with the
1967 Arusha Declaration. 104 The aim of the
Declaration was
to emphasize the importance of agriculture
and rural

development as an integral part of the new policy
of 'selfreliance.
Given the dominant role of peasant and
»

subsistence farming and the inadequacy of the previous
agricultural policies, the Declaration was potentially very
constructive.

The earlier capitalistic model of development

had been an expensive failure, mainly because the equipment
and techniques were unsuited to the land and the crops
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9rOWn
'

Mditi

™

lly
'

While

~ity Production grew,

due
to the enterprise of
a small minority of
large
producers and growing
production for the market
by small .
holders, subsistence
agriculture production grew
faster
For instance, between l
960 and 1968 it increased
from 55 tc
71 percent of total agricultural
output. However, agriculture as a whole declined
from 60.9 to 41 percent
of
105
GDP.

-inly

These problems provided
ground for Nyrere to look
fo r a
radical new departure in
agricultural policy. Moreover,
as
Hyden observed, "patronagepolitics in rural areas, in
which party members and bureaucrats
created private fiefs
and in turn were influenced
by the demands of their
peasant
clients, was growing.™ if such
a socio-political system
were allowed to continue, then
Nyerere reasoned, it could
hinder development and ultimately
threaten the power of TANU
as the dominant influence in
a centralized socialist
state.

107

The Arusha Declaration, therefore,
can be seen as
Nyerere >s response to the stated political
and economic
problems.
By adopting the concept of Ujamaa, he
attempted
to invoke an idealized version of the
mutual self-help of
the peasant household as the basis for a
socialist work
ethic.
By replacing capitalism with this
'socialist'

concept, he hoped to legitimize intrusive action
by the

state to obtain higher levels of production.

At the same

time, he could also neutralize the political influence
of
183

the rural petty bourgeoisie
geoisie.

primary motive.

™<
This

may well have been his

108

in 1973, in a new
policy Kyerere ordered
all villages
to beco»e „ ja »aa villages
by i976 and
to them.
This declaration reflected
his frustration with

m

^

^

the outcome of the first
six years since the Arusha
Declaration. During this
period, despite his efforts
to
make Tanzania self-reliant
and self-sufficient, his
emphasi
on collective and communal
production and the elimination
o
capitalist farming failed to
meet his expectations.
The new policy may have had
short ten, political gain
for Nyerere, but as we now
know it was disastrous for
economic development. Politically,
he gained support from
the poor peasants because he
ordered most sisal estates to
be nationalized, and many of the
large grain
farms to be

expropriated and turned over to the
state farms or to be
operated by Ujamaa villages. Also,
African farmers with
sizable holdings were forced to give
up much of their land
and move to the villages.
Furthermore, some success in efficiency and
political
control was achieved in concentrating peasants
in villages
by putting communal production under official
supervision.
For instance, between 1970 and 1974 the
number of people

living in Ujamaa villages increased from 531,200
to
2,560,472.

By 1972 perhaps half of the population lived in

villages, though by no means all were in the new Ujamaa
system.' 09

In any case, by 1977 most villages had declared
184

themselves ujamaa and over
90 percent of the
, ho population
had
settled in them, though
raosi: of f
most
haiB
y
them
amounted to littl.e more
than a na»e."o By the

^^^^

^

-~

million people were living
in villages, def
at least 250 families,
which inclufle<J pre . lg67
survivals, old villages
ana the largely new
settlements
created under the new policy.
At the time this must
rate as
one of the largest enforced
population movements of modern
history (topping even the
recent enforced population
13

^

movements in Ethiopia)."'

As in Ethiopia today, after

peasants had settled into their
new villages, the government's response to the food
crisis in many instances was
to
start state farms with capital
intensive machines
and

expatriate technicians, often under
foreign aid schemes. 112
Unlike the short term political
gain for Nyerere, the
overall political-economic effect
of the new policy was
disappointing. At constant price,
price output grew at 3.9
percent from 1965 to 1971. Subsistence
was estimated to
have grown at 3.1 percent; but in the
three years after the
new policy took effect, from 1968 to
1971, subsistence

production was virtually static and monetized
production
grew by only about 5 percent. 3 Meanwhile
the major export
crops were in serious decline.
Between 1966
1 '

and 1973 cotton

production dropped by 3,695 tons, sisal by
53,612 tons,

pyrethrum from 5,558 to 3,962 tons, and coffee production
was almost static."'

Only cashew nuts and tea grew

significantly.
185

^

Apart from the few highly
suo=essfui voiuntary
villages, such as the

tm

^

(later to be closed down
because it was too
independent)
peasants found that they
could take little active
part in
Planning collective activities,
which were in the hands
of
the civil servants, nor
was there much advantage
for them i„
taking part in collective
production. This was reflected
in
the substantial decline
of agricultural production.

For instance, the production
of export crops declined
from 403,000 tons in 1973
to 305,000 tons in 1978.From
1974 to 1976 there was a major
drop in agricultural production, which was possibly
intensified by drought,
the
period from 1971 to 1978, cotton
production declined from
71,296 to 65,199 tons, sisal from
168,977 to 105,009

m

tons,

and cashew nuts from 121,750
to 82,404 tons." 6 Food crops
also suffered as reflected in
an increase of grain imports

from 11,600 tons in 1970/71 to
413,200 tons in 1974/5. 117
The overall effect of villagization
seems to have produced
more on the negative side than on the
positive.

Among the many factors that may have
contributed to the
relatively poor performance of the economy
were exogenous
ones.
Before 1982 adverse factors included a
rapid decline
in Tanzania's terms of trade (1980=100)
from 105 in 1979 to
86 in 1981 and a substantial increase in the burden
of its

considerable external public debt (see Table

6)

,

made worse

by the decline in the volume as well as the value
of com-

modity exports." 8
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TANZANIA'S

™AL

TABLE

6

P„ BLIC DEBT AND DEBT
SERVICE, 196 2 -198 2
Dollars)

(In Millions of U.S.

A
ueou outstanding

"

B

Debt service

1962

48.0

n/a

1967

139.9

7.3

1970

248.5

15.7

1973

463.7

31.9

1977

1,005.0

33.2

1979

1,213.4

59.8

1982

1,631.6

46.4

table 16 and appendix table
?
1 Iffia-I^M
World Bank, World Tah1 Pg (Washington
DC, 1980?
,

^r ^
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But so far as the failure of state public
policy-making

and execution is concerned, the current
consensus seems to
be that the main weakness lay in the ability
and attitude of
the political and administrative elite.

On this score

Tanzania is not alone among African states.
The Kenyan agricultural policy in many ways differs

from that of Tanzania because Kenya was far more favorable
to a private indigenous agriculture and sustained commodity

exports.

One can see this from what economists call nominal
187

protection coefficients of
the „ain export crops,
Price paid to the producer
divide(j

^

^

^

i. e .,

the

prxce (the higher the
coefficients the .ore favorable,
Moreover, Kenya continued
the colonial agricultural
structure by preserving mixed
and grade cattle fanning,
as well
as establishing a class
of African .nediun, and
smaU fanners
geared to the market.
The growth rate of the
agricultural sector was high
in
comparison to most other African
countries.
the 197 0s
(no comparable figure
found for the 1960s) the
growth rate
was 5.4 per cent; and, although
from 1969-71 to 1977-9 there
was a small negative trend
in per capita food
production,
the growth of non-food production
was sufficient to make
Kenya one of the few sub-Saharan
African states with a
positive per capita growth of
agricultural production in
120
that decade.
Between 1970 and 1977, and at
current
prices, the gross marketed production
of crops and livestock
(excluding subsistence production) rose
from Kf85 millions
to Kf415 millions. 121

m

On the other hand, there is very little
information, if
any, on the production or productivity
of the majority of
small farmers who did not enter the cash
economy.
Therefore,

it is impossible to value the greater
proportion of

the product of Kenyan agriculture.

The distinctive feature of land and agricultural
policy

was the individualization of ownership, through
registration
of tenures, as contrasted with the informal or group owner188

ship and largely private
use characteristic
Qf
^^^^^
peasant societies. As
discussed earlier, this
was the
result of large-scale
European land ownership,
the
commercialization of a s.j.gniricant
sianif Mn t part of.
agricultural
production, which encouraged
Africans to consolidate
their
holdings, and the process
b y which land was
transferred from
European to Black African
ownership from the mid-1950s.'*
By 1977 a large proportion
of usable land in the
most
productive areas had been registered
or was under

adjudication. 123
The process began officially
in 1955 and was complete
in Central Province before
Kenya gained its independence.

Simultaneously, the removal of all
previous restrictions on
the commercial crops Africans
were permitted to grow in the
interests of European settlers provided
the incentive for
Africans to invest in European land.
The transfer
of

ownership was eased first by the Land
Transfer Program
financed by Britain (refer to the historical

section), then

in 1961 by a scheme funded by the
World Bank and the

Colonial Development Corporation and run
by the Kenya Land
Development and Settlement Board. Settler land
was to be
bought and divided into relatively large farms

(intended to

produce 1,800 -yeoman' farmers with 20 ha or more
and 6,000
•peasant'

farms of

6

ha or more).

since large down payments

were needed, these settlers would have to be wealthy.

124

The scheme, however, failed because of the lack of

suitable land, the cost of buying unwanted settler assets
189

such as large farmhouses,
and lack of suitable
settlers
willing to leave their tr
bal

^

.

^^^^ ^

^

Million Acre Scheme
me (40s
nnn ha),
(405,000
intended to provide small
holdings for landless people
r.„,i«. *
which resulted
p e wnicn
some 35,000
holdings averaging only
13.4 ha.
Yet more land (some
600,000 ha) was acquired by
Africans privately, much
of it
in relatively large units,
as compared with some
470,000 ha
sold under the scheme.
addition a large number of
small
holdings, averaging 7.5 ha,
were created. Under the
Haraka
Scheme of 1971 for co-operative
farming on large
'

m

m

estates,

workers were allocated one hectare
per family for their own
use.

125

Kenya thus emerged with a uniquely
large number of
African landowning peasants, but
also with an exceptional
differentiation between large and small
farmers.
For most
of the small farmers an income
outside their farming was
necessary. 126 Nevertheless, unlike
Tanzania, there was no
political control restricting peasants
from moving anywhere
in order to earn their living in any
way they wished
to.

From the limited evidence so far, the main
achievement
of the agricultural production was the
growth of cash crop
production by the larger smallholders, which some
have taken
to constitute an 'agrarian revolution.'
Gross farm revenues
of smallholders rose from Kf8 millions to Kf34
millions from
1958 to 1968, an increase of 435 percent, led by coffee,

pyrethrum, tea, grade cattle and improved maize.

smallholders produced

1

By 1977

million tons of sugar cane, a third
190

of the country's total
production.'" This increase
was
greatly helped by governs
research and extension services
and, in the case of sugar,
by the successful Mumias
nucleus
estate scheme in Western Province. 128

A word of caution is necessary
here.
According to
Hazelwood, in 1974/75 only about
9 percent of smallholder
output was of the main export
crops in which this impressive
growth had occurred. On the other
hand, the smallholders
produced 20 percent of food-crop
sales and 16 percent of
livestock and milk sales.
addition, they produced 38
percent of food and 17 percent of
livestock and milk for
family consumption. 129 Thus some 33
percent of smallholder
output consisted of livestock and
milk.
Kitching estimates
that in the later 1960s beef sales
alone constituted

m

25

percent of farm revenues.

130

since most of this cattle was

unaffected by technical improvements and the
low prices paid
by the Kenya Meat Commission, this implied
that the mass of

smallholders were still heavily dependent on an
unimproved
product,
only some 350,000 out of 1.2 millions smallholders
had been affected by the agrarian revolution. 131
The record of public policy in Kenya, therefore, is
mixed.

Compared with Tanzania, it was far less prone to

waste resources on conspicuous public consumption, inefficient state farms and manufactures.

On the other hand, it

was relatively generous to producers of cash crops and
rational in its treatment of foreign investment.

Yet,

it

adopted conventional protectionist policies for industry,
191

provided state support
PPort to enable a small
wealthy minority to
accumulate land and establish
private industrial enterprises, and accepted growing
social inequality.'" It
came
to depend increasingly
on foreign loans and
investments to
sustain the expanding modern
sector and offset defioits
in
its balance of payments.
On this score it is
identical with
its socialist neighbor.
The pattern of accelerating
indebtedness and its consequences
is clear from table 7
below.
TABLE

7

KENYA'S EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT
AND DEBT SERVICE
1959-1982
(In Millions of U.S. Dollars)
"

A
Debt out standing

*

n<=sK+
Debt
servic e
.

2

1959
1963
1967
1970
1973

82.9
142.4
219.6
312.8
433.2
821.4
1,885.7
2,401.6

19 "77

1979
1982

S °? rce:

1959

.

n/a

l*'*

54^
l*l'm l

1963: UN, Statistical

Yearbook
*° rld ^bles^iihlAgton
DC 1976)
1970
° rld Bank
World Tab1es (Washington DC,
1976
1979: World Bank, Accelerated Develon^nt a
pp. 7,
13, 14.
1982: World Bank, Toward Sustained ne.vel n m
p
13
14
and also from IMF Internatio nal FinanH^I
P
oF f 1'
Statistics
Yearbook (1984), 1979 and 1982 Column C:
4.

8

>

7-T SF^V"*'

'

'

.

,

•

'

'

^

'

These figures show that, although the total debt

increased considerably between 1959 and 1982, its burden was
kept down by a parallel expansion of exports and by continu-
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ing easy terns of deot
service

.

Thereafter

increase and a sudden rise
in rates of
service very onerous indeed. 133

^
^^

^^

in any case, comparing
the respective economic
growth
of Tanzania and Kenya one
finds Tanzania lagging
far behind
Kenya.
part, this is due to the
fact that Kenya had been
consistent in its economic
policy since independence.
when

m

it became independent it
merely followed the development

path mapped out by the colonial
state.
part, Kenya had
the full support of the
British colonial administration
and
political elites in London, which
in turn increased the
confidence of foreign investors to
invest in Kenya.

m

On the other hand,

a

casual visitor in Kenya finds

sparkling skyscrapers and luxuriant
suburbs populated by
well-to-do local entrepreneurs who
drive Mercedes-Benzes and
splash in marble pools. What he or
she may not
realize is

that these seemingly economic benefits
are scant, and are
not evenly distributed.
In contemporary Kenya, 45 percent
of all personal income earned is held
by only 10 percent of
the population. 13A
An even more threatening problem looms ahead
for Kenya

when the current population of 24 million people
doubles as
expected to 40 million people by the year 2000.
By
then,

according to

a

the population.

report by the New African, »[t]he majority of
.

.could well be under 15 and the country will

be fully stretched simply in providing basic health care
and

ed ucation for all its new citizens.
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The economy will have

provide jobs for the major
ty Qf
in contrast, Tan2ania
had neither
Policy nor benefited from
its Cerman

^^^^^

.

nlJ5

,

or British colonic
The Oermans had been
interested in their
piantations and in
any case did not stay
long enough to reevaluate
their
policies even if they had
wanted to.
Once Tanzania fell under
British administration,
the
British, already firmIy
established in Kenya, were
unwilling
to invest heavily in
Tanzania as

^

^

instead used Tanzania as a
market place for their
products
manufactured in neighboring
Kenya.
Nevertheless, Tanzania
flirted with free enterprise
for some time until it
became
frustrated with the results and
drastically changed its
development course with Nyerere's
Arusha Declaration.

This

declaration effectively shut out
interested foreign
investors from investing in Tanzania
even if they had wanted
to.
From then on Tanzania embarked on
a previously
uncharted course and began rural-focused
socialist
development (Ujamaa)

Conclusi on

From the discussion thus far, we have
seen how the
development processes pose severe difficulties

for Lies like

Tanzania and Kenya.
time, are scarce.

All the necessary resources, including

Yet the people (rich and poor) expect and

demand quick results.

Because of time pressure the poli194

txcaX elites hope to
modernize their countries
i„ years or
decades; what has taken
the XCs generations or
oenturies. To
bring this to reality,
the elites base their
development
strategies on either capitalist
or socialist paths and
call
their people to make
sacrifices. Meanwhile, the
inexorable
increase in population,
expected to double in the
year 2000
coupled with the political
repression justified by the
need
to rectify the economic
inequalities, threaten to cancel
out
the meager economic gains
made by strenuous efforts.
Behind the struggle for
development to overcome acute
deficiencies in statistical data,
trained personnel, honest
political elites, developed
transportation systems,

power,
schools, houses, savings, a
representative political system,
to name a few, loom time and
uncontrollable population
growth.
Even if one assumes programs which
combine perfect
economic rationality and administrative
feasibility, their
realization would encounter tremendous
political and social
difficulties.

In the case of Tanzania it is clear
that its develop-

ment strategy, rhetoric aside, is a long
way from making
itself self-sufficient.
In 1975 the gap in income between
the urban and rural dwellers widened by 17
percent. In the

same year unemployment and inflation increased
by 17 and 26
percent respectively.' 36 Perhaps a much more serious
set

back for Tanzania's Ujamaa policy is reflected in the

decline of its agricultural production. 137

It is hard to

believe that with all its socialist policies specifically
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aimed at increasing the
well beings of peasants,
it should
suffer a food shortage
and must import grain
to stave off
possible starvation in the
138
1980 -s.

In Kenya too, especially
after 1973, significant

problems were becoming evident
in the agricultural
sector
For instance, from 1972
to 1980 the average annual
growth
rate of gross domestic
product was 4.2 percent per
year with
growth rate fluctuating from
year to year as a result of
instability in import and export
price (see table
8)

TABLE

8

THE ANNUAL GROWTH RATE OF
KENYAN GDP (1973-1980)
Year
Percentage rate
19721973197419751976197719781979-

1973

1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980

1.2
5.6
8

6
4
2

U
Government Statistical Abstract
1977° 1978, and Economic
1977,
Survey 1981, table 2.1.

^«

1975,

,

The growth rate for marketed agricultural
output fell to 2.9
percent. With population growing at between
3.5 and 4

percent per year, total output per capita fell
in at least
two years, 1976 and 1980. 139 Most farms were too

small or on

land of poor quality to enable them to achieve the
basic

needs level of income.

in addition,

income differentials

correlates with geographic concentrations in industry.
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As a

result the income yctp
gap betwppn
oeiween the urban-rural
sectors
continue to widen. 140

Table

9

(see endnote 143)

indicates the total reported

number of employees and the
estimated earnings without
regard to whether they are in
the public or the private
sector, or involved in
agricultural or industrial activities.
Since most private industry
is located in the
towns, the table may be viewed
* rough
rn „„u approximation
as a
of
rural-urban income differentials.
From the computed
averages, it can be seen that the
towns greatly exceed the
provinces in payments to labor while
they employ significantly fewer people; the result is
that the average wage
in the towns is more than triple
that of the rural
jr

areas.

Feldman, Crawford and Thorbecke found
that in the mid-1970s

approximately 570,000 rural smallholder
households or
million people lived in dire poverty. 141

3

.

Because of this legacy, industrial growth in
Kenya has,
like most other LICs, been concentrated in
a few urban
areas.

Kenya's small modern industrial sector is not yet

sufficiently diversified, nor has it built up sufficient
internal integration nor innovative capacity to be
capable
of generating its own investment capital.

Most of the major

industries have been the product of the penetration of

multinational corporations.

For instance, from 1970 to

1975, multinational investment in the country totalled 22

percent of GNP.

Most of these investments were concentrated

in manufacturing, and some in general trade, petroleum,
197

banking, transportation,
advertising, and agriculture
While this pattern of
industrialization has proved
the
industrial sector and
contributed to higher employmentin
that sector, it has also
contributed tQ
in wage employment in the
agricultural sector.'"

«

^^^
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PART III

TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE PARADIGM

CHAPTER

6

ASSESSMENT OF THE PARADIGMS

in this chapter, our aim
is to assess the develop(modernization)
dependency, and

mental

orthodox Marxist

,

paradigms in light of the
developmental experiences of Kenya
and Tanzania. We will argue
that these experiences cannot
be adequately interpreted by
only one of the paradigms,
instead, some aspects of the
development experiences
of the

two countries can be found to be
consistent with some, but
inconsistent with other, dimensions of
the paradigms.
Our
assessment will show that none of them
fully describes or
adequately explains the processes of
development. Thus,

development strategy should focus upon
delivering what the
people want by minimizing pain and suffering
through a
series of cautious, flexible, limited actions,
rather than
attempting a major leap (as the Tanzanian case

illustrated)

based on one's imperfect and partial world-view
(ideology).

Overview

These experiences by Kenya and Tanzania provide

interesting insights into the basic assumptions of the three
paradigms.

First, there is truth to the dependentistas

claim that a marked dominant and dependent political and
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economic relationship exists
between ICs and post-colonial
LICs.
colonial and national LICs
were, as the two cases
demonstrate, drawn into the
international economy as
exporters of foodstuffs, raw
materials and other minerals,
and as importers of capital
and manufactured goods.
The
production and investment
decisions by the LICs often
followed the interests of ICs.
Consequently, the determinants of the development and
the structure of
the LICs

class formations remained
largely exogenous to LICs.
By
concentrating on primary product
exports, LICs were unable
to develop an autonomous
capacity for growth and change.
In both countries this was
facilitated by the presence
of a European settler population,
which remained in Kenya
and Tanzania (though more in the
former than in the latter)
after independence and played a major
role in the countries'
political and economic life. European
colonialism had
distorted the countries' political and
social structures
(particularly their land tenure system) and
had made their
market structure, as Samir Amin and Andre
Gunder Frank put
it, outward looking.
Even after colonialism ended, the best
land still remained in the hands of a few
European and
1

•nouveau riche

Tanzania). 2

•

Africans (more pronounced in Kenya than in

Seen in this light, it is hard to dispute the

dependentistas claim that the opportunity for autonomous,

self-sustaining growth was distorted by colonialism.
Second, just because a LIC is heavily reliant in its

initial stage of development on a limited range of commodity
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exports is not neoessarily
inimical for deV eiop me nt.
As
modernization theorists
orists assert,
a^^erf this has
served Kenya and
Tanzania as a foundation
for their rapid economic
growth.'
Third, the effects of a
particular economic structure
is dynamic, contradictory
and can change over time
and
Place.
For instance, in Kenya,
the removal of certain
restrictions on the development
of African commercial
agriculture, in particular those
on coffee and tea product ion, helped spur growth
of marketing production

in the
small holding sector as
peasants responded to the removal
of
the constraints/ On the other
hand, in Tanzania, a similar
strategy, such as the transformation
scheme and the massive
ground nut growing scheme, failed
disastrously. 5

Fourth, orthodox Marxists criticize
the dependency
paradigm, which casts all social
ills on foreigners, as

being anti-capitalist and

a

shield for nationalism.

They

also reject the dependency paradigms'
assertion that international capital necessarily creates
underdevelopment rather
than development. Hence, they dismiss
the paradigm. They
argue instead that capitalism is a necessary
stage that must
be experienced and its historical role
is to develop the
world and pave the way for socialism. 6
According to this
argument, Kenya and Tanzania will inevitably
become

socialist as the contradictions between the forces
of
production (expressing the social character of

production)

and the relations of production (based upon
private

property) sharpen.

(For orthodox Marxists, Tanzania did not
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qualify as a socialist
state because it did not
follow
scientific socialism.)
The orthodox Marxist
approach rejects the developmentalist characterization
of LICs as a dual society:
one
modern and the other traditional,
in which development will
take place via the diffusion
of capital.
For orthodox
Marxists, the developmentalist
snapshot representation of
Lies is ahistorical and hence
arbitrary, whereas the dependentistas, in their view, distort
the concept of capitalism,
and neglect the importance of
domestic class contradictions,
differences and relations. For
orthodox Marxists, what
determines the characteristics of
LICs is the mode of
production: the form of extraction
of economic surplus from
the producers arising from
specific relations of production,
but not from the motives of the
ruling class, of the
practices of exchange. Although more
than one mode of

production (primitive, feudal, or capitalist)
could coexist,
the complexities should be ignored and
the characteristics
of the country in question should be
understood
in terms of

the dominant mode of production. 7

The fact that serious

unemployment and political arrest and detention
plague

contemporary Kenya, 8 while contemporary Tanzania retreats
from its strict socialist policies by opening up
its

domestic economy for private enterprises, suggests that
the
two countries reflect to some extent the orthodox Marxist
approach. 9
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A cursory examination
of the development
experiences of
the two states shows
however, that the
dependency and the
developaentalist arguments are
useful.
The fatalist view of
orthodox Marxists that
LICs can best he explained
by „ ay of
a contradiction between
the forces of production
and the
relations of production is
not fully sustainable.
Their
argument that Kenya and
Tanzania fit the capitalist
and the
socialist mode of production
respectively, is equally not
sustainable. As the preceding
chapters attest, both
incorporate an element of the
two modes of production,
with
Kenya leaning towards
capitalism and Tanzania towards
socialism.
All this implies that the
three paradigms contribute
valuable insights into the two
countries' history of

development.

The structural factors central
to dependency
theory and their initial rapid
economic growth after independence, despite a history of
exploitative colonialism,
were crucial for them. In this
regard the dependency theory
is in accord with the
developmentalist approach, to the
extent that both paradigms emphasize
the importance of the
international economic and political power
relations. 10

Kenya and Tanzania have been subjected
to dependency
ties as colonies and as participants in
the postwar political economy. 11
view of Kenya's impressive economic

m

growth, external dependency is not always or
necessarily

harmful.

Undoubtedly, Britain's colonial policy toward

Kenya was determined by the metropole's economic
needs and
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involved a siphoning off
of surplus from Kenya
economic structure that
was

^^

^
^_^
^

^

»ore favorable in comparison
tQ
break up of the East-African

.

^^^

Community, and proved
quite

functional for rapid
industrialization once the
constraints
of colonialism, such
as the develops of
African co ercial agriculture, were
removed.
These favorable conditions
helped Kenya achieve a
high rate of economic growth

m

in the

first decade of independence.
in Tanzania, however,
Nyerere witnessed not only a
failure to attract foreign
investment, but he also saw

foreigners owning the lion's
share of the main export crop,
sisal (28 percent of the
total export)
Consequently, he
boldly turned to a policy of
"African Socialism" and selfreliance to minimize foreign
domination of the domestic
.

economy.

He nationalized the key sectors
of the national
economy: banks, land, industry,
housing, insurance, and
trade.

The new policy reversed the
patterns of ownership by
socializing all industries. But the
declaration did not
give any positive guidance or recommendation
for a strategy
of industrial development.
However, as time passed economic
events forced making explicit the policies
on the strategy
of industrialization.
Four strategies have operated in
Tanzania.

12
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Strategy

l:

Maximum Growth Strategy-considers
industrialization the main engine of
development. This approach was
adopted from the early years
of independence by the
National
Development Corporation (NDC)
which was created to encourage industrial development,
it is based on the policy
of import substitution.
(a)

,

Market Socialism Strategy-stresses
industrialization based on comparative
advantage and cost production.
It favors labor-intensive
production technique as well as
projects which can bring quick
foreign exchange
(b)

returns.

This is the approach which has
been adopted by the parastatal corporations.

Strategy

2

Processing Industry Strategy-places
emphasis on establishing processing factories of major
export raw
materials.

it

assumes that Tanzania's comparative
advantages and growth
prospects lie in increased processing for
export.
The
approach is also seen to break the colonial
trade patterns
of exporting raw materials. Therefore it
is considered to
reduce dependency on the metropole.

Strategy

3

Small-scale Industry Strategy— favors rural based smallscale industries.

its exponents see it as being the

strategy best suited to the policy of rural socialism.
this approach emphasizes the use of local resources in

production.
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Also

Strategy

4

Basic industry
Strategy-emphasizes the restructuring
Qf
production and elimination
of dependence on outside
forces
in this respect it expects
to achieve self-reliance.

m

addition this approach
promises to bring production
and
consumption in line through
emphasizing the production of
producer goods on a large
scale and consumer goods on
a
limited scale.

Depende ncy:

TCPny ^

For the postindependence era,
Kenya's and Tanzania's
experiences demonstrate that three
dimensions or types of
dependency exist and suggest that
Kenya's relative economic
success (in terms of economic
growth) came from a specific
combination of dependency linkage.
First, as some scholars
13
argue,
there is a distinction between foreign
trade
dependence on global economic markets
and power dependence
on the decisions of specific foreign
actors, e.g.,
MNCs,

governments, or classes.

Second, conditions of political

relations (clientalism) involving governments
in the ICs and
LICs should be separated, for analytical
purposes, from

their economic relations.

in the contemporary era, the ICs

political and economic penetration into the economy
of the
LICs may follow a quite different logic. 14
When a major power is interested primarily in main-

taining a political sphere of interest, often for national
security reasons, it may be willing to subsidize rather than
217

exploit its peripheral allies.
»

Finally, the converse of

dependence can be either
independence or interdepend,lence
(i.e., mutual dependence).
Thus, a dependent state can
attempt to better its society's
well-being either by
withdrawing to some extent from
the international system or
by developing power resources
vis-a-vis external dominating
forces

Kenya experienced power (political)
and economic
(market) dependence.
Power dependence involves a foreign
actor's explicit control over domestic
outcomes, in this
case through LICs political economic
relationship with the
ICs.
Kenya's case, power dependence was
primarily part
of political and economic relationships,
especially with
Britain and the U.S., which viewed it as a
valuable client
in the cold war competition.
As a result, they were willing
to subsidize it heavily, as in foreign aid.

m

Thus, the viability of Kenya's initial growth
depended

to a large degree on Britain's foreign aid and
later on that
of the U.S.

16

Britain's early considerable influence with

the established government, primarily through the settlers,

also helped promote liberalization and reform.

The culmi-

nation of land reform, the transformation of settler farms
to the African "bourgeoisie," and the transformation to

export-led growth, proved to be beneficial for its ultimate
growth and structural transformation.

17

More recently,

Kenya's closer ties with the U.S. has brought it a favorable

review for investment and aid by the West and gave it
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a

sense of security from
its more unstable
neighbors li ke
Uganda, Somalia and the
Sudan.- such a willingness
by the
West to aid Kenya can be
interpreted as a subtle form
of
politically motivated subsidy,
since the country's economic
value to the West, at best,
is marginal.
Thus Kenya's political
dependence on Britain, and now
also on the United States,
was not entirely harmful
(perhaps
even profitable) because it
was part of a clientelistic
relationship with a sponsor willing
to subsidize it in the
pursuit of geopolitical strategic
goals. 19 Political
dependence was minimized in the
economic realm and market
dependence contributed to growth
because a strong state with
a relatively successful
managerial strategy existed. This
indicates that Kenya created a significant
amount of interdependence with external actors through
a paradoxical combination of strength (e.g., attractive
economic environment
and a strong state) and weakness (e.g.,
vulnerability to

military threats from its own citizens who
oppose its
development path, and from its hostile neighbors
Somalia and
Uganda)

This shows that it is possible for an ostensibly
weak

African nation to use creative "statecraft" to manipulate

major powers in order to derive the reciprocal benefits
of
"interdependence". 20

Kenya also demonstrates the danger of

dependency, however, in the sense that, as mentioned
earlier, what happens in an economy is dependent on events

and decisions elsewhere in the international system. 21
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Thus, for example,

Ericas'

view of Kenya primarily
in
political terms may keep
Kenya much more subject
to the
existing non-threatening
political dependence, and help
keep
its enemies at bay, while
its international market
dependence creates lasting
vulnerabilities to changes in
its
international competitive
position and protectionism. 22
Power dependence can also
result in the economic sphere
when foreign MNCs assume a
leading role in a host country.

This has not been a major
problem for Kenya even though
they
Play a prominent role in its
development. According to
Nicoli swainsen, the government
is credited with regulating
MNCs better than many other
African countries in terms of
channeling them into desired sectors,
emphasizing
joint

ventures with local, private and
public capital, and establishing integral links with the
domestic economy. 23
Of particular importance, Kenya
is aware of the dependency theory warnings that foreign MNCs
can present economic
and political threats and has, accordingly,
imposed a series
of regulations in such areas as domestic
content, technology
transfer, and types of permitted operations. 24
indeed Kenya

emphatically claims that it has a policy of African
socialism. 25

Kenya's relative success in managing the foreign
capital rests on the following:

(i)

its strongly nationalist

regime with its neoclassicist ideology,

(ii)

the indigenous

bourgeoisie which is allied with foreign capital controlling
the state, 26 Kenya, as other LICs, has undergone consider220

able learning experience
about the effects of MNCs. 27
Nevertheless, the development
efforts of Kenya and Tanzania
remain under the mercy of
external price fluctuations for
their export commodities and
28
foreign financial
inputs.

Export-led growth made Kenya highly
dependent on inter29
national markets.
Thus far, dependence has been
managed
well and its export-based strategy
has been seen as key to
its growth.
Market dependency still means that
domestic
economic growth is primarily a function
of external economic
events and decisions. 30 For instance,
Kenya's growth and
export record was greatly affected by
the two oil price
surges and the global recession of the
early 1980s resulting
in a serious balance of payment crisis. 31
The state is
well

aware of the potential danger of such
dependency; thus it
has diversified its commodities and its
trading partners.
As a result there is minimal dependence on
western European

consumers who now absorb only 10-15 percent of all
Kenyan
exports compared to

38

percent during independence.

There

is presently minimum vulnerability to external
trade. 32

However, its expansion of trade relations to avoid depend-

ence on a single country does not mean that it controls

other decisions like prices for its exportable products.
That still is very much a function of international prices

largely decided by the MNCs in the ICs.
Furthermore, Kenya's extreme dependence on inter-

national markets, as evidenced in its 1979 development
plan, 33 makes its continued modest economic success
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(compared to Far Eastern
countries, l ike Taiwan and
Korea)
vulnerable to challenges to
its current position in the
international sphere. Kenya's
export-oriented industrialization strategy via
multinational investment is further
threatened by countries in Africa,
such as Ivory Coast,
Niger, Nigeria and Malawi,
which compete through their
generous tax holidays and offerings
of a guaranteed return
for investors. 3 *
addition, many West European
countries,
like France, because of their
strong neo-colonial strangleholds, prefer to invest in
their former colonies.
the
near future, other African countries,
like Tanzania, which
emerge from their socialist experiments
and enter the world
economy (by conscious choice or necessity)
might be expected
to squeeze Kenya's competitive
international position. The
prognosis for Kenya, therefore, does not
seem encouraging.

m

m

The three paradigms might explain why
dependency and
growth have not been entirely incompatible
in the Kenyan
case.
Some dependency theorists, like Samir Amin,
could

argue that Kenya, especially because of its
colonial and
current special political relations with EEC countries

and

the United States, constitutes a rare but possible
example
of a limited upward mobility (dependent development)

global capitalist system. 35

in the

Others, like Fransman, contend

that Kenya's reliance on foreign investment for finance has

merely increased its dependency since its balance of payments problems has increased as a result of heavy outflows
of surpluses. 36

The developmental ists, in contrast, could
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argue that large inflows
of foreign invests
into Kenya
and stable earnings fro*
priory exports, by successfully
applying an international
comparative advantage, have
helped
finance its industrialization
programs."

Orthodox Marxists, on the
other hand, could cite the
spread of the capitalist
mode of production in Kenya,

whether or not externally
conditioned. They would favor
(here they are at one with
developmentalists) letting
capitalism run its course until
class contradictions become
so strong that a violent
revolution creates a scientific
socialist option.

Dependenc y; Tanzania
Tanzania, through the principle of
self-reliance, has
aimed at diversifying trade as well
as foreign relations,
and has concentrated on internal
resources.
Yet, even after
it launched the policy of
self-reliance and diversified
its

foreign trade, its dependence on foreign
aid and grants did
not decline (see Tables 10 and
11).
This is hardly a sur-

prise given its emphasis on redistribution
before accumulation. 38
It is clear from the following tables that
Tanzania has

not been able to succeed in becoming self-reliant.

Indeed,

it has failed to achieve the production
targets it had es-

tablished for itself and to escape the dependency syndrome
it has so determined to overcome.

The external factors have

had a devastating impact on its "African Socialist

"

policy.

TABLE 10
TANZANIA:
SOURCES OF FINANCE FOR
FIVE-YEAR PLAN
(In Millions of
Shillings)
1st plan

Domestic
Finance
External
Finance

2nd plan

340

4,543

(48%)

(56%)

13 725
(51%)

2,

2,

560

4

,

542

13,249

(44%)

(49%)

085

26, 974

3,

(52%)

Total

£

,

900

8,

"includes parastatal surpluses.

TABLE 11
TANZANIA:
FOREIGN AID AS A PERCENTAGE OF
GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT
EXPENDITURE FOR 1975/76-1979/80
(1)

Year

75/76
76/77
77/78

(2)

(3)

Total
Expend.

Foreign 3
Aid

2590
3044

3860

1413

1802

2227

(4)

as

(3)
%

of (2)
55.

2

59.2

(5)

Foreign Aid b
allocated

(6)
(5)
%

as

of

(3)

836

58

.

5

890

58

.

5

57.7

1496

67 0
.

78/79

5548

3503

63

1

2817

80.4

79/80

7187

4219

58.7

3223

76.4

.

This figure shows the total foreign aid (in 000s US$)
received by the country.
This figure shows the amount of aid fund allocated to
various major sectors of the economy.
Source:
Makadirio ya Kitabu cha Fedha za serikli
Kitabu cha nne 1975/76-1980/81.
224

These factors include: the
droughts in 1973-74 and 1979-80;
higher oil prices; world
stagflation; the $250 million
expense incurred as a result
of the break-up of the EastAfrican Community in 1978; and
the $500 million required to
finance the Ugandan war in
order to get rid of Idi
39
Amin.

As a result, Tanzania has been
keeping afloat only with the
help of millions of dollars a
year in foreign aid (see table
This is larger than the aid
11).
received by any other
African country and such aid now
supports more than 2/3 rds
of its development budget. 40

Tanzania's attempt to be politically
independent or
neutral in the contemporary international
order, has made it
lose a substantial amount of economic
subsidy critical
for

its development programs.

While political dependence was

minimized, economic dependence, on the other
hand, was maximized leading it to economic stagnation because
of the

country's policy of economic "redistribution before
accumulation."

This indicates that Tanzania has created

a

condi-

tion unattractive for foreign investors or for clientelistic

political relationship with a foreign power. Its show of

political independence, though gaining it respect around the
world, failed to be translated into real economic independence.

As a result, it was made to keep afloat only with

the help of substantial amount of foreign aid, especially
from the Nordic countries. 41
To be sure, Tanzania's policy of self-reliance has made

remarkable achievements in meeting the basic needs of the

people.

For example, adult literacy
has increased from
about 10 percent in 1960 to
73 percent in 1978.
Primary
school enrollment increased
from about 25 percent of the
school age population in 1960
to almost 95 percent in 1980.
Life expectancy increased from
approximately 34 years prior
to independence to an estimated
51 years today.
A concerted
effort has been made to provide
village health care.

Approximately 35 percent of rural villages
now have clinics,
whereas such clinics were virtually
non-existent prior to
independence. Approximately 40 percent
of villages now have
clean tap water, again unheard-of prior
42
to
independence.

This shows that it is possible for any
LIC to mobilize
its internal manpower resources in order
to enhance the well
being of the majority of its people. It also
demonstrates
the danger of dependency in a sense that the
people become

largely dependent on the largesse of donor countries.

The

current change of policy in Tanzania allowing private
enter-

prise to operate perhaps reflects the dilemma confronting
it
and many other LICs in a similar situation.

Capitalism or Socialism ?
Kenya

Another basic question concerns the relevance of the
Kenyan and the Tanzanian case for the fundamental debate

between the three paradigms over whether free market

capitalism or socialism promotes development or underdevelopment.

Neither of the two states could be considered
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successful in their development
paths.
Several analysts
have argued that Kenya presents
a model of successful
capitalist development validating
the developmental ist
43
approach.
Rapid growth resulted in an essentially
free
market economy that came to be highly
integrated with world
markets. Moreover, such growth has
helped develop
an

increasingly powerful indigenous class
capable of controlling the state and producing a dynamic
capitalist
transformation, resulting in a faster expansion
of
production at a lower social cost than any possible

alternative pattern or strategy. 44
strategy also demonstrates that

a

This export-driven

developing country can

have a decided comparative advantage in international
trade
and that such an advantage can change fairly quickly—
in

Kenya's case, since independence from agricultural products
to labor intensive light industry and to some extent to more

sophisticated capital intensive and technology-dependent
products. 45

Kenya's development has been based on a series of

structural transformations, which in large part has been the

result of conscious government policy and direction.

The

domestic economy is far from a laissez-faire free market.
For instance, government investment and state corporations

continue to play a major role in its economy, and even

import-substitution protectionism was continued after the
1974-1977 liberalization and development plan favoring both

import-substitution and export-oriented production. 46
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The contribution of the market
to Kenya's growth IS
more complex than the proponents
of dependency paradigms are
willing to admit. As mentioned
earlier, Kenya's success in
economic growth can be attributed to
a combination of both
structural factors in the domestic and
international economy
and the state's conscious political
choices.
Of course,
previous positive effects of the market
are certainly not
guaranteed for the future (e.g., the dangers
of market
dependence discussed above). Indeed, externally,
Kenya is
becoming increasingly squeezed in the international
terms of
trade just like the rest of LICs. 47 Internally,
the inability of the market to promote income equality through
a high
demand for labor is a result of the same structural
force

that shaped the export sector/ 8
Tanzania

Tanzania's development experiences tell a different
story.

Among its several accomplishments (for instance, in

education, health)

,

some scholars point to the remarkable

strides it has made toward a more egalitarian society in
income and wealth.
and many displaced.

All capitalists have been challenged,

Moreover, the policy of self-reliance

and non-alignment has helped Tanzanians make their own

decisions on issues compatible with national priorities,
though some of this, as we have seen earlier, has been
costly.

They were able to use to the maximum their domestic

sources of resources, such as land and labor, for their own
interest.

This does not mean isolation from the inter228

national community.

Tanzania never severed its
link with
foreign countries, but
continued co-operation with
the
external world without
sacrificing its independence
and
freedom/' its socialism and
self-reliance attempted to
disengage the country from the
forces that impede development, forces which include
capitalism as well as
feudalism. 50

it attempted to force the
people to be

responsible for their own welfare
by showing them how best
to utilize local resources.
On the other hand, the Tanzanian
experience was not
entirely anathema to private enterprises.
There were and
still are "cash-crop farmers and
some private commerce and
industry which operate independently of
state and party." 51
After more than a decade of socialist
policies, signs of
integrating its economy with the world
capitalist system are
currently gaining momentum, since Nyerere
stepped down as
president in November 1985, and especially since
1986 (a

year symbolized by the signing of an agreement
with the IMF
for $77.5 million to support a recovery program),
the state

has been putting more emphasis on export growth,
tourism and
a more positive attitude toward business and
investment.

Since the capitalistic economic reforms, the economy has
shown signs of recovery.

But Tanzania still remains a one-

party socialist state, with the state still owning all land,
banks and many essential industries. 52

A closer examination

of the two countries' development paradigms indicates that
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far more than the operation
of free market and socialism
were at work.

Role of statg

Kenya

The fact that the state has
played a central role in
Kenyan and Tanzanian economic
growth, or stagnation, has
been recognized by scholars of all
paradigms. The strength
of the state and its relation with
the dominant domestic
classes are seen by many as instrumental
to promoting

development. 53

m

Kenya,

increased agricultural produc-

tivity and exports during the colonial
period were mostly
the result of British policy and settlers'
high productivity, which overrode the opposition of
traditional, mainly
Kikuyu, elites to change and innovation.
The weak links

between the Kenyan state and the Kenyan settler
landlords
explain the success of the land reform program in the

1950s

and in the

post-independence era.

Finally, the state's

continued leading economic position permitted the transformation, however small, to export-oriented production and

subsequently to a more capital-intensive industry orientation despite the negative impact of these changes on

existing employment patterns.
Thus, the relatively strong state in Kenya has

controlled and suppressed domestic "subordinate" classes, 54
while accommodating the "dominant" classes who would have
otherwise opposed and probably sabotaged development
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policies.

This situation seems to
contradict Olson's
provocative theory » which says
that distributional
coalitions use their power to
distort the functioning of
free markets, thereby promoting
economic inefficiency and
retarding growth. While Olson's
work seems to imply that
state intervention disrupts
market operations, Kenyans and
many other moderately successful
LICs use state power to
protect the economy from distributional
coalitions, even
participation in production. 56
'

The Kenyan case is consistent with the
political institutionalization strand of developmental ist
theory that says
strong authoritarian governments may be
necessary to promote
57
development.
However, such a conclusion about the economic efficacy of authoritarian government is
overly
simplistic, for several reasons.

First, the strong regime

has limited the power of subordinate classes while
enhancing
the power of the dominant ones in the domestic society
and
economy, but this has surely not been in defense of free-

market operations as neoclassical economics would have it.
Rather, Kenya appears to be an excellent example of a

market-driven bureaucratic authority, industrializing
regime, 58 which is more akin with recent dependency analyses
•

of "strong states". 59

Second, Kenya also seems consistent

with critiques of the neoclassicist approach that stresses
political institutionalization, but ignores the tendency of

authoritarian governments in Africa to be dominated by
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military regimes and/or
patrimonial bureaucracies whose
values are antithetical to
economic transformation. 60
In Kenya, the state's
development strategies and the
degree of success were associated
with the absence of

military control of the regime
and the limitation of various
disruptive ethnic groups and more
traditional bureaucracies. 61 Finally, in Kenya, the
developmental process has
created almost irresistible pressures
from the people
for

political liberalization and economic
democratization.
follows an early variety of developmental

This

ist thought, which

contended that economic and social development
(growth)
almost inevitably create social mobilization
and increased
demand for popular participation in politics. 62
This is also what orthodox Marxists call a
developed

objective condition which is supposed to create favorable
conditions for

a

violent revolution, eventually paving the

way for scientific socialism and a dictatorship of the
proletariat. 63

Either way, the conclusion seems to be that

as development proceeds, political and economic institu-

tionalization may well require increased democratization.
The recent Soviet policy to liberalize its economy and its

politics (Perestroika and Glasnost) seem, in part, to
support the orthodox Marxist claim, and in part to repudiate
it.

64

Refusal to respond to popular demand for democracy may
lead to political repression.

The ultimate effect is

evident in Kenya by the government's preoccupation with
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strengthening its position
since spring 1982 (before
the
attempted coup by disgruntled
young military officers)
against any potential
opposition. The state has
even
changed its constitution
in order to legitimize
the ruling
political party. Opposition
groups are suppressed and
forced to go into exile
or underground, and some
leaders and
members are in detention. 6 *
The regime seems to be determined to follow in the same
footsteps of other African

governments by creating conditions
leading to political
chaos and economic mismanagement. 66
It is hard to predict the
effects of the current

regime's obsession with silencing
the opposition and the
effects such political paranoia
might have on Kenyan
performance.
Politically, the current trends
towards
repression might increase the tension
within the existing
"uneasy collaboration [that exist]
between the country's
many ethnic groups, the minority
commercially vital Asian
and European groups, and the new middle
class of detribalized Africans prosperity has produced. 67
Thus,

it is still

an open question whether development
will continue to have a
reciprocal relationship or whether the
political repression
will continue and ultimately severely
disrupt the relatively
good economic performance.

While state autonomy may be considered necessary
for
successful development, it certainly is not sufficient.

Strong authoritarian regimes may well pursue other
goals
besides development (for instance, mobilization
and

organizing of the masses in
order to control the,), and
even
counter productive strategies
for development." One must
go beyond the idea of a
strong and autonomous state
to
attempt to explain the state's
multiple positions
and its

dynamic and contradictory
processes.
Hence we must analyze
other state characteristics,
such as the nature of the
elites or the "ruling class" that
dominate a state and how
their interests, and their abilities,
promote or retard
69
development.
In Kenya, for example, the
structural transformation
that has stimulated rapid growth has,
in part, occurred as
the result of specific policy decisions
by the African

elites wedded to the status quo.

The British colonial

administration in collaboration with the white
settlers
fostered the initial agriculturally based
growth, but

Britain's exploitative economic relationship with
Kenya and
the Kenyans meant that further development
potential could
not be realized until the Mau-Mau uprising and the
resulting
removal of British rule in the 1950

's.

The new spurt in

agricultural production after independence resulted from

a

radical land reform program that probably could not have

been implemented if the regime had been tied to white

settlers in the Highland area.

Kenyan's subsequent economic

growth was led by an African elite of technocrats who

emerged in the 1950s.
Kenya's post-independence development strategy, in
turn, was devised by the technocrats not only to maximize
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their own political power
but also to encourage
private
enterprise in which most of
the rewards were reaped by
the
African business community,
which has close ties with the
technocrats. The emergence
of prosperous economic elites
further created pressures for
their greater participation in
politics, creating a new sector
of electoral politicians.
The new political elites are
much more repressive
and less

tolerant of dissent.
Tanzania
In Tanzania, Nyerere, the founder
of TANU, was able to
realize the importance of moral concerns
in politics at an

early stage.

In reorganizing the objectives
of TANU, he

tried to orient the political state
system to the cultural
and moral system of Africans. Nyerere
maintained that
African traditional society was built on
the principles of
democracy and participation. He went further
in his

philosophical foundation of African socialism, to
assert
that African traditional conceptions of communal
cooperation
assumed the western notions of Christian brotherhood,
liberal democratic self-government and the European

socialist ideas of non-exploitation (Fabian socialism). 70

Nyerere described the features of the future society to
be built by taking the principles of African socialism
as

the basic line of thought for the new political system.

Therefore, he viewed acquisition of the formal authority to

govern in relation to a government which promotes rights and

welfare for the masses.

In this respect the apparent

235

conflict between the interests
of the individual and those
of the community are
resolved by the presumption
that the
society is concerned with
equality, in which everybody
is a
worker and status comes only
with age and doing
a job

well.
in this concept lies the
foundation of distributive
justice.
Nyerere maintained that government
is instituted

among people not to secure
advantages for a few but to
promote the rights and welfare
of the many.
He then developed the philosophical foundations
of a one party democracy
He saw it come from the traditional
conceptions of African
"core values":
communal cooperation.
Due to the break in
traditionalism because of colonialism,
Nyerere realized
the

need to re-educate and teach the
people to cooperate, that
is "people to help people, » something
they had lost touch
with during the interim period.

"

Another important issue was the foundation
of decision
making in Tanzania, which shall be derived
from the African
tradition of decision by consensus. Nyerere
held that in
African society people talked until they agreed
(or I might
add until one of them dies). 72 Therefore, because
to
the

African the whole purpose of discussion is to agree, it
rules out the existence of opposition political parties.
Besides, decisions based on agreements reflect public

opinion.

It is upon the tenets of this philosophy that

political organization was tailored in Tanzania.

It was

also on this tenet that the economic system, particularly
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the Arusha Declaration
invoking villagization and
rural
socialism, was based. 73

Assessmpnt

These interpretations of
regimes in Kenya and Tanzania,
therefore, go well beyond
the neoclassical (and structuralist) assumptions that
political institutionalization
and
authoritarian politics can be
functional for development.

The interpretations are also
contrary to the dependency
theory's central tenet that
elites (national or international) will use their power
to block structural
development that threaten their
economic, political, and
social positions.
Some of the changes that took
place in
Kenya and Tanzania resulted from
historical circumstances,
e.g., the British choice to
make Kenya the center of East
African community, which benefited it
at the expense of
Tanzania and Uganda. After independence,
however, a key
element was, inter alia the willingness
of the dominant
elite groups to centralize power in order
to promote
national development as the modernization
process proceeded.
This deviates substantially from most
dependency assumptions
that neglect the internal class relations in
the LICs.
The
delicate ethnic balance in the composition of the
political
,

elite that governs Kenya, to some extent Tanzania
as well,
also runs counter to the view of the orthodox Marxists
that

deterministically view the state as

a

superstructure that

merely reflects the functioning of the economy at the base.

The specific role
of the
tne st-*^
m
state in Tanzania's
and
Kenya's development
strategy
«*egy, therefore,
th.r 0 f
is mor e subtle and
CMPl6X than USU3lly
an y one of the contending
Paradigm The principal

~^ ^
•

*

~*

^

^

^
^

has been to maneuver
the country
coraparative
advantage in the global
system based fundamentally
on a
market economy. Consequently,
the government has been
relatively ..flexible" in
terms of its share of
resources and
drrect control of the
economy.
The state's role then,
follows in some ways
Haggard's (1986, model of
moderately
successful Lies," in which
state-g uided development

policies are used to promote
comparative advantage rather
than to distort market
forces in some politically
desired
direction, though there is
an element of this as well."
Tanzania, however, the
principal goal of the government
is
to institute policies of
villagization, provision of social
services, education for
self-reliance, and so on, in order
to achieve the transformation
of society into the twentyfirst century.

m

Tanzania's attempt to bypass
capitalism and follow a
socialist (African or scientific
socialism) path in order to
implement its policy of distribution,
has been a recipe for
76
disaster.
This seems to give credence to
orthodox Marxists, who categorize Lies as
feudal or
semifeudal, and argue

that the latters must first achieve
capitalism before they
can achieve socialism.
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A final question concerns
the impact of culture on
develops. Neo-classical or
modernization theory asserts
that the replacement of
traditional social structures
and
cultures with more modernizing
value systems is a sin^ua
Eon for economic change. Kenya
and Tanzania provide an
interesting variant in that the
social structures and

cultures can be seen as ones
that neither promote equality
and development, nor hinder
them.
This contrasts with the
sweeping conclusion made by many
neo-classicists about
African culture as one which stifles
economic and political
77
change

A consideration of the central element
in the Kenyan
social structure, particularly the
KiKuyu's land tenure
structure, indicates that it bears an
ambiguous relationship
to the development process, because its
implications
for

developmental activities are clearly contradictory.

its

principles to permit widespread access to land
use emphasizes an individual contribution to collective
accumulation. 78

The Kikuyu culture encourages entrepreneurship

without the chief as head stifling the economy. 79

Tanzania

also suffers very little from such hierarchy hindering
its

development processes.
For Kenya, the traditional Kikuyu culture was

supportive of developmental activities.

First,

its

entrepreneurial spirit has clearly profited from the neoclassical forms of the economy.
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Second, its stress on

respect but not on authority
may explain the political
stability (however fragile)
that exists today in Kenya,
in
the face of predictions
from supporters of the three
paradigms that rapid socio-economic
change will create
political instability and change. 80
Thus, while socio-cultural
variables can be related to
Kenya's and Tanzania's relatively
successful growth

(development)

the relationship is much more
complex and
multifaceted than the formulations of
dependency theory
which discount the relevance of
domestic culture, or of
modernization theory which overemphasizes
its relevance, and
the orthodox Marxist approach which
views massive cultural,
economic and political change through
class struggle as a
,

prerequisite for successful development.

Rather, the

characteristics of the indigenous culture appears
integral
to the respective countries' developmental
history.

This is

significant because traditional cultures have proved
much
more resistant to change than the neoclassicists
originally
assumed.

Both cases, however, also indicate that more is

involved than simply the basic norms in their cultural
traditions, since they have elements that support and hinder

developmental activities. 81

Conclusion
This chapter has applied the case of Kenya and Tanzania
to several of the central theoretical questions addressed by

the competing paradigms.

Superficially, all three might
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claim to explain the two
countries' development as an
example of (1) f ree-.arket-based
industrialization

and

modernization,

"dependent development," or
(3) a stage
in a transition period
from feudal to capitalist
mode of
production, a closer examination,
however, reveals that the
positions held by proponents
of the three paradigms appear
overly deterministic: dependency
theory for assuming that
certain structural features
will inevitably create power
differences and undermine growth;
neoclassical (and structural) theory for assuming that
structural features and
relationships to the global economy
are necessarily
(2)

important for stimulating growth and
development; and the
orthodox Marxist theory for assuming
that certain structural
features will inevitably create economic
disparity in the
domestic economy, which in due course will
sharpen class
differences, intensify the class struggle
and ultimately
lead to a revolution, followed by a
"scientific socialist"
option.
Both states have played a dominant role in
promoting

development in their own unique way.

The nature of their

external linkages and of the internal alliances are
identical with the structures of dependent development
in Latin
America. 82

Kenya fits the model of countries using state direction
of the economy to promote internal development and even-

tually establish a competitive market niche in the world
economy, 83 while Tanzania uses the state machinery to

advance its policy of
self-reliance and rural socialism.
The final point, therefore,
is that none of the three
paradigms discussed fully explain
the processes of development.

All three lines of argument,
as pointed out earlier,
appear too deterministic since
this facet of the so called
"Kenyan success story- compared
to Tanzania's story of
failure, depend on structural
factors (i.e., the nature of
dependency and host state of dependency
theory) and the
choice in development strategies of
neoclassicalism, the
class interests of the national bourgeoisie,
and other
factors that may not always be as obvious. 84

Undoubtedly, all three have made a positive
contribution, even though they have failed in
explaining the

developmental processes fully in the countries concerned.
A reconstruction of an all-encompassing theory,
capable of

capturing the unique condition of Tanzania and Kenya,
by
keeping in mind the pitfalls of each of the developmental
paradigms, is in order.

We will next propose a recon-

struction of such a theory, based on the Resnick and Wolff
use of the concept of "overdetermination.
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7

A NONESSENTIALIST DEVELOPMENT
PARADIGM

Introdun-M on
In the last chapter we demonstrated
that, in spite of
some utility, there are fundamental
conceptual and method-

ological difficulties involved with
the theoretical assumptions of each of the three paradigms.
As a result we have
shown that each paradigm, by itself,
fails to fully explain
the development problems of Kenya and
Tanzania.
We also demonstrated how each of the
contesting

positions within each of the paradigms, and the
debates
between them, proceeded from empiricist and
rationalist
epistemological points of view.

All the participants in the

debate argue from a common epistemological standpoint:
they

presume a basic dichotomy between reality (facts, experience, history, etc.) and thought (theory, concepts, ideas,

etc).

They claim, in reference to development that the

more wealth the more development.

They seek to produce

knowledge that is aimed at capturing an objective reality.
For instance, from an empiricist

— Marxist — perspective,

a theory is validated or invalidated by appeal to an

independent measure of "facts" or "history."

We have

already shown each of the theorists' rejection of the
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others, assumptions, by an
appeal to "let the facts speak
for themselves" and "let history
show" arguments.
Because
each theory removes the others'
supposed » inaccurateassumptions, each thought its theory
to be "superior" to
that of the others and the only
one that permits a "correct"
path to development. But each theory's
focus misses the
influence of other important processes
on development and
underdevelopment, including the essence of one
theory being
repressed in another.

On the other hand, many of the issues of
development
debated are argued from a rationalist point of
view.

Resnick and Wolff summarize the Marxian rationalist
perspective:
Its proponents operated from the presumption,
however
grounded, that Marx discovered the truth of social
reality, that his theory captured, and thus was
identical to, the essence of that reality.
For them
disputes over that reality then properly reduced to
disputes over the precise specification and formulation
of that theory.

...Granted such identity, such "truth," it follows
that Marxist theorists so persuaded would and did
devote themselves to producing ever more rigorous
statements of the logic of Marxist theory with special
emphasis on precisely defining and resolving the
logical contradictions, inconsistencies, or lacunae
which they discovered in that logic. It also follows
that a rationalist standpoint will likely emphasize
textual quotation from Marx over other kinds of
evidence brought forward in support of its statements.
1

Numerous examples of a rationalist influence in both
the dependency and orthodox Marxist paradigms abound.

For

example, Warren's criticism of the dependency theorists is

based of his understanding of Marx's theoretical positions,
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according to which the
structure of forces and relations
of
production are the "determining
element" of the inequalities
between nations. According
to him, the essence is
given by
Marx-s formulations and they
alone can take us to the level
of reality.
short, the Marxist theorists
understand
Marx's theory to have discovered
the truth of social
reality.
The debate then reduces to
arguments over the
proper specification of the logic
of that

m

theory.

Frank and Immanuel also share this
rationalist view.
It is only because they have
the "correct perspective" that
they are able to, through their
theoretical reasoning, bring
thought into correspondence with the
reality: i.e., deduce
the conceptual logic which structures
the world system.
This perspective reveals their acceptance
of a separation
between subject and object of knowledge.
It reveals, moreover, their rationalism.
Because they have the "correct

perspective," they are able to construct theories
which will
lead them to discover the true logic of social
reality.

In this chapter, we offer an alternative approach
which

distances itself from all the three approaches in two
important ways.
ical entry point.

The first concerns our choice of theoretThe second concerns our rejection of the

notion of an "essence"
processes.

— an

externally related cause of other

Our alternative way of theorizing will allow us

to bring to the forefront elements that are often repressed
by the previous paradigms (due to their methodological

differences)

,

in determining (overdetermining)
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the processes

of

develops

not only in Kenya and
Tanzania, but in other

LICs as well.
To this end, first, „e

win

explain the main conceptual

components of the alternative
paradigm we think have broader
and flexible explanatory
power and compare the* with
those
of the paradigms oritiqued
so far.
Seoond, we raise epistemological issues assooiated with
our alternative paradigm to
highlight its differences from
the epistemological standpoints of the others.
At this juncture a word of
caution is in order. Our
alternative theorizing should not
be seen as a theoretical
breakthrough ready to remedy the
theoretical deficiency
inherent in the methodology of the
paradigms examined. We
reject such authoritative claims.
To do that would be to
fall into the same essentialist
trap the theories we have
been criticizing had fallen into.

Our aim is two-fold.

First, to supplement our

deconstructive work in chapter six by contrasting
the
conceptual tools (components of their paradigm)
used by the
three paradigms to that of our own.
In other
words, the

inflexibility of each of the paradigms examined to
accommodate other theories will be emphasized further.

Second, to

reverse the hierarchically arranged theoretical constructs

based upon pairing concepts like base/superstructure,
traditional/modern, dependent/ underdevelopment, and

bourgeoisie/proletariat, which are considered undesirable
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and inconsistent, xii
in order
ujraer to stress
a**.*.., what
u
essentialists
desire to stress.
/

Our alternative theorizing
proceeds without "privileging" any aspects of the
processes of development. It
advocates a different entry
point, a different method of
explaining it, and a correspondingly
different conception of
the development process. Our
position that society
is an

ensemble of mutually constitutive
processes rules out
privileging any aspects of the
processes of development.
Any one process (including class
process),
hence,

is one

among the various "overdetermined"
processes (see below) of
what constitutes life.
In short, our goal is a modest one:
to identify and criticize essentialisms
in theory
and to

suggest different directions than what
is currently dominant
for analyzing the problems of political
and economic
development in the LICs.

Epist emoloaical Standpoints
The Concept of Points of Entry

The variety of conceptions of development which we

encountered earlier are different in part because of the
different points of entry taken by theorists.

"By entry

points," said Resnick and Wolff, "we mean that particular

concept a theory uses to enter into its formulation, its

particular construction of the entities and relations that
comprise the social totality." 2

Thus, the knowledge

produced by each theory is as different as the entry point
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and logic used to construct
that knowledge.
Each of the
paradigms reviewed thus far
embrace an essentialism in its
theory.
Moreover, each also offers
its entry point as the
focus of its knowledge production
and as the determinant of
the structure and dynamic of
society.

The neoclassical theory-a
theory which is constructed
from the point of view of scarcity
and choice-will produce
a different knowledge than
the orthodox Marxist one which
begins from the point of view of a
contradiction between
forces and relations of production.
These in turn produce a
different knowledge than the dependency
theory which begins
from a point of view of power and
dependency.
The entry
concept each theorist adopts is seen as an
"essence" to

which phenomena are related as its effects.
The alternative paradigm uses the notion of
class as
the production and appropriation of surplus
labor— its

unique conceptual entry point around which it organizes
its
theoretical logic and explanation.

Unlike the three

paradigms, the alternative theory does not let its entry

point function as an essence.

The class process, therefore,

is only one among the various "overdetermined" processes.

It influences and is influenced by all other processes.

The

paradigms, such as the neoclassical, on the other hand,

repress the class process or simply dismiss it as useless in
social analysis.

256

Overdetermination

This concept is used to distance
the conception of
causation in our alternative paradigm
from the other three,
in which their theoretical
assumption leads them to the
conclusion that one aspect of a "social
formation" 3 determines all the others as its phenomenon.
"Overdetermination"
is a relational concept referring
to a ceaseless change and
development.
in this view, every social activity
(political, economic, cultural, ideological)
or relationship
among people is conceived to be the site of
the converging
effects emanating from all other natural and
social processes, each distinct and inseparable.
In this formulation,
no one process or group of processes is reducible
to a

simple effect, and cannot be understood as deterministically

affecting any other or others.
"dominant," "dependent,"

None can be understood as

"developed," or "underdeveloped"

or as an "essence" of a social formation.

(With all other

processes as being understood as their epiphenomena.
Hence, the social determination of any process is always its

overdetermination.

Each process exists only as the

overdetermined outcome of all the other processes
constitutive of the social formation, processes which

continually provide its "conditions of existence." 4
Moreover, each process is complex in its own unique
way, depending upon a correspondingly particular set of

contradictory

pushes and pulls exerted upon it.

Each is

internally contradictory because it is subject to the
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influences of all other
processes.
The unique constitution
of each gives it a
"relatively autonomous"* status
because
it is overdetermined in
a particular way by
others, which
may well be uneven in their
level of development and in
their social formation.
this conception, therefore,
all
social phenomena are
interconnected in multiple ways
(overdetermined)
so that no one of them is
unambiguously either
the cause or the effect of
another.

m

,

Thus, in our approach, the
transition from LICs to ics
is not dependent on, as
neoclassical theorists

(both in

political and in economic sciences)
posit, by a change in
individual wants and productive
capabilities as the primary
economic categories, or, as orthodox
Marxists argued, by
regarding all others including the political
processes as
derivative from them. Nor does it depend,
as the dependentistas' claim, by poor countries being
poor because the
rich and powerful countries "exploit" them.
Such claims are
deterministic, therefore, and of inadequate value
in

explaining a development problem that is complex,
dynamic,

contradictory and overdetermined.
The concept of overdetermination, therefore, rejects
the conceptualization of any one process or group of

processes, including "class" process

(a

concept which we

will define below) as the essence of social formation, while

considering all other processes, independent of a conceptual
framework, as epiphenomenon.

This concept will also enable

us to conceptualize the dynamic of each process as the over258

determined outcome of the
effects of all other processes.
Each overdetermined process
also is part of the overdetermination of all other
processes in the social formation.
it admits of no basic
dichotomy between reality
material and thought,
short, overdetermination
enables
theorist to understand social
life as a whole and rejects

m

neutral process of observation.

a

a

Knowledge is produced

within the context of particular
conceptual frameworks which
are always overdetermined.
Thus, the processes of development
in LICs cannot be
fully understood, in our view,
as the product of any one
source of determination, as the
product of an essence, or
the logical product of a certain
primary contradiction. Our

approach distances itself from the three
paradigms which
locate an essential cause or origin of
development (or
nondevelopment) in the LICs.

singular truth claims.

m

We reject the notion of such

our view, development, like any

other social process, is the site of the combined
effects

emanating from all other processes.

Moreover, because

theory is part of this process, every theoretical work
will
exert particular effects upon these processes and thus in

their change and development.

The analyses of development

in this theory has no place for any a priori determinism
as

the paradigms thus far examined suggest.
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The three paradigms
conceptualized development
differently, in part
beoause each

_

,

"pornt of entry."'

^

^

A theory which is
constructed fro, the
entry point of individual
preference, scarcity, or
political
power (as neoclassical
and structural theorists
do,
will
produce a different knowledge
than one which begins from
the
perspective of "relations of
production" or "mode of production" (as orthodox Marxists
do)
To choose a theoretical
entry point and particular
conceptual tools is to specify
the parameters of the logic
of the theoretical arguments.
Our chosen point of entry
in this theory is the concept
of
class process.
,

.

The concept of class in our
approach is different from
those used by numerous other
theorists (both orthodox
Marxists and non-Marxists) from a
variety of disciplines.
To mention a few, there are those
who use class to designate
groups of persons in society according
to the political
power or authority (for instance, ruling
class) they hold in
a

particular society. 7

others use class to designate groups

who possess varying quantities of property
(as in propertied
class)
still others designate class as groups who
share

.

common social positions (for instance, working
class, middle
class, upper class, underclass, lower class
et al) 9
in

short, the narrow concepts of class are imbued
with

ambiguity because of the different understanding of
various
theorists, who focus on a reductionist (deterministic)
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production of theory.

We reject the definitions
of class as
exther political power or
property concepts for their
deterministic and essentialist
approach.

Fundamental Class Processes

This process involves the
performance and appropriation
of surplus labor in the
form of surplus value from
direct
producers. 10 it is a particular
form of process in which
agents may participate either as
performers of surplus
labor, or as appropriates
(extractors) of surplus labor or
11
both.
This process defines two class
positions: the
creators of surplus value (Marx called
them "productive
laborers") and the initial appropriates
of that surplus
value (Marx called them "industrial
capitalists"). Unlike
the previous theorists' concept of
class as social groups or
individuals, the capitalist fundamental class
process 12 is
conceived of as only one social process in the
life of human
beings.
In this sense, agents are not rigidly defined
as

participating only in

fundamental class processes, but also

as participants in the performance, appropriation,
or both

of the social processes.

The position held by these agents

as they play their specific role is called "class
position."

This process can exist only in so far as other equally

important social processes (political, cultural, physical,

biological and others) are in place.
The performance and appropriation of surplus labor is

overdetermined by economic processes such as the purchase
and sale of commodities and legal tender, by political
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processes such as the
adjudication
"judication o*>
of disputes concerning
contracts and private
prooertv and u
property,
by cultural processes
such as religion and
educate
education.
short, the capitalist
fundamental class process
is overdetermined

m

b y (and in
turn, participates in
the overdetermination
of) the nonclass processes that
distinguish one fundamental
class
process from another.
,

Subsumed Class Processes
Once surplus is appropriated
by the capitalist it is
distributed to finance some
of those social processes
that
overdetermine the fundamental
class process.
For example,
the industrial capitalist
may distribute portions of
the
appropriated surplus value to
merchants, money-lenders,

stock owners, and state officials
who participate in
processes that secure the "conditions
of existence" of the
original appropriation of surplus
value.
This process of
distributing and receiving surplus
value, as against the
process of producing and appropriating
surplus value, can be
called the capitalist subsumed class
process. 13 The fundamental class processes (economic life)
cannot exist without
the existence of the subsumed class
processes (the political
life) or vice-versa.
We should point out that the placement
of the political life under the
subsumed class does
not

suggest that it is in any way less important
than the
economic life. Here, elements in both categories
are

equally important.
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Such a distinction win k„i
WlU hel P us identify and
differentiate complex and
contradictory class and
non-ciass processes,
contrast this to the
other parades which
structure
concepts simplistically ,
in opposed pairs

^

-lation,-

__

lik e the expioited
and the exciters,
the
developed and the
underdeveioped.
In the pr0 cess, they
obfuscate other dynamic,
complex and contradictory
aspects

More important, our way
of conceptualizing
win help us
avord the notion held by
the other paradigm that
all IC s
which have political and
economic ties with LICs
somehow
have a one-way exploitative
economic relationship to
either
siphon off profit from them
or help them develop.
To
consider such a relationship
as either exploitative
or
advantageous to one group or
another without distinguishing
the fundamental from the
subsumed class and non-class
processes is to ignore the complex
class and non-class
differences (and relationships)
involved,

simplistic way out.

indeed it is a

15

Non-class Processes
To discuss class processes
necessarily involves

knowledge of international relations
and other non-class
processes.
the works of Resnick and Wolff
(from whose
work this chapter has drawn)
non-class processes mean
social processes in which agents in
a society participate in
what is regarded as one of the requisites

m

,

for the "condi-

tions of existence" of

a

fundamental class process in

a

social formation."

For example, not only
the state (an
institution that provides
economic, political, and
cultural
Processes which are conditions
of existence of the fundamental class process), but
also merchants, managers,
and
bankers are such agents who
may be regarded as participants
of non-class processes.
These agents require a share
of the
surplus labor in order to
participate in them. Thus, they
are also referred to as
being subsumed to the fundamental
class processes because they
condition and are conditioned
by it.
short, a flow of value which
does not represent
the sale of productive labor
power, the direct appropriation
of surplus value, or the
initial distribution of surplus
value, is viewed as non-class
payments.

m

Any one agent may occupy all, none
or any combination
of these class and non-class
positions during the course of
a day,

a year,

or a lifetime.

Not only that, but an agent

may also occupy different and conflicting
class positions
simultaneously. 17 Agents who occupy fundamental
class
positions as appropriators (first claimants)
of the surplus
labor, also may participate in the subsumed
class process

as

first distributors of surplus labor.

There are thus two

different (yet mutually conditioning) agents who
occupy the
subsumed class: those who occupy the fundamental
class

position and those who participate in the non-class
processes
This means, in contradistinction to the three paradigms, the concept of fundamental and subsumed class or non264

class processes and of
overdei-om,^^overaetermmation provide us with
a
framework within which the
class and non-class process
in a
capxtalist or non-capitalist,
internal or international
social formation, can be
theorized.
In this

formation,

a

transition from an Lie to
an IC (be it socialist or
capitalist) would depend not
only on state intervention
in
every sphere of people's
life (as Tanzania and to
a lesser
degree Kenya attempted to do)
but also on all the other
processes (political, cultural,
economic, environmental, and
international relations) in the
society at the moment when
such transition is said to
take place.
,

Epistemo loqical Issues

The last chapter has shown that
a particular choice of
entry point through which the three
paradigms made sense of
the development path in Kenya and
Tanzania excluded certain
aspects of development, thus leading
each paradigm to reductionist conclusions concerning the solutions
to development.
Our alternative approach utilizes a
different entry point
and different conceptual tools; consequently
a different way
of making sense out of a social life in
a given social

formation at a given moment, but not through
reductionism
and essentialism.
Kenya and Tanzania can serve to underscore the signi-

ficance of the specificity of the concepts we utilize
and
our definition of class and its anti-essentialism.

The two

countries indicate that "theoretical discourse" within the
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traditional analysis of
either one of the three
parades is
too deterministic to
fully comprehend the
complex and
dynamic processes of
development, why are the
paradigms we
crxtiqued so deterministic?
How do we understand the
theoretical differences
between those we critiqued
to that
of our own? We answer
these questions by way of
a brief
discussion of the epistemological
(theories of knowledge)
basis-either empiricist or
rational ist-on which the
various paradigms in question
rest. 18

Empiricism
The empiricist perspective
attempts to validate a
social science by relying on
data (which it regards as
"facts") on observations which
it considers as a given,
independent of human thinking. if the
data culled fits well
with the theoretical positions then
the theory has achieved
the truth or close to the truth of
the reality. 19 Scholars
of such theoretical persuasions
attempt to validate a

theoretical discourse (against another) by
appeal to a set
of neutral facts that represent an
objective
reality, a

truth given, and independent of the theoretical
framework
they are supposedly validating. The reality,
in their view,
may be known through some form of neutral
process of
observation. 20

All facts gathered by this means are

regarded as "value free" or neutral, and presumably
right.
Rationalism
The second reductionist epistemological standpoint is

rationalism.

Like empiricists, the proponents of this
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theory insist that there
wiere exi^«
exists ™o
only one truth of social
reality, and that the task
of a scnoiar
„
scholar is
i, +
n discover
to
it 21
Unlike empiricists, however,
rationalists contend that there
exist a priori principles
of reason by which proponents
of
rationalism are guided in their
activities to produce knowledge." Human reason is
viewed as the standard by which
facts are judged, rather
than the other way round
•

as advo-

cated by empiricists."

Put differently, rationalists
argue

that knowledge is the product
of human reason (thoughtconcrete)
rather than the product of
accumulated facts
,

(concrete-thought) as contended by
empiricists. 24

They view the theories they construct
as true
expressions, embodiments, of the essence
of the concrete
social aspects their theory attempts
to capture.
in this
view, the logic which structures
the real (its reason)

can

be gradually arrived at by careful
attention to conceptual
logic (human reason).
Like empiricists, rationalists

proceed from the assumption of a separation
between the
subject and object of knowledge. Hence an object
of

analysis is independent of a conceptual framework.
Since we view all thinking as overdetermined by
other
social processes, there can be no essentialism of
theory

consistent with the alternative method.
rationalist and empiricist theory.

We thus reject

Validity criterion, in

the alternative perspective, is always internal.

"Facts" or

concepts are viewed to have meaning only by virtue of the

framework from which they are socially constructed.
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Which

"facts" are selected, discussed,
ordered and which are not
is a process of and in
theory.
We do not, however, reject
empirical testing (theories are
forever testing, revising,
and elaborating their discursive
statements and such an
activity always involves the
selection, ordering, and
relating of old and new facts) as
long as it fits into a
theoretical framework. if the activity
of theorists is
intertwined with the object which they
are theorizing about,
then rationalist and empiricist
formulations must be
rejected.
In our view, knowledge production is
a product of the

mutual interaction of the empiricist and
the rationalists
(and perhaps even some other processes
which we have

yet to

discover)

rather than the product of mere reflection of

,

either one or the other

(

or,

a reduction of the various

complex aspects of social life to a mere phenomenon of
an
essence)

25
.

Epistemolo gical Terrain of the Debate
The position of each of the contending paradigms, and
the debates between them, are seen to proceed from empir-

icist and rationalist epistemological points of view.

All

participants in the debate argue from a common epistemological standpoint
reality.

— they

presume a basic dichotomy between

They produce knowledge that is aimed at capturing

an objective reality.
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From an empiricist
perspective, a thecry is validated
(and ethers invalidated)
by appeal to an independent
measure
of "facts" or "history...
„. have already noted neoclassical
economists- rejection of
several orthodox Marxists and
dependentistas arguments concerning
the phrase "the facts
indicate" (i.e., by measuring
the GNP)
As a result, the
neoclassicists view their theory as
"superior" to that of
the orthodox Marxists and
dependentistas, and the only one
that permits a correct understanding
of the problems
.

of

development in the LICs.

This is evidence of their reliance

on an empiricist epistemology

Several instances of a rationalist
influence in the
"underdevelopment" debate can be detected.
Most of the
criticisms by orthodox Marxists of other
paradigms proceed
from this standpoint.
For example, orthodox Marxists criticize dependentistas for not accepting "Marx's
theoretical

position" according to which the structure of forces
and

relations of production are the "determining element"
of the
inequalities between nations. 26

Because dependentistas

misread Marx's concepts, they improperly specify the truth
of social reality and direct us toward "unrealistic

reformist positions" (the correction of inequality by

delinking relationships with the ICs)

.

In the views of

orthodox Marxists, the solution to unequal development lies
only in a "revolutionary transformation of production

relations with the subsequent development of the productive
forces."

According to this school, the essence is given by
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Marx's formulation and it
alone can take us to the level
of
reality.
The epistemological terms of
the debate, in this
instance, is rationalist. The
theorists involved understand

Marx's theory to have discovered
the truth of social
reality.
The debate then reduces to arguments
over the
proper specification of its logic.
It is the connection between epistemology
and political

practice that renders this a key issue in
the present
critique.
Throughout this dissertation we have illustrated
the manner in which the epistemological
standpoint
from

which a theorist constructs his/her knowledge.

We have

illustrated in each paradigm the political consequences
(policy prescriptions) that derive from theory.

Logically,

the political practice prescribed by the theorist must
be

called into question if the epistemological position that
informs it is rejected.

A few examples will shed more light on these essentialist claims.

For instance, neoclassical economists believe

that the aim of development in the LICs is to primarily

modernize (economic growth) the urban sector so that it will
serve as an "engine of growth" for the country as a whole. 27

Neoclassical political developmentalists also suggest that
strong authoritarian or military governments may be necessary to facilitate development. 28

Dependent istas argue

that, given the current economic relations between the ICs

and the LICs, the perpetuation of underdevelopment or
270

dependence is the most likely
outcome because of the
unequal power relations (itself
viewed as a reflection of
the economic difference) between
29
them.

Orthodox Marxists too conceptualize
relationships
between nations and between classes
(limited definition of
class) mainly in terms of economics.
They argue that
the

relationship between the ICs and the
LICs necessarily leads
in the latter to the extraction of
"exploited" surplus labor
which gets appropriated by those who own
the means of
30
production.
Such a process, will inevitably
lead to a

revolution resulting in a change in the
superstructure (the
political) in favor of the working class. 31
This school encourages foreign investment of
capital,

much like neoclassicists, to enter the LIC's market
in order
to promote capitalist development and eventually
bring
about

a proletarian revolution.

Paradoxically, as stated earlier,

neoclassical and orthodox Marxist paradigms resemble each
other,

for both claim that the economy determines all other

aspects of social life, including the political one.
All the paradigms support their theoretical positions
and affirm their theoretical truth claims by relying on

either the rationalist or the empiricist method.

But a

closer look at the development experiences of Kenya and

Tanzania shows that none of the three paradigms that utilize

exclusively the rationalist or the empiricist method have
succeeded in capturing the dynamics of development.
yet,

And

it is such essential ist paradigms that dominate the
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development plans of manv
many Lire
aM that whope to overcome
lics, ~i
plans
poverty and "underdeveloDment-"
u«veiopment tH**
with a^ minimum of structural
changes. 32
.

The practical impact of such
essentialism has led LICs
to serious political and
economic development difficulties.
For instance, the strategy of
most dependent istas regarding
change and development in LICs,
which includes the nationalization of the means of production
with which they hope to
facilitate the distribution of the
produced surplus among
the people, has not been successful.
Nyerere's Tanzania or
Kenya's neoclassical development path
attest to dismal
failure.
The most disappointing of the three
paradigms is
the orthodox Marxists, which constructs
its theory in such a
way that change and development are the
consequences
of a

simple contradiction (crisis) between the forces
of

production (read technology) and relations of
production
(read politics and economics), according to a
predetermined

blueprint. 33
In our view, the three paradigms focus on (privilege)

economic events and reduce change and development to a

consequence of only economic crises.

Our alternative

approach is unequivocally anti-essentialist and employs no

a

priori or posteriori arguments for development to take place
in LICs at all.

We reject the notion that any one aspect of

societal life, from the infinite set of class, culture,
power, technology, resources, environment, and capital,

could be the "determining" essence of the rest.
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In our

approach, none of these individual
aspects of life is
understood to exist by itself,
but rather by a site of the
combined influences emanating from
all the others. 34
The concept of overdetermination
and the notion of
"relative autonomy," 35 outlined above,
provide a nonessentialist explanation of the crucial
problem(s) of regime
change and development in LICs. In
this approach, a social
process can be regarded as relatively
autonomous in the
sense that this site is constituted by
contradictory effects
within and between social processes, thus
giving the site
its own distinctive dynamic.
This concept is cast in terms
of the Marxist notion of the "uneven development"
of social

processes. 36

A social formation is reproduced in so far as

the social processes (class and non-class) that
comprise it,
and which are relatively autonomous and, hence, unevenly

developing, are reproduced.

Also each of these contra-

dictory sites evolves and develops (reproduces) at its own
rate

37

It is here, where class and non-class struggles,

centering around the production-appropriation (economic
process) and distribution of surplus labor (political processes)

,

take place.

In this approach, we reject a rank-

order, such that one element exists prior to the other or

one element determines the other.

(For instance, orthodox

Marxists claim that the base [the economy] determines the
superstructure [politics]).
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in our approach, societal
struggle, transition and
development depend on the class
and non-class processes, and
the cumulative buildup of
contradictions (crisis) within
these processes, which triggers,
though not necessarily, the
collapse of the original structure
(for instance, the feudal
structure faced by capitalist
structure) *
this process, a number of other
elements-culture, language, religion, environment, international
relations-also play a role
and affect the outcome. The effect
it may have varies for

m

different countries in different situations.

in some, where

particular constellation or "conjecture"
of class and nonclass process takes place, its particular
relations with
other countries may prove explosive; while
in others, where
a different mix takes place, the
opposite might be
a

true.

One outcome of such multicausal, overdetermined,

analysis is that it prohibits a priori even the
possibility
of any general analysis of the causes of social
revolution.

Historical revolution and change cannot be reduced to, as
the neoclassical theorists suggest, individual preferences
and technology or, as orthodox Marxists argue, to a mere

contradiction and struggle between two antagonistic classes.
Nor can it be reduced to a mere power relationships between
powerful and weak nations as dependentistas will have it.
In our theoretical formulations, transition and change

cannot be considered inevitable according to a predetermined
pattern.
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in this dissertation, and
in the works of Resnick
and
Wolff, structural changes
in a society occur as a
result of

heterogenous overdetermined and
overdetermining domestic and
international processes. 39 Every
one is indispensable
to

the outcome.

since these processes always
change and are
unpredictable, this theory dismisses
other theorists' claim
to have a reliable blueprint
for understanding revolution,
development and change. I„ our
theoretical formulation,
such phenomenon can only be understood
by examining events
in specific social formations, at
a specific moment, by
using "key relational concepts," such
as overdetermination,
class and nonclass processes, central to
the overdeter-

minationist concepts of change and development. 40
conceptual tools provide us with an understanding,

temporary one at that, of what specific mix of

These
a

contra-

dictions or crises are responsible for any transition
and

development in LICs.
In the same vein, the idea of "exploitation" cannot
be

reduced to a generalized relation of domination/dependence
(Frank)

or a result of orthodox Marxist school emphasizing

the opposition of perf ormer/appropriator to extractor.

dependentistas
simplistic.

'

Most

account of imperialist exploitation is

For them, it means a situation where a powerful

metropole siphons off the surplus material of a satellite
through the medium of MNCs or other agency, by applying

various forms of political coercion

(a

reflection of the

country's power), deceit, and trickery in the process of
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international commodity and
capital flows.
Some of these
forms of exploitation
specified by dependentistas
include
low wages paid by MNCs to
workers in LICs and unequal
commodity exchanges between
the LICs and ICs in favor of
the
ICS, as a result of the
monopoly position held by the
MNCs
based in the ic.« Each one
of these is considered to be
responsible for the ongoing plight
of LICs.
But a quick
glance at the development experiences
of Kenya and Tanzania
shows that international relations
is not a zero sum game.
Contrary to dependentistas claim,
Kenya, by allowing MNCs to
operate in its economy, has not necessarily
been exploited
(in a Marxist sense) though it may
have lost a nonclass
payment.
Tanzania, by contrast, has prohibited MNCs
from
operating in its socialist economy. its closed
door policy,
however, did not result in a self-reliant
economy as the
dependentistas has predicted. Instead, Tanzania
became even
more dependent on foreign aid for its socialist
programs.
We too understand Marx's concept of exploitation
to

refer specifically to the performance and extraction of
surplus labor.

The exploitation to which the others refer

to is not, in our view, exploitation in the Marxist sense

because the international exchange of commodities between
individuals does not occur as part of the process of surplus
labor performance and extraction.

Unequal development due

to unequal exchange, for example, wherein the wealth gain
for one country implies a loss for another, does not involve

the production of surplus value and thus no exploitation.
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Whereas for proponents of
unequal exchange, l ike Emanuel,
monetary flow is an index
of exploitation, in our
conception
it is a nonclass process
which may or may not influence
the
process of exploitation. it
follows that the elimination
of
unequal exchange via delinking
or some other means (and thus
a gain for the periphery
in the dependentistas
discourse)

would not, in our view, imply
any necessary change in the
rate of exploitation (and thus
no gain or loss)
Our theoretical approach, using
class and non-class
processes combined with overdetermination
as analytical
conceptual tools for analyzing a society,
provides us with
broader understanding of the concept
of exploitation,
development, and change.

a

Our approach recognizes the

importance of the other three paradigms because
conceptual
tools deployed in our paradigm enable us to
break

loose from

the narrow conceptual tools the others
rigidly employ.

Moreover, it enables us to be flexible in our
development
theory.

From our perspective, dependentistas proposals to

end unequal exchange not only would not necessarily
decrease

exploitation within the present approach.

It could conceiv-

ably increase the rate of exploitation.

Consider the following hypothetical situation, to
illustrate the essentialist position of the other paradigms.
Let us suppose, for a moment, that a British capitalist

establishes an enterprise in Kenya employing Kenyan
laborers.

If the "surplus value" 42 extracted is initially

appropriated by the British capitalist, then, according to
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this alternative theory,
the Briton occupies a
fundamental
class position.
this case, the British owner
exploits
the Kenyan laborers: from
this theoretical perspective,
exploitation does exist. Because
commodity production in
Kenya is feudal, the capitalist
also occupies a feudal
fundamental class position. For
him to occupy such a dual
or multiple class position
requires the presence of capitalist and feudal subsumed classes
as well as non-class

m

processes as their conditions of existence.
But it must be borne in mind that
such exploitation
does not exist in a vacuum. Contrary
to the other paradigms' claim, exploitation exists not
just because some

economic surplus is extracted and appropriated
by one group
or another, but also because of the dynamics
of numerous
other political, economic, cultural processes
that affect
exploitation.
Let us further suppose that the British capitalist

turns over the ownership of his enterprise to the Kenyan
nationals, and receives only rent from the latter for the

right to sell the produced commodities.

In this instance,

as in the previous one, commodity production continues, but

now the surplus labor is appropriated by the Kenyan capitalist.

In our theoretical formulation, the former British

owner now occupies a capitalist subsumed class position. 43
Nevertheless, the exploitation of the laborers continues
unabated.
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These examples illustrate that a foreign
capitalist

penetration in LICs economy and its profits does not
necessarily mean that, as many dependent istas assert,
foreign exploitation exists.

To conclude as such, without

closely examining the complex processes in the LICs,
is to
reduce the complexity to a mere phenomenon created by
exogenous means.

Such reductionist claims have forced

dependency theorists to make exaggerated conclusions like
the delinking of trade relations with the ICs as a solution
to the problems of development in the LICs.

These examples illustrate the dynamic and complex
nature of the processes that determine exploitation.
also suggests that agents (societies) are not static.

It

They

may change from occupying a fundamental class position to

a

subsumed class position, or even occupying several conflicting class positions simultaneously.

They also should illustrate how our alternative theoretical approach offers, inter alia, a broader and more

flexible understanding of the complex relationship between
ICs and LICs, and the social whole within LICs as opposed to

the deterministic approaches taken by neoclassical develop-

mentalists and orthodox Marxists.

It is also meaningless to

merely show the presence of MNCs operating in

a foreign

land, and suggest, as many dependentistas do, that it is an

instrument of exploitation.
MNCs,

in our alternative approach, are understood to be

an overdetermined site of struggles and political alliances

among contradictory domestic and
foreign classes and nonclasses.
Hence even if LICs successfully
carry out the

nationalization of MNCs (e.g., Tanzania),
this does not
eliminate the flow of surplus value in
the form

of shares

(profits) to occupants of subsumed and
non-class positions;
indeed, it may even increase it.
Current problems of Kenya
and Tanzania best illustrate that there
is no shortcut to a

sustainable development in today's LICs.

An attempt to redistribute wealth, as in
Tanzania, may
even set in motion complex effects and lead
to an increase
in exploitation if,

for example, sales of traditional

exports fall off as a result of tax increases, compelling

exporting firms to lower their prices and costs, via an
increase in the rate of exploitation.

A wealth

redistribu-

tion could interact with other processes in a variety of
ways to influence exploitation. 44
Class or non-class conflict over the appropriation and

distribution of surplus value, as well as class or nonclass interaction, in any social formation are complex,
contradictory, and changing.

The understanding of any

social formation requires the employment of enriched concepts, such as those deployed by Resnick-Wolf f

,

who offer an

alternative which could remedy the theoretical deficiency
created by the preceding theorists

1

deployment of narrow

conceptual tools.
The use of overdetermination concept as an analytical

framework will also prevent theorists from making such
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statements as that surplus absorption,
unequal commodity
exchange, or simply the direct
exercise of imperial power
will perpetuate dependency,
freeze the international division of labor and make it
impossible for industrialization
to take place in LICs/ 5 We
have seen how this logic led
Frank and his cohorts to conclude
that LICs must delink or
decouple from the capitalist world
system if they want to
develop.
if one accepts this logic, then
one is also

forced

by it to sympathize with such
policies as that of Pol Pot in
Cambodia, since he too adopted autarkic
policies by severing
trade relations with the outside world.
But from millions of
people killed there, it is safe to say that
"bad theories
are like bad medicines," and can lead
society to a tragic
end.

Consequently, such theories must be avoided at
all

costs because they can be used to justify killing
people.

Conclusion
We believe that with the use of the concept of class
and non-class processes as a conceptual entry point,
along

with the use of the concept of overdetermination, we can
produce an enriched knowledge of LICs development problems
and strategies, which produce no deterministic conclusions

based on only one aspect of social processes.
While we do not deny the three essentialist theorists'

contribution to knowledge, we reject their deterministic and
essentialist conclusions based on, inter alia, epistemological grounds.

We also object to the use of class to
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construct concepts such as development,
growth, exploitation, and underdevelopment reduced
to questions of only
one aspect of the many processes.
Instead, our conceptual
tools and our theoretical framework,
as developed by Resnick
and Wolff, should be employed for the
analysis of concrete
social situations in any social formation.
The practical outcome of this is that
Kenya and
Tanzania, and by implication other LICs, no
longer have to
adhere rigidly to one paradigm to guide their
development
path, as many of them seem to have done with
disastrous

consequences.

Rather, the alternative paradigm will allow

policy makers in these countries to jump from one
paradigm
to another (hold multiple theoretical positions)

in order to

search for the best theoretical tool for their particular

problems facing them in the rapidly changing international
arena.

Consequently, a democratization of paradigms will

follow in which certain discursive fields that have been
suppressed, criticized or "drowned out" by the dominant

paradigms, will have an equal "opportunity" in an open

discourse.

Previously suppressed social, political-

economic, and sexual-political or cultural fields would be

able to compete freely with the coercive power of a

normative transcendental "science" conceived as absolute
knowledge.
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APPENDIX
MAPS

MAP

1

Source:
Africa Today: An Atlas of Reproducible Pages
llesley, MA: World Eagle, 1983).
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MAP

2

Source:
Africa Guide: A Comprehensive Appraisal of the
Continent and Up-To-Date Political and Economic Analysis and
Essential Information (Chicago, San Francisco, and New York:
Africa Guide Company, 1977)
288

MAP

3

Source:
Africa Guide: A Comprehensive Appraisal of the
Continent and Up-To-Date Political and Economic Analysis and
Essential Information (Chicago, San Francisco, and New York:
Africa Guide Company, 1977)
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UGANDA

Seat*

MAP

4

Source:
Jannik Boesen, Kjell J. Harnerik, Juhani
Koponen, and Rie Odgaard, eds., Tanzania:
Crisis and
Struggle for Survival (New York and London: African
Publishing Company, 1986)
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MAP

5

Source:
Jannik Boesen, Kjell J. Harnerik, Juhani
Koponen, and Rie Odgaard, eds., Tanzania:
Crisis and
Struggle for Survival (New York and London: African
Publishing Company, 198 6)
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